


**The United
States**



and



Canada

**Political Systems,
Policy-Making
and the Middle East**



The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) was founded in March 1987 by a group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals in Jerusalem - Al-Quds Al-Sharif.

PASSIA is a Palestinian non-profit institution with a financially and legally independent status. It is not affiliated with any government, political party or organization.

PASSIA seeks to present the Palestinian Question in its national, Arab and international contexts through academic research, dialogue and publication.

PASSIA endeavours that research undertaken under its auspices be specialized, scientific and objective and that its symposia and workshops, whether international or intra-Palestinian, be open, self-critical and conducted in a spirit of harmony and cooperation.

PASSIA's projects include a series of seminars on Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, Strategic Studies and Security, the European Union, Education on Democracy and Foreign Policies of Arab States. This seminar program provides a much needed focus inside Palestine for training Palestinian graduates in international affairs with lectures and discussions held by the highest quality Palestinian and foreign specialists.

PASSIA's involvement in the question of Jerusalem remains extensive. It hosts regular workshops which address different but inter-connected problems concerning the Holy City such as access to information, holy sites, Israeli settlements, and viable future municipal arrangements as capital for the two States.

PASSIA cooperates and coordinates with other Palestinian institutions both inside and outside Palestine in its persistent efforts to ensure a wider understanding of Palestinian issues.

PASSIA, by providing a forum for the free expression and analysis of a plurality of Palestinian perspectives and methodology, strives to develop and clarify its own and others' understanding of international relations as they affect the Palestinian struggle for justice and peace.

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TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



PASSIA Seminar 1998

**THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLICY-
MAKING
AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

PASSIA, Jerusalem
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

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PASSIA seeks to present the Palestine Question in its national, Arab and international contexts through academic research, dialogue and publication.

With its Education and Training in International Affairs program, PASSIA has pioneered educational seminars for Palestinian graduates. This seminar program provides a much needed focus inside Palestine for training Palestinian graduates and mid-career professionals in the field of international affairs with lectures and workshops held by the highest quality Palestinian and foreign specialists. Where possible, fellowships or study visits abroad are awarded to the most outstanding seminar participants.

The PASSIA Seminar 1998 on *The United States and Canada: Political Systems, Policy-Making and the Middle East* was kindly supported by the Ford Foundation.

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INTRODUCTION

PASSIA's seminar on "*The United States and Canada: Political Systems, Policy-Making and the Middle East*" was part of PASSIA's annual "Training and Education in International Affairs" program.

The Seminar 1998 aimed to train Palestinian graduates about the "*The United States and Canada: Political Systems, Policy-Making and the Middle East*" and to apply this knowledge to regional and international affairs. It is part of PASSIA's endeavor to meet the needs of the Palestinian community for formal education, training and practical experience in an area that is receiving increasing attention as Palestinians define and address their own political and economic needs.

PASSIA hopes that this seminar will enable Palestinians to continue the process of state-building and to enhance relations and understanding with others in the international community.

The following report contains the transcripts of comments, lectures and presentations made at PASSIA during the seminar as well as a summary of the subsequent discussions. Some of the presentations given by the American diplomats during the seminar were off the record, therefore PASSIA cannot proceed into publishing them.

In the appendices, one can find information about the lecture program, the lecturers, the Palestinian participants, and a list of relevant reading material.

We also thank most warmly the American and Canadian diplomats, the guest lecturers from the United States, Canada and Europe, and all the local and regional scholars whose lectures and expertise contributed greatly to the success of the seminar.

Last, but not least, the PASSIA team would like to thank the Palestinian participants for their comments and enthusiasm to learn about the political systems and policy-making in the United States and Canada towards the Middle East.

Jerusalem, September 1998
The PASSIA Academic Committee

SEMINAR PROGRAM

1. Preparation

PASSIA consulted with Palestinian, American, Canadian and European scholars in order to plan and implement the seminar. Consultation began in September 1997 and PASSIA advertised the proposed seminar in the local press, *Al Quds* and *Al-Ayyam* during the month of November 1997. Notification was also given to national institutions such as universities, research centers, and institutions of the Palestinian National Authority. No travel, accommodation, food or other expenses are required from participants nor any fees for undertaking the course. The seminar was supported financially by the Ford Foundation.

2. Participant Selection Procedure

PASSIA formed a committee specifically for the preparatory stage of the seminar. Its members were: Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Dr. Rosemary Hollis and Ms. Deniz Altayli. PASSIA received applications from all over the Palestinian Territories, and all applicants were invited for interviews. The Program Coordinator, Dr. Rosemary Hollis, came from London specifically in order to conduct the interviews, which took place over the period 16-25 December 1997 in Jerusalem, and Ramallah, respectively. The Committee selected 14 of the interviewees to participate in the seminar plus four reserves.

3. Reading Period

The lecturers provided each participant a list of reference materials covering the topics addressed in their respective lectures. Required reading material was photocopied and distributed to the participants in January in order that they could familiarize themselves with the concepts of the seminar beforehand. Each participant received a reading package including assorted articles and essays amounting to approximately 300 pages.

During the seminar, the lecturers distributed further reading material on their subjects and additional material recommended by the lecturers was available for the participants at the PASSIA library. The reading period included the preparation of a background paper, whereby each of the 14 participants was assigned a specific topic on which to collect the required information. PASSIA Program Assistant Ms. Sawsan Baghdadi was at the participants' disposal for whatever help they needed regarding their research work and was, as Seminar Assistant, available for further questions that might have arisen.

4. Lecture Program

From 16 to 27 February 1998 a series of lectures, workshops and other educational exercises was given by the Palestinian scholars and foreign experts. In addition, representatives from the diplomatic corps in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv gave presentations on certain topics. The participants themselves presented their background research papers that they prepared as part of the one-month preparatory reading period.

5. Writing Assignments

Participants were required to write two essays. The first one, a background paper in English on a certain topic assigned prior to the seminar itself, was submitted at the beginning of the lecture period. The assignments centered around subjects such as the basic characteristics of the USA and Canada (geographic characteristics, natural resource base, population size, age distribution, literacy rates, skilled and professional classes, main ethnic and religious groupings, size of the economy (GDP or GNP), per capita incomes, main features and/or dominant sectors in the economy), the political system of the USA and Canada (constitutional arrangements and formal institutions), foreign policy decision-making in the USA and Canada (which institutional players/personalities have most weight in foreign policy decision-making and how they interact or bargain with each other) and foreign policy interests of the USA and Canada. The participants presented these topics during the seminar.

The second essay on topics studied during the seminar was required for submission by 27 March 1997. Seminar lecturers had compiled a list of suggested titles for these essays and participants selected one each for analysis.

Participants who performed all required tasks were handed a certificate acknowledging their successful participation in the seminar program.

6. Publication

PASSIA recorded all sessions and discussions of the seminar. This seminar report contains transcripts of all the lectures and summaries of the discussions.

7. Advanced Studies

Based on their performance during the seminar, the PASSIA Academic Committee nominated the two most outstanding candidates from among those seminar participants who fulfilled all requirements, Hind Khoury and Jamal Abu Khadijeh, for a field trip to the US, which was kindly facilitated and arranged by the United States Information Service (USIS) in Jerusalem. Furthermore, another two outstanding fellows, Hayat Dabus and Saed Abu Hijleh, were nominated and subsequently selected to participate in the International Leadership Program 1998 of the UN International Leadership Academy (ILA) at the United Nations University in Amman. The Leadership Program seeks to enhance the commitment of leaders and potential leaders to UN values; participants have the chance to learn directly from important successful leaders, regional and global.

WELCOMING ADDRESS

Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the PASSIA program on Training and Education in International Affairs, which this time deals with the subject of *The United States and Canada: Political Systems, Policy-Making and the Middle East*. The timing is opportune, not only due to the role of the two states in the Middle East Peace Process but also in light of the current Gulf crisis.

The question I would like to put before you in this context is can we study the policies of the US and Canada scientifically without concentrating only on their relationship with the State of Israel? My answer is yes, we can and we should, for there are different major establishments in these states that all play a role when it comes to assessing their respective national strategic interests and sharing the responsibility of decision-making. In the US, for example, the various components of the political system are the White House, the Congress, the State Department, the security and military apparatuses, and the economic and financial establishments, in addition to the media and educational and scientific institutions. Clearly, one of the responsibilities of the US President in making political decisions is to balance the positions and interests of these various bodies.

Coming to the current crisis in Iraq, we are all aware that the issue is not limited to international sanctions but extends to the ongoing threat of a second Gulf war. Whilst bearing in mind this environment of war, it is possible to imagine several hypothetical scenarios. I now intend to present the four scenarios that I consider the most credible.

The first scenario evolves from the current contact between the UN and the Iraqi Government and involves continuous efforts toward a diplomatic solution, which began with UN General Secretary Kofi Anan sending a high-level UN delegation to Baghdad to negotiate on the implementation of the UNSCOP mission. The Iraqi Government was receptive to the delegation's mission and made an official statement in which it said that it would open the eight controversial locations for the UNSCOP inspection team, whose head, Mr. Butler, said that his delegation was aware of the sensitivity on the part of the Iraqis concerning their sovereignty over these locations. Russia's promotion of a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi crisis and its opposition to any military attack against Iraq was also expressed by other UN Security Council members with the exception of the US and Britain. In the region, King Hussein urged Mr. Kofi Anan to go to Baghdad and talk to Saddam Hussein directly. The majority of other Arab leaders voiced similar sentiments, being aware of the fact that they would be unable to contain the anger of the Arab masses much longer. In Palestine, people took to the streets to protest the US stand, despite a PA decree forbidding such public demonstrations. At the same time, the American public expressed its disapproval of a military strike against Iraq, which was clearly reflected in the media and in numerous statements.

The bottom line is that Mr. Anan's visit to Baghdad will take place as soon as possible and he will be able to convince Saddam Hussein to allow the UNSCOP delegation to carry out their investigations in full in return for a plan to lift the sanctions on Iraq under the banner of 'Food for oil'. Although this would represent a major victory for the UN, it would also lead to the legitimization and strengthening of the Iraqi regime.

The second scenario involves a limited American military strike whose aim is to totally cripple the Iraqi military institution. This is the preferred course of action of the US administration, which would have the full support of Israel, assuming that Iraq does not meet the UN conditions. Such a limited military strike

would guarantee that the UNSCOP mission would continue without further hindrance and more than satisfy the Kuwaitis and Saudis, although it could result in the division of Iraq into a Kurdish, Shi'ite and Sunni state. Such a division, which may be considered an exaggerated hypothetical conclusion, would pose a serious threat to regional security. Syria and Turkey in particular would oppose by any means the possible establishment of a Kurdish state.

Another possible outcome of such a limited military strike is the emergence of a new Iraqi leadership, be it through a *coup d'état* or the disappearance of Saddam Hussein.

The third scenario is the Israeli option. The Israeli right-wing government headed by Mr. Netanyahu has been trying its utmost to change the Oslo environment of peace in the region into an environment of war and confrontation. In the previous Gulf Crisis in the early 1990s, the Shamir government was contained by the US administration, but this time around the Washington-Tel Aviv relationship is taking very different directions and the vast differences between Netanyahu and Clinton and Shamir and Bush are becoming all the more apparent.

The Israeli option is to attack Iraq from Israeli and Turkish military bases. Israel continues to use the pretext that it is living in constant fear of a second round of scud attacks against its territory and the threat of an attack with biochemical weapons. Israel conveniently disregards its peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and appears to underestimate the anger of the Arab masses and its implications for the entire region. This particular scenario should be taken very seriously, taking into consideration that Israel represents a strong military power in the region. Nevertheless, it is pending on the failure of the diplomatic solution as well as a possible limited military strike on the part of Washington.

The fourth scenario involves another all-out war against Iraq. The likelihood of such a war taking place and its imminence are clear in the recent statement of Crown Prince Hassan, which reads as follows: "It is a matter of hours. It is not a matter of days, it is not a matter of weeks, it is not a matter of months; it is a matter of hours....This is a very serious and dangerous situation." The Crown Prince adds that those concerned should work very fast for a diplomatic solution, especially by encouraging the UN General Secretary to go quickly to Baghdad and prevent the situation from deteriorating even further.

As we witness the increased deployment of US and European troops in the region, lending even greater credibility to the growing concerns over the threat of a military strike against Baghdad, there is widespread recognition of the fact that none of the regional powers are in a position to challenge the US. Nevertheless, since the majority of the members of the international community have voiced the opinion that a military strike is undesirable, one of the three previous hypothetical scenarios is more likely to materialize into real action on the ground.

In conclusion, envisioning various scenarios while taking into consideration the given balance of power and the components influencing decision-making is one of the ways to understand international politics. In the case of the US policy towards the Middle East it can be said that it has been more or less consistent throughout the changing administrations, having been based on the American interests in the region, namely the oil factor, certain alliances (first and foremost with Israel), and related strategic implications. The current US-Iraqi crisis is but further proof that it is these same American interests that inevitably determine much of what goes on in our region, both in times of peace and times of war.



Lectures and Discussions Part I: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

The State in the International System : Alternative Theoretical Frameworks ¹

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

Why Theoretical Frameworks Are Important

Faced with an immensely complex world, we have to sort out what are important and what are unimportant facts if we are to make sense of things. Analysis requires that we have a theoretical framework to determine which pieces of information we need most and which we can discard. Our theoretical approach, or paradigm, will guide what we look for and shape our perceptions of the world, whether we are aware of this or not.

Political scientists and others engaged in the study of international affairs may make theory sound grand and complicated. They are simply trying to articulate the assumptions underlying different approaches to international relations and organize them into coherent schools of thought. What you may think is common sense, the International Relations Theorist would identify as your personal theoretical approach, which may or may not resemble one of the schools of thought developed by the academic theorists. It could incorporate elements of different theories.

In any case, theoretical frameworks are not optional. They are necessary. We need tools of analysis and it is useful to be explicit about our in-built theoretical approaches and to benefit from the work of political scientists who have worked out the different strands.

Here we shall look at the three branches of theory that have come to dominate the study of international relations in the West. The three are: realism, liberalism and World-System Theory.

The Three Main Schools of Thought in Brief

Realism identifies states as the main actors on the world stage. They have sovereignty that cannot be overridden by any supra-state or international body. It sees states as engaged in a quest for or struggle for power, which will in turn produce a prevailing balance of power. Military force represents an important facet of power. The balance of power in the Cold War era was dictated by the rivalry between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. States maneuver and bargain in accordance with the international system dictated by the prevailing balance of power. In any case, they act in the name of something called the national interest.

Liberalism is sometimes called pluralism. At one extreme it may take the form of Idealism, but in any case the liberalism school embodies a belief in progress, which is one of the facets of this approach that contrasts with realism. States are not the only actors on the world stage: others such as NGOs and multinational corporations feature too, depending on the 'issue area' under consideration. Thus, there is no such thing as the national interest. To a liberal, what the realist calls the national interest is simply the outcome of bureaucratic bargaining at the domestic level. Cooperation is possible and desirable between the various actors in the world and order results from international agreements between differ-

¹ This lecture draws specifically on the work of International Relations Theorists published in a volume of *International Politics and Globalization*, edited by Steve Smith and John Baylis.

ent actors at different levels and in regard to different issues. This school, therefore, highlights the phenomenon of interdependence between states and peoples within the international economy and the global ecology or environment.

World-System Theory is also known as structuralism or neo-Marxism. According to this theoretical framework, world politics take place within the context of world capitalism. Within this global economic system the most important actors are not states but classes and the system is characterized by class conflicts. In the global economy World-System Theorists discern a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery. Within the semi-periphery and the periphery areas there are cores that are linked into the capitalist world economy. What matters here is the degree of economic autonomy enjoyed or attainable by the various players in the system.

Realism

The core components of realism are as follows:

- Anarchy predominates at the systemic level, since there is no international body capable of enforcing laws on all states.
- States are sovereign bodies capable of enforcing laws, since, by definition, they hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a given territory. States are the most important actors in the international system.
- States are unitary, rational actors, engaged in a struggle for survival and power.
- Security exists only within the state.
- It is assumed that the units (usually states) in the system act rationally and calculate forces.
- Military force is ultimately the most decisive facet of power.
- National ambitions and threats to survival are permanent.
- The imperative factor and source of order in the international system is the balance of power.
- It is impossible (and thus unrealistic) to operate in the system on the basis of ethics.
- Power is used rationally, not morally.
- The goals of states are based on national interests.
- Geopolitical factors play a key role in the definition of states' goals.
- The personified state is what international relations is all about—not class conflict, ideology, law or the bureaucratic process.

Key criticisms of realism include the following:

- On empirical grounds: States are not the only important actors in the system. Other units or actors can challenge the power of the State from above or below and play a crucial role in determining outcomes in certain issue areas.
- On moral grounds: The statist view fails to provide a way for the world to respond to collective concerns such as environmental degradation and disease.
- Also on moral grounds: If states must always judge on the basis of ends not means, what limits are there to what they can do in the name of national survival?
- On empirical and normative grounds: The expectation that states will inevitably prefer self-help or self-sufficiency to collective action or regional integration is misleading and not necessarily accurate.

Liberalism

Liberalism has evolved largely in reaction to realism and sometimes appears to gain the upper hand. The establishment of the United Nations was one such instance of liberalism, or idealism, triumphing over realism though the Cold War then took control of the system.

The core concepts of liberalism include:

- ❑ Collective security.
- ❑ Conditionality: Economic benefits are distributed by states or institutions to developing countries on the basis of their meeting certain conditions deemed 'good' by the benefactors or donors.
- ❑ Democracy: Both national governments and international institutions should be run democratically. This is justified on the basis that democracies do not make war with one another. Furthermore, the goal should be to encourage regionalism and international integration through democratic institutions such as regional parliaments like the EU and a democratic and accountable global parliament to replace the UN.
- ❑ Enlightenment: A belief in secularism, progress, reason, science, knowledge and freedom.
- ❑ Idealism: A quest to institutionalize the rule of law at the international level. (The foundation of the League of Nations was the brainchild of the idealists who enjoyed ascendancy at the end of World War I.)
- ❑ Integration and the notion of ramification: The objective is regional and international integration between states and the belief is that cooperation in one area will encourage it in another (ramification). The process is usually expected to start with cooperation to solve technical problems, which then builds into a pattern of cooperative regimes.
- ❑ Interdependence: A process is at work whereby societies and states are becoming ever more interdependent and decisions made by one actor in one setting will affect others around the globe.
- ❑ The liberal ideal: Liberty of the individual is the core value of the ideological orientation of Liberals. Generally, the belief is that the state is necessary to preserve individual liberty from harm by others. But, unlike in realism, for which the state is the master, in liberalism the state is the servant of the collective will.
- ❑ Liberal internationalism: The natural order of things is for people to cooperate and therefore the more contact there is between peoples across state and geographic boundaries, the more the natural order of harmony of interests will prevail over the perverting effects of undemocratic states and the balance of power.
- ❑ The normative imperative: Theorists should concern themselves with what ought to be rather than just analyzing what is.
- ❑ Pluralism: Rejection of Realist ideas on the primacy of the State and the coherence of the State as an actor.
- ❑ Peace through world government.

Liberalism has been open to criticism recently in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, which initially looked like the triumph of liberalism.

Because liberalism assumes the pursuit of progress or normative goals like peace, human rights and international cooperation on environmental protection, it is subject to conflicting visions of what goals to pursue. For example, some liberals might argue that developed countries should intervene in the internal wars of other countries (such as the former Yugoslavia) in the name of protecting human rights in those countries. Other liberals, however, could argue against putting the lives of the citizens of one country at risk in order to protect the human rights of people in another country. Alternatively, some other liberals might argue against imposing the norms of one country on the people of another.

Typical of the liberalism school is a belief in the universal 'good' of democracy, capitalism and secularism. Liberals are therefore open to charges of 'Western imperialism' wrapped in moral guise.

World-System Theory

This theoretical framework provides a description of how the structure of global capitalism (which is the hidden or underlying determinant of the way the world works) divides the world into core areas of prosperity and peripheral areas of poverty and dependency. To illustrate the point: one third of the world's population consumes most of the available resources, leaving the remainder to exist in poverty. If the distribution were more equitable, then the great pockets of wealth that now exist could not. Therefore, the wealthy minority depends on preventing the poor majority from escaping their plight. This is 'zero-

sum' logic, completely at odds with liberal idealism, which believes that progress can embrace and benefit all through cooperation.

Thus World-System Theory places economics at the heart of its analysis. This, of course, contrasts sharply with the Realists' emphasis on the ascendancy of military force and the balance of power between states. Marx laid the groundwork with his dialectic on relations of production. Lenin built on this to define the relations between core and periphery that is imperialism.

The core concepts of World-System Theory are as follows:

- The key unit of analysis is a world-system, that is the geographic area governed by the logic of one system. (The Roman Empire could be considered one such world-system.)
- Holistic approach: All the elements within the system are inter-linked and politics cannot be separated from economics. Also, the system is essentially self-contained: all developments within a system can be explained by internal factors.
- Classes are actors within the system.
- Core and periphery: Spatially, the system comprises core, semi-periphery and periphery areas.
- Historically there have been two types of world-system: world-empires and world-economies. The modern world-system is a world-economy and incorporates the whole globe.
- World capitalism: The capitalist world economy is the modern world-system and as such the structure within which domestic and international politics take place and which determines the pattern of political relations.
- Resources within the modern world-system are transferred from the periphery to the core through the mechanism of the market.
- (Wallerstein) process or dynamics at work over time within the system include: cyclical rhythms (boom and bust/growth and depression), secular trends (the long-term trend; system does not revert to the original beginning with each cycle), contradictions (certain behavior is beneficial in the short run for certain actors, but not in the medium term), and crises (produced by interaction of other three dynamics and heralds the collapse of the whole system).
- Stability within the modern system is provided by the emergence of an inter-state system in which states in different areas (core/periphery) play different roles; plus the existence of dominant ideologies of liberalism and scientism.

Criticisms of current World-System Theorists include:

- Questions concerning the definition of capitalism on which it rests.
- The approach is too deterministic.
- It interprets events in accordance with the theory and allows for no alternative explanations.
- The semi-periphery may contribute more to instability than to stability.

Equipped with these three alternative theoretical frameworks, it should be possible to discuss the meaning of so-called 'globalization' in relation to each. Also, how one determines the place of the US and Canada within the international system will depend on which theoretical framework one is using. Similarly, definitions of the national interest vary according to the theoretical approach employed.



The Phenomenon of Globalization ²

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

According to political theorists Steve Smith and John Baylis:

“By globalization we simply mean the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away. A globalized world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected, and also one in which they have more impact.”

Prominent facets of the phenomenon include:

- ❑ The World Wide Web, e-mail, satellite communications, worldwide TV networks, global pressure groups like Greenpeace, global franchises like McDonalds, Coca Cola and Pizza Hut;
- ❑ the international economy, including investment flows and the global production systems;
- ❑ military strategy is conducted on a global stage (including psychologically through the media);
- ❑ fashion items, e.g., jeans, Barbie dolls;
- ❑ global environmental concerns;
- ❑ disease control, e.g., AIDS.

The crucial question for international relations is whether ‘globalization’ has introduced a wholly new world or just a development of the old. The case for arguing that globalization is something wholly new rests on the following key arguments:

- ❑ The speed of economic transformation: states are no longer discrete units able to manage their economies in isolation. Governments are powerless or very constrained in the face of global economic developments that impact on state economies. Trade and financial transactions are of a new order of magnitude and expanding fast.
- ❑ The spread of electronic communications has allowed for instant contact with other parts of the world, leading to the development of new social groups or societies and transnational networks. As a result, people will develop new and multiple identities.
- ❑ A global culture links urban settings around the world, with these having more in common with each other than surrounding national hinterlands.
- ❑ Homogeneity seems to be increasing, with distinctions between cultures, peoples and values diminishing.
- ❑ Time and space seem to be collapsing. Our old ideas of geographical space and of chronological time are undermined by the speed of modern communications and the media.
- ❑ A global polity is emerging with people identifying and according loyalty to new political agendas that have nothing to do with state boundaries.
- ❑ People think more and act more in global terms.
- ❑ Risks are seen as global and beyond the intervention of the State.
- ❑ The territorially rooted sovereignty of states is undermined or challenged by the phenomena beyond state control, such as international bond trading, multinational company operations, and information flows.

The case for dismissing globalization as a catch phrase and not a transformation of the world-system rests on the following:

- ❑ It is no more than the latest phase of capitalism. The openness of the world economy today is not unprecedented or unique. Very few companies are genuinely transnational. There is no shift of

² Again this lecture draws extensively on the collected volume compiled by Steve Smith and John Baylis.

capital from the developed to the underdeveloped world but quite the contrary. The main trade and financial flows are not global but within and between three blocs: Europe, North America and Japan. The system could be controlled if these three blocs decided to coordinate and regulate.

- ❑ The effects of the phenomenon are very uneven. Only a minority have access to the facets of globalization such as the World Wide Web.
- ❑ Globalization could well be Western imperialism in disguise. Non-Western values are being lost.
- ❑ It is the triumph of liberal capitalism in certain parts of the world that is worsening the plight of those on the periphery. Meanwhile, it entrenches the hold of the most developed and technologically advanced on the system.
- ❑ The effects are not necessarily 'good'. International crime can exploit the phenomenon.
- ❑ Accountability is harder to operate and transnational actors are not democratic. If anything democracy had a greater chance of flourishing in a state centric system than it does in a global village.
- ❑ Some of the most successful players in the global village do not espouse the values thought to be predominant.
- ❑ Globalization has triggered a revival or resurgence of nationalist, religious or particularist movements and hence resistance to it.
- ❑ Geography, military power and the State are still powerful determinants of the fate of peoples.

The Realist Response to Globalization

The Realist school appeared doomed with the end of the Cold War. The most optimistic interpretation of globalization, that it is the triumph of liberal ideals, is, however, at odds with reality and thus the Realist school is comfortable with its approach even in the era of globalization. Realists expect war, punctuated by periods in between when states prepare for war. This could well describe what to expect in the coming years. Globalization could have made us all more vulnerable not more secure. Backlash nationalism and resort to force characterized the war in Yugoslavia. The conflict in the Gulf can be seen as the projection of US power and values, not as either an anachronism or a misrepresentation of events.

The Liberalist Response to Globalization

Liberalism was boosted by the end of the Cold War but is now going through a crisis. For one thing there are competing strands, which do not sit well together. For another thing wars have torn countries apart despite greater international interdependence. US military intervention was seen as necessary to end the Yugoslav war, and it is a key factor in the current Gulf crisis. True, globalization has been characterized by a spread of liberal economic values, but, as discussed above, only in the most developed pockets and areas of the world. The fact that globalization is not intrinsically good and that democracy is in retreat in the new global and regional organizations and amongst the transnational actors does not reinforce liberal belief in progress. Also, there is a backlash against the spread of liberal values, which are seen as culturally determined and not universal.

The Response of World-Systems Theory

World-System Theorists acknowledge the central characteristics of the globalized economy, polity and culture, but they see nothing unique or novel in the trend. Rather they see it as a progression of the phenomenon of global capitalism. Meanwhile, they notice that globalization is cited as an excuse to reinforce business interests over those of the community, or workers and the poor. The State, it is argued, is powerless to control economic forces and the market must decide. However, they see dangers looming that may spell crisis and demise for the modern world-system. Ecological damage is rendering resources more scarce and even the elite are affected by environmental dangers. Workers can no longer be bought off with expensive welfare systems in the core areas. They also see a crisis for liberalism that threatens order and obedience within the state system, which has helped stabilize the modern world-system. The result, argue World-System Theorists, will be chaos (and possibly barbarism) and/or the emergence of a new system.



The US and Canada in the International System

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

Participants were invited to discuss how the US and Canada feature in the international system, in accordance with the three alternative theoretical frameworks already identified and discussed at some length. These are: realism, liberalism and World-System Theory.

Realism

Within the framework of realism it is easy to discern that the US will be considered the most powerful state or actor in the world, indeed the only superpower. This is important because, according to realists, states are the most important actors on the world stage. They alone can provide security, which essentially only exists within any given state. At the global level anarchy prevails, though the power balance between states may provide a sort of order. This was very clear during the Cold War years, when the global order consisted of a bipolar power balance between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the US and its allies on the other.

Although the US enjoys predominance in the post-Cold War world, it may not always be engaged in conflicts around the globe. The order that prevails is patchy and dependent on the US projecting its power. When it does so, it can be expected to prevail unless confronted by a more powerful coalition of states. However, coalitions could be transient or operate only in certain contexts. As a single entity, the US possesses the single most powerful military in the world. Even its NATO allies lack the capabilities possessed by the US. For example, in the operation mounted to protect Kurdish refugees who attempted to flee from Iraq to Turkey in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 and were turned back at the Turkish border, Britain, France and Italy could not manage between them and needed the capabilities of the US to make the operation effective. More blatantly, it was the US that took the overwhelming lead in the liberation of Kuwait and the war would not have happened without it. Indeed, the prevailing view is that the Gulf War would not have happened if the Soviet Union had still been in a position to challenge the US and counterbalance its power in the world.

These examples serve as proof, according to realists, that military force is the most important facet of power in the world - the ultimate decide. From a realist perspective, the US can be expected to act in pursuit and protection of its own national interests. These will determine when it becomes engaged and when not. It was able to give up its intervention in Rwanda because vital interests were not at stake. In the Gulf, however, the access to vital energy resources was perceived to be at risk and so the US not only acted to oust Iraq from Kuwait but established a sort of 'Pax American' in the area thereafter.

According to the realist school, meanwhile, Canada ranks as only a middle or small power. It is dependent on the US economically and is in no position to challenge it from a military point of view. The population of Canada is only about one tenth of that of the US, which in part explains why the size of its economy and military are so much smaller. From the realist perspective, therefore, Canada has little choice but to try to remain on the right side of the US and will act in concert with it in order to have some influence on the world stage.

Liberalism

The liberalism school takes alliances and collective security arrangements much more seriously than the realist school. Therefore, it will put more emphasis on the power of NATO than of its individual members and when NATO acts it will be more compelling than when the US acts alone. Similarly, if the US acts with the blessing of the UN, this will be seen as more effective as well as more acceptable and moral by Liberals. Respect for International Law is both achievable and desirable for liberals. Under International Law, Canada can claim rights to the same extent as the US can and Canada's role in international peacekeeping gives it status according to liberals.

In keeping with the scale of values identified by liberals, economic development goes together with free markets and democracy. The fact that the US is both democratic and capitalist helps to explain, from a

liberal perspective, why the US enjoys prosperity and is accorded a leadership position. Liberals also do not expect democratic, capitalist states to fight with each other. Therefore, they do not see the US as a threat to Canada, simply a natural partner in economic life and the pursuit of democratic values. Canada, just like the US, can serve as an example to others.

Meanwhile, since liberals believe that states are not the only important actors on the world stage, they do not think that the US can always have its own way. It is constrained by international norms and rules of trade and by economic interdependence. Liberals distinguish between what multinational companies do and what states or governments do in the world. They believe that transitional organizations of environmentalists and philanthropic associations can influence the policy decisions of both states and companies. This dynamic will affect Canada and the US. And international organizations may provide Canada with opportunities to combine with others to influence the US.

Liberalism is thus an important tool for understanding why Canadians are actively involved in 'good causes' like helping Palestinian refugees. They believe that development aid, even if disbursed in small sums, can make a difference and that this can provide Canada with the means to influence events outside its borders, regardless of its relatively modest power in the world.

World-System Theory

According to this school of thought, states as such are not the key determinants of the balance of power. States operate within the context of a world-system determined by economics. Some will be identified as being at the core of this system because of the wealth they have accumulated and can generate. Other states will be located on the periphery of the global economic order, trapped in poverty and dependency. Even within states, meanwhile, there will be core and periphery areas and communities.

From the perspective of World-System Theorists, the US and Canada are located at the core of the economic order that prevails today. Nevertheless, they cannot be secure in this position. The internal contradictions that characterize capitalist economics portend the collapse one day of the global economy. Companies that have cut their costs down by substituting machines for people in the developed world and locating some of their operations in parts of the world where labor is cheap will eventually reach a point at which further savings cannot be made. Meanwhile, laying off employees in the name of efficiency reduces the number of people with money to spend and therefore reduces consumer spending. This in turn will hit the profits of companies. Equally, laborers in the peripheral areas cannot be allowed to earn more and consume more because this would draw off resources from the rich core. Any one company cannot respond to the demands of poor laborers for higher wages without losing out to more ruthless competitors. Therefore short-term thinking prevails with detrimental effects in the longer term for the players (companies) involved.

Canada and the US are simply areas of wealth at the core, rather than actors in the system, and since the system, determined by the dynamics of economic activity, dictates all that happens within it, neither the US nor Canada can ultimately avoid the consequences. For the time being, however, their governments will try to placate the demands of their citizens without having the power to alter the system itself, or, in other words, the power to deliver. They may profess to operate according to democratic principles, but since they cannot deliver, they will succumb to more totalitarian measures to keep a semblance of order in the face of economic forces beyond their control.

International Political Economy

It may be helpful, at this point, to introduce a model from the field of International Political Economy. A theorist in this field, Dr. Susan Strange, has developed a model to define the most important facets of power in the international system. She identifies four sources of power, which she compares to the four faces of a pyramid. The four together are thus mutually supporting and reinforcing. The four facets are as follows: the power of military force, the power to grant or deny credit, the power of production, and the power of knowledge.

This is a useful tool for assessing the relative power of different actors on the world stage. The US possesses a significant amount of all four types of power. Since all four reinforce each other, the chances are that the US can go on being powerful, contrary to what systems theorists contend. Canada, meanwhile, is a much lesser power in the world, given that it possess less of all four types of power than the US.



Defining the National Interest

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

Both the realism school and the liberalism school are useful frameworks within which one can define the national interest of any state.

Realism

This school maintains that the interests of a state are permanent and unaffected by changes of government within. What this means is that geo-strategic factors will determine the interests of any given state. These factors include: geography, resources, neighbors, and the prevailing balance of power.

Geography will determine the size and nature of the terrain. Switzerland, for example, has been able to adopt a non-aligned posture because the mountain ranges that surround it have provided natural protection from its neighbors. The US is a vast country encompassing a variety of types of terrain. Most importantly, it has two seaboards, giving many points of access for sea traffic east and west and affording it the benefit of not being surrounded by other states. It therefore has freedom of access to the rest of the world but can enjoy relative isolation. Canada is actually bigger than the US, but a large proportion of the country is uninhabitable and icebound in winter. Its eastern access to the sea is also constrained by weather conditions in the winter. Its relative isolation predominates over ease of access and obliges Canada to look southwards to the US for land communication.

The resources of the US are so abundant that it has been able to build up a very large economy within, regardless of external trading relations. It has massive stretches of arable land, sufficient water supplies (given proper management), and minerals, including fossil fuels. Canada too has good farming land and other natural resources. However, whereas the US has upwards of 260 million people, Canada has but a tenth of that figure. True, in both cases, education standards and skills are high, but the sheer distances in Canada render it sparsely populated outside the main urban centers and less integrated than the US. In other words the US benefits from a greater manpower base.

The proximity of the US is thus the determining factor for Canada's national interests, whereas the converse is not true. The only security problem posed for the US by its neighbors today is the potential for illegal immigration and smuggling from Mexico to the south. Neither Mexico nor Canada pose a military threat and neither do their economies represent rivals to that of the US, except in specific cases.

Having said this, the prosperity of the US does depend on its access to resources and markets in other parts of the world. For some years now, the US has been a net importer of oil. America is run on the motor car and the high percentage of car owners amongst the population, along with established patterns of consumption of electricity to run air-conditioning, heating, consumer durables like refrigerators and all kinds of other gadgets, quite apart from industrial needs, gives the US the highest rate of fuel consumption per capita in the world. This helps explain why energy resources in the Middle East are considered a vital interest of the US. Even though the Americans can import sufficient supplies from closer to home, from Latin America and West Africa, the health and growth of the economy depend not only on energy supplies but prices. Were supplies elsewhere to become unavailable, the cost of meeting US needs would mount, as it did during the energy crisis of the 1970s.

Export markets, meanwhile, are the key to expanding the US economy. The theory goes that the US entered World War II in part to prevent Western Europe from being overrun by a hostile power and thereafter helped to rebuild the European economies in the interests of ensuring that they could remain good trading partners. Also, according to the realists, the US could not withdraw into isolation at that point because the Soviet Union posed a threat to capitalist economics, on which the US thrives, and later became a nuclear power, capable of destroying the US physically.

For Canada, according to the realist perspective, the national interest is determined by its neighbor, the US. Canada has extensive investments and vital trade links in the much larger US economy. This means that what is good for the US economy is good for Canada, even if the relationship is one of dependence, and Canada has no choice but to 'get along' with the US.

Liberalism

This school of thought provides useful insights into how Canada has chosen to define and pursue its national interests. While not denying the compelling factors revealed by realism, liberalism suggests ways to maximize the benefits of alliance politics. Canada simply does not have the option of dominating the world stage like the US, therefore it must protect its own prosperity and well-being in more subtle ways. Inevitably it must work with not against the US, but beyond that it can champion causes like International Law, peace, and human rights, from which it too stands to benefit. Similarly, Canada depends on open markets and the effectiveness of regulations that protect businessmen wherever they operate. Thus Canada is essentially predisposed to enhancing the benefits of economic interdependence.

The US can afford to be more selective in its compliance with International Law and support for international organizations such as the UN. Even so, the values that the US professes to uphold and many Americans do espouse, embrace the concepts of democracy and free markets as universal goods.

Where liberalism differs from realism on the matter of national interests is in terms of choice. Realism says that states automatically act in their national interests, regardless of others. If policy-makers try to go against the dictates of geo-strategic factors and aspire to goals such as promoting world peace and human rights, according to realists, the results could endanger the state itself. For liberals, however, choices do exist, and they want statesmen to act in the interests of the collective good rather than from purely selfish motives. They believe this will benefit all in the long run. However, realists say you cannot count on others putting long-term goals and collective benefits ahead of short-term self-interest. Consequently, they argue, the only real option is self-interest or perish.



Decision-Making Theory

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Theories about how decisions are made are principally a facet of the liberal or pluralist approach to international relations. After all, for the realist school, the internal dynamics of domestic politics are a minor or irrelevant consideration. Realism assumes rationality on the part of states and sees them as unitary actors. Interests are permanent and states are assumed to calculate the costs and benefits of certain policies in accordance with state interests. The World-System school, meanwhile, focuses on the structure within which all actors must operate and assumes that their options are prescribed and proscribed by this structure.

For the liberal or pluralist school, however, states are considered important actors but not the only ones on the world stage. At the state/domestic level, not only are there interacting and sometimes conflicting interests and groups, but there are decision-makers whose rationales may have more to do with their personal ambitions than *'raison d'état'*, or indeed with their positions within bureaucracies.

A theorist called Graham Allison produced a set of three alternative models for how foreign policy-making takes place. These are summarized below.

1) Rational Policy Model

This model encapsulates how realists see the world. It serves as a contrast to the other two models. It assumes that the State or the government is a unitary, rational actor. State action is thus seen as a rational choice in which:

- goals and objectives are identified (national security etc.);
- available options are discerned in the context of the international marketplace;
- consequences are assessed in terms of outcomes, costs, and benefits;
- choices are made on the basis of net evaluation.

2) Organizational Process Model

The organizational process model assumes an ethos of behavior, an operational program.

Governmental actions are not choices but the product of organizational functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.

Organizations (foreign ministry, transport ministry, armed forces, etc.) operate according to their own standards regarding operating procedures and programs, e.g., training to automatically take orders in armed forces, the profit motive and accountant's bottom line in business.

Government options are dictated by available organizational resources, including the armed forces and how they operate, e.g., mobilization procedures.

Some factors involved in the process are:

- corporatism (or organizational ethos);
- each organization has its own agenda behind foreign policy;
- sequential attention to problems/goals;

- feeding information upwards as part of the standard operating procedure, which is resistant to speedy action/change;
- an existing repertoire of programs to call upon;
- uncertainty avoidance - all new information is fitted into a framework of knowledge;
- a range of decentralization versus control between government leaders and organizations;
- different arrangements for the interaction between the various bodies.

In conclusion, leading decision-makers receive only such information and assistance as an organization is capable of providing, given its role in the picture.

3) Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm

- Policy is an outcome of political bargaining between those in the government hierarchy.
- Government officials have separate and unequal powers over different aspects of the whole situation, as well as separable objectives in various sub-games.
- Individuals involved in decision-making have their own constituencies, personalities, background and 'baggage'.



Lectures and Discussions Part II:

THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE US AND CANADA

The US Political System (I): Separation of Powers

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When you start asking questions about US foreign policy, you will find that the answers are extremely complex. One could say, for example, that the American national interest in the Middle East is oil, which explains, or so it would seem, why the US is willing to put forces in the Gulf and why it was prepared to risk going to war in 1991. On the other hand, the fact that oil is America's national interest in the Middle East is not so obvious because when you actually look at the military budget, you find that the US spends between US\$50-90 billion a year on Gulf defense; clearly, you could afford to have the oil prices doubled and still be better off not having any military presence at all! This means that you have to ask questions about how you came to the conclusion that the need to protect America's oil supplies requires having forces in the Gulf. So even when you start off with a concept that seems so clear - in this case, the idea that America's greatest interest since the end of the Cold War has been oil - one should still refrain from rushing to make hasty conclusions. Although Americans believe that oil is the most important commodity, it is not oil that tells them what to do, nor is it oil that tells them to have military forces in the Gulf.

In order to think about how the American political system generates the idea that we are better off having a force in the Gulf, one has to understand how the American political system operates and how it generates such ideas. This is particularly important today, when the US is preparing to go to war against Iraq, even when many of the specialists in the area think that this is a bad idea, even from the US interest point of view. There is not much debate in the US about the pros and cons of going to war, the vast majority of the American public and members of Congress having simply assumed, according to automatic thinking, that it is the best thing to do in the absence of any successful diplomatic efforts. Any debate that does occur is restricted to the level of aggression and the basic objectives, not the question of the rights and wrongs of going to war in the first place; that question was answered very early on.

When studying the political dynamics that lead the government to make decisions that are hard to explain, one soon discovers that it is often not at all obvious why the US is doing what it is doing. Moreover, having developed a sense of the American political system internally where foreign policy is most often domestic politics, particularly since the end of the Cold War, one's tendency to believe in conspiracy theories gradually disappears. I wish American politicians *were* clever enough to devise conspiracies; that might not be too bad, given the fact that most of the time, there is no rationale for the policies as they are implemented.

The American Political System

When you look at the American political system as an outsider, it often appears very striking. At the moment, for example, almost all the world is puzzled why the President is being dragged into court because of a supposed sexual advance that he made toward Paula Jones - forget about Lewinski - when he was still only governor; apparently he proposed that they do something and she refused, and that was the end of the matter, but now she is taking him to court, claiming that in her estimation, the fact that she turned down his advances damaged her chances of promotion. The whole thing is unbelievable! A President, who is popular with the people, is being dragged into court with all that this entails emotionally and in terms of taking up the time of the most powerful man in the world, and he is as powerless as any other citizen, the one exception being that he has access to more resources to fight in terms of the legal system. He is being dragged into a court as helpless as the next man and the fact that he is President does not help him because the Supreme Court ruled that his position as President should not preclude his being taken to court. And then we have the Lewinski case, where a Congres-

sional oversight resulted in Congress appointing an independent prosecutor to investigate the President to make sure that he has neither abused his power nor otherwise broken the law. Why? Because what the founding fathers of the American political system feared more than anything else was the abuse of power. They disapproved of the monarchs who ruled most of the world and the first thing they wanted to guarantee was that in America, no single man or center of power would be able to dominate the others. They wanted to create a balance between institutional effectiveness and reducing the chance of tyranny, and that was how the American political system was created.

The Constitution was based on four principles, which were as important then as they are today. The principles are as follows:

- ❑ **Republicanism:** Republicanism is opposed to monarchy. It evolved from the idea that the elected representatives of the people should be the ones to make decisions, meaning that ultimately the power is the power of the people through representation. American Republicanism has become more and more dominant in the political system over time; the public has much more input in all branches of government than it ever did before, which explains why the centers of power are looking more and more alike.
- ❑ **Federalism:** What was intended was not to create a unitary central government, but to have some devolution of power and a balance between states and local power and central power in the federal government. There is an interesting relationship in the American political system between the power of the individual states and the central federal government, which has authority for some issues in all of the US.
- ❑ **The Principle of Separation of Powers:** This particular separation is the one that was designed especially to prevent any single center of power from dominating. The idea behind it was that you should have three different branches of government with different functions:
 1. The legislative branch, i.e., Congress, which has sole responsibility for making federal laws, the making of laws being its only purpose.
 2. The executive branch, which is essentially the Presidency as a chief executor of laws. Its functions were not very clearly articulated except in certain areas. The President was declared commander in chief of the armed forces, making him the highest-ranking person in the military with responsibility for making executive decisions. He also has the power to receive ambassadors, which ultimately means he has the power to recognize states. In this respect one is reminded of the quick presidential decision of President Truman in 1948, whereby he recognized Israel in spite of the opposition of most centers of power around him.
 3. The judicial branch, i.e., the federal court system, which is totally independent from Congress and from the President. Its basic function is to interpret the laws passed by Congress. The courts have the power to invalidate congressional or presidential actions by declaring them contrary to the Constitution, federal laws or treaties.

Although the branches have different functions in the system, there is much more power sharing than power separation, which has been the case throughout America's history. Moreover, all three branches are responsive to public opinion: the President because he is elected directly; members of Congress because they are elected by the public and are therefore affected by public opinion; and the courts because, even though they are supposed to be almost entirely unaffected by public opinion, they are ultimately affected. There are some states where judges are actually elected, and there is an ongoing debate as to whether this should be allowed, taking into account that it could undermine their ability to separate between public opinion and the law. At the federal level, however, the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate appoints them all.

In terms of the way the power has been shared, the most interesting example is the issue of war making. The US Constitution empowers Congress with the sole power to make or declare war, but in practice, this is not the way things have worked out. Presidents have been able to find other ways than declaring war to drag the US into actual war while agreements between the President and Congress and various new laws, such as the 1973 War Powers Act, have in fact given the Executive the right to go into battle without first declaring war.

During the Cold War period, i.e., 1948 to 1989, the American political system went through dramatic changes simply because the Soviet Union was perceived by Americans as being a huge threat to the US; that fear was used by different presidents to manipulate the system and build a huge national security bureaucracy to defend their interests and enable them to gain more power at the expense of Con-

gress. Presidents have often used foreign policy crises to draw power away from Congress because when people think they are about to go to war, they become more nationalistic and that draws the power more towards the President. When in 1950, President Truman sent the troops to Korea without declaring war on Korea, he called it a 'policing action'. Ultimately 30,000 Americans died; war was never declared, and Congressional authorization was not acquired, simply because Truman had decided to call the whole thing a policing action.

An even more striking example is the Vietnam War where the power was passed from Kennedy, to Johnson, to Nixon while hundreds of thousands of American soldiers became casualties in a war - probably the worst in American history - that had never been declared, and which had never received the authorization of Congress. Partly because of Vietnam, 1973 witnessed the passing of a law that demanded that Congress be consulted whenever the government sends a large number of troops into a foreign country. Even then, the President was given the authority to send forces and inform the Congress within a 48-hour period if he thought that this was in the national security of the US. Of course, should this happen, by the end of the 48-hour period and with the troops already on the ground, public opinion will always support the decision. In spite of the fact that this was not the intention, the President *does* have a tremendous amount of power, and although it was probably intended that only Congress could send forces to fight an offensive war, whereas a President could send forces to fight defensive wars if danger was imminent, the reality is somewhat different.

It is interesting that Bush felt he needed Congressional approval to go to war against Iraq. At the time, we witnessed probably the most interesting Congressional debate to have occurred in recent years with people asking some very serious questions about whether American troops should be committed or not, and it was a very close vote. Every president, including Bush, has argued that there was not really the need for Congressional approval for war, so what Bush in fact was saying was that he would prefer to have Congressional approval, even though he felt that he had the right to go ahead without it. Today, President Clinton is saying the same thing, and the reason why we are not likely to see war this week is not because of Kofi Anan going to Baghdad, but because Congress is out this week; I do not think Clinton, in this divided international coalition, is going to go without Congressional approval when he is almost certain to get it.

There is clearly a separation of power between the presidency and Congress, but there are also checks and balances. The current investigation of President Clinton is a good example, as is the attempt to impeach President Nixon in the 1970s; Congress had the power to ask questions and to investigate, and if he was found to have violated American Law, it had the power to impeach him, i.e., to remove him from office. This has never happened, by the way, and Nixon ultimately resigned. The Judicial Committee in the Congress voted to have him impeached, but there was not a full vote and Nixon decided to resign before the full vote was taken.

Impeachment can also be applied to federal judges who, once appointed by a president and approved by the Senate, become judges for life. Obviously judges can be criminals too. There was a judge, for example, who was convicted of tax evasion but who refused to resign, saying I will pay my dues, but it is your duty to keep me as a judge forever, which, according to the law, was correct; there was nothing that said a convicted judge should be removed, so Congress was obliged to obtain a two-third majority vote to impeach him.

Although the President has much more power than Congress, especially with regard to foreign policy, no one is totally independent. The President has the right to appoint a judge, but the Senate has to approve the appointment, and if it does not, the appointment is invalid. It should be noted, however, that the President has the edge because he can say if you turn down my first candidate, I still have another candidate who is a Democrat like me. It is part of politics.

Where it becomes really interesting is at the Supreme Court of the US, which is the highest court of the land. What is decided there cannot be overturned except by the Supreme Court itself. In essence its judges decide the law unless a new law is legislated by Congress to supercede it. The Supreme Court hears about 175 cases a year from the 4,200 presented to it. Most of these cases come to the court from the federal courts of appeal. Each case must raise an issue covered under the Constitution, federal laws or treaties. For the cases the Supreme Court refuses to hear lower court decisions stand. Four or more (of the nine) Supreme Court Justices must agree that a case warrants their consideration for it to be placed on their docket. The Solicitor General, a presidential appointee and the third-ranking official in the US Department of Justice represents the federal government in suggesting whether cases

should be granted or denied reviews. The justices undoubtedly also look for clues in the requests for review that a case is particularly important.

About 15 cases heard by the Supreme Court each year come to it under its 'original jurisdiction' or authority to hear before any other court "all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a state shall be a Party." (Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution). The Court's review of all its cases results in about 140 signed opinions a year. Few Supreme Court decisions make national news, as most are not of interest to the general public, but some are so important they cause uproar among those who disagree with them and affect the lives of millions of Americans, such as 'Brown v. Board of Education' in which the Supreme Court ruled in 1956 against racial segregation in public schools and in the 'Roe v. Wade' case and related abortion decisions, in which the Supreme Court extended the right to privacy to include a woman's right to an abortion early in pregnancy. The decisions of the Supreme Court became the precedents lower court judges use to rule in similar cases.

For more than 200 years, the Supreme Court has had the power to invalidate federal laws, but it has done so only about 100 times. Although the most-publicized rulings are controversial, they rarely depart from majority sentiment. Presidents and Congress know that actions taken for political reasons can be reversed by the Supreme Court, as when President Nixon refused to hand over the Watergate claims after he had been subpoenaed. The Court denied his claim of executive privilege.

We have a case now where Congress and the President got together and decided on new legislation, the so-called 'Line Item Veto'. The US budget is passed by Congress, but the problem is, every Congressman is trying to protect his or her personal interest or his district's interest, so they try to make bargains; a Congressman from Illinois who wants a road to be built to a certain town will put that in the US budget whilst promising some kind of an advantage to someone in Ohio, and so they make all these little deals and the system is unable to do anything about it. In order to get out of this mess, it was decided that the President should be given the right to veto specific lines in the budget. The Congress and the President passed that law because it was a sensible thing to do, but other groups took it to the Supreme Court, which decided it was illegal. That is how the system operates in those arenas.

At least building roads is a good cause, but sometimes you find things much worse than building roads brought into these laws, usually because a particular member of Congress has been promised a lot of money by someone with a vested interest in seeing it included. All Representatives do it, which is why they do not want to see things changed. In addition to the big lines, they always hide a couple of extra little things here and there in order to get somebody's vote or support. A tremendous amount of federal money is wasted on projects that make no sense, but one has to remember that the one priority of each member of Congress is to get reelected; that is what drives them, and it is the most dominant theory in American Congressional politics.

Most of the appointments in the judiciary branch are political ones. People are rarely appointed as federal judges unless they are very well known and accomplished lawyers, and there are always political issues involved. Clearly there is a lot of interdependence, and the separation of powers is a myth. A president does not know most of the people appointed to be judges, but simply follows the recommendations of the Justice Department. What really matters most is Supreme Court appointments because these nine judges make the big decisions. Supreme Court judges are chosen for life, and usually they are appointed late in their career. Filling vacancies gives presidents influence on the legal system long past the end of their own terms. Candidates are subject to intense scrutiny by the Senate and the media.

I will now give a brief description of Congress, the executive branch and the courts. The Congress is an interesting institution that was established through bargaining, which characterizes the rest of American politics. As the Founding Fathers were deciding on a constitution, they were trying to figure out what kind of legislative body they wanted. The small states of the union wanted every state to have the same number of representatives as the big states whereas the big states wanted proportional representation, so they bargained back and forth until they decided to have two houses: a Senate with an equal number from each state and the House of Representatives, with proportional representation, meaning that today, the Senate has 100 members, two from each of the 50 states. What is really interesting is that the House of Representatives started out with only 65 members or so, making it much smaller than the Senate but as the US grew, the number of members grew until there were 435. Naturally, this undermines their power: if you are one out of 435, you have much less power than you would have if you were one out of 65 members. It eventually became very hard to manage such a huge institution, which resulted in a decision being made to limit the number of members to 435. Today, representation is still proportional but recalculations are done based on the national census every ten years. If California be-

comes bigger and New York becomes relatively smaller, then they simply take away some members from New York and give their places to representatives of California. Each representative is elected by a specific Congressional district, in most cases an area within each state, but some states with low populations have at least one representative.

The members of the House of Representatives are elected every two years. The original idea was to allow for a good relationship with the constituency, but that was before it became obvious that the representatives were becoming more reliant on the money constituency than they were on securing the votes of the voting constituency. Each member of Congress is obliged to spend hours and hours on the phone, day and night, speaking to constituents and to people who can bring money in for the campaign. They literally finish one election one day and start working toward the next straight away, thanks to the two-year term. The system is different in the Senate, where every member is elected for a six-year term and elections are staggered so that you have only one third of the members standing for election every two years.

In essence, there really is not that much difference between the House and Senate; laws are passed by both. The House has exclusive right to impeach, i.e., formally charge federal officials such as the President and federal judges with serious crimes, but the Senate acts as the court to try impeachments. The Senate must approve important federal appointments (e.g. judges, ambassadors) and must approve treaties. When the Founding Fathers created the US, they seemed to think that bills, i.e., new laws dealing with money, are important because they have to do with raising funds, so they gave the right to propose such laws only to the House. In fact, this was a meaningless distinction because any law still requires votes by both the House and the Senate. In general, either of them can pass a law, but once it has been passed in one chamber it needs to be passed by the other, which means that both chambers have to negotiate the exact terms of the law because they both need to pass it, based on exactly the same wording. Not surprisingly a lot of negotiations take place between the House and the Senate whenever a new bill is proposed, and only when a law is modified by the Senate to the liking of the House will it finally become effective.

In order for a law to be passed it needs a two-third majority, but it is also possible to have laws passed with a simple majority in both houses if the President signs the bill. The President, however, has the right to veto the law, in which case Congress has two choices. One choice is to say we do not like your veto, and they say that by having a two-third majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, i.e., they say we override your veto, and the law passes anyway, although it rarely happens that way. What happens usually is that they enter negotiations; they will ask, what will it take for you to support this bill? The President will then say, if you make this change, then I will approve it, and they begin to bargain. In other words, it comes down to power sharing most of the time. The House negotiates with the Senate and then they both negotiate with the President. The whole thing is about bargaining.

Each house is organized into a majority party and minority party, each with its own leadership. Today, we have a Republican majority leadership and a Democratic minority leadership. Each chamber is broken into committees, for example, the Agricultural Committee and the International Affairs Committee, after which come the sub-committees. Typically, a law is first proposed to the sub-committee, after which it goes through the committee in the Senate for vote.

The rules on committees vary. In general, a chairman of a committee used to be able to also chair a sub-committee but this changed recently when the Republicans won the majority, which is one reason why the Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East was abolished. One naturally assumes that the sub-committee was erased because it was not needed or for the sake of saving money, but the truth of the matter is that there was a Republican Congressman named Benjamin Gilman who had tremendous interest in the Middle East. Gilman is from New York and he has a very substantial Jewish constituency including an Orthodox community that cares a lot about Israel. Because he was chairman of the International Affairs Committee, he could not become chairman of the Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East, so he simply decided to abolish the committee and bring up all the issues of the Middle East in the context of the International Affairs Committee. The fact that one man decided to abolish the entire sub-committee for his personal interest was never questioned because the leadership was perfectly happy to eliminate a committee that was both time-consuming and costly.

It should be noted that although members can be members in more than one committee, they are not allowed to chair more than one committee. In the main committees, there are usually 40-50 members, whereas in the sub-committees the number is usually somewhere between 15 and 20. Some committees are more desirable than others are. One would probably assume that the most desirable committee in Congress is the International Affairs Committee, but actually, no one is really interested in joining

because Americans, in general, do not care about foreign affairs. It should be remembered that committees are extremely important for shaping Congressional policy.

With regard to the presidency, we think of the presidency mostly as the President, but the President has executive institutions, which are very important. The President is supposedly elected directly by all Americans, unlike the members of Congress who are elected by district. The Senators of course are elected by the state because they represent the state, so if you live in California, you have the right to vote for two senators, but if you are voting for a member of the House of Representatives, you only vote for the one who represents your district because it is a smaller-scale event.

Although Americans vote for the President in a nation-wide election, he is actually elected by what is called an electoral college; the college is proportional, so every state can choose a certain number of electors, which depends on the population of the state, to join an electoral college. Anyone can run for the Electoral College, and once selected, the electors go into a meeting and vote for the President. The original idea was that in theory, the elector would decide which presidential candidate should receive his vote and the community would have enough faith in him, a member of an educated elite, to respect his choice. What happened, however, is that because of increased democracy, the public did not accept the idea of voting for someone without knowing who he was going to vote for, and now everyone running for the Electoral College states who he is going to vote for.

The number of electors is somewhere in the hundreds. It is not particularly meaningful because in essence you are voting for the President, and not for the elector. The entire system is nothing but a way of being faithful to the Constitution without being faithful to the Constitution, so to speak.

It should be noted that presidential elections generally coincide with other elections, such as the election of members of Congress, which take place every two years, one third of the senators, and sometimes even a governor of the state, so when you go to the ballot box, you could possibly find six or seven offices to be filled, including, in some instances, a district attorney or local official. Even if you do not know the candidates at the local level, it is easy to find out who is Democrat and who is Republican and make your choice accordingly.

The President can hold office for a maximum two terms. It sometimes happens that a president will not finish his term. Nixon, for example, was forced to resign before the end of his term and to hand over control to his Vice President Gerald Ford, who later ran as a Republican candidate and lost to Jimmy Carter. The vice president is elected too (one must vote for the running mate of the presidential candidate one prefers), and if a president serves out his full term, the Vice President usually becomes his party's leading candidate in the next presidential election. This means that the American public wants to know who is running for vice president because there is always a good chance that a president might not finish his term and they want to know who will take over. It is clear that the position of vice president is a token position; most of the time, vice presidents are simply waiting for their chance to take over, although they keep very busy, laying the foundations to generate funds for the next elections. Gore, for example, is busy grooming himself for the presidency and attempting to secure greater support.

In general, the President does not govern individually; apart from Congress you have bureaucracies - the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and so forth. The President does, however, have enormous power because it is he who appoints the heads of all these departments: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor, and every single cabinet secretary. But the Senate has to approve each of the appointments and it occasionally prevents someone from being chosen. The President will almost always appoint somebody from within his own party, although the present Secretary of Defense, William Cohen is actually a Republican who was appointed because the President wanted to have some token Republicans in his Cabinet, although this particular appointment was not so 'token' because it involves an extremely important position.

Each of these departments is huge. The Defense Department, the Pentagon, is the largest single bureaucracy in the US Government with one million employees, excluding the military forces. Health and Human Services, meanwhile, has something like 225,000 people working for it. In contrast, the State Department has a relatively small workforce of some 25,000 people.

As to salaries, they vary from very low to extremely high. You can make US\$100,000 in federal jobs. But if you need a new Secretary of the Treasury you want to bring someone with tremendous experience, and it is hard to tell someone in the industry who is making US\$2 million per year as Chairman of the Board of General Motors or something similar that you are going to offer him US\$100,000 or US\$200,000 a year and that he is forbidden from doing anything on the side because of a conflict of interests.

With regard to the National Security Council, it is a relatively new institution that only really formalized during the Kennedy administration. Every president has had advisors around him separate from the State Department and other departments. Each department has its own bureaucracy. Every bureaucracy includes political appointees. These professional bureaucrats are usually experts in their field, and it is they who give advice to the Secretary, who is usually a person trusted by the President. Generally speaking, most presidents do not fully trust bureaucrats because the bureaucracy consists of one million people and professionals with different party affiliations. Realizing that it is not possible to have control over them, presidents try to have their own appointed staff of just a few people around them, and that is how the idea of the National Security Council emerged. Today, the President has a National Security Advisor and a small staff that advises on certain issues that are important to the US but do not require Congressional approval. Unlike in a bureaucracy, you control money, you have a budget and you run people. As a member of the small White House staff, you are basically a counsel to the President, who makes the decisions as to what to do with your advice. Incidentally, the White House is connected from underneath to a building standing next to it called the Old Executive Building, which is where the staff works.



The US Political System (II): Interest Groups, Lobbies and Public Opinion

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Who decides in America? What is the American political system really all about? This is best understood by focusing on its Republican and pluralist aspects and, to a lesser extent, on Congress and lobbies. Many people have the not totally unjustified impression that much of what happens in the US with regard to the Middle East happens because of the role played by American Jews. Indeed, this is quite true. But what is so puzzling is that American Jews constitute only 2.5 percent of the population. Why, then, do American Jews have a significant influence on Middle East policy when their number is so low?

When discussing the role of domestic politics, i.e., lobbies or organized groups that try to influence Congressional decisions, people mention, for example, AIPAC - the American-Israeli Political Action Committee - as being extremely important. However, taking into account that the organization's budget is around US\$20 million per annum, it is difficult to understand why the American political system is so responsive to AIPAC and not to organizations such as oil companies, which would think nothing about spending far more than US\$20 million if they thought it would affect a decision in Congress. In spite of their access to large sums of money, oil companies could not arrange a deal with Iran, nor could they have policy reversed on certain other issues. Why? If lobbies matter, what is it about lobbies that matters?

The idea that American democracy means that a majority prevails is an absolute myth. The American political system was not designed to be about majority rule, but about a system of pluralism, whereby a majority of people prevail on issues they consider important. It is not about the majority of Americans being questioned on every single issue of foreign policy, but about the issues with which they are most concerned. The Chicago Council for Foreign Relations Survey confirmed that if you ask the vast majority of Americans what countries are most important to the US, Israel is not among the top five countries. But their answers mean very little, because most Americans simply do not care about foreign policy, or about the majority of issues. What you have to do, therefore, is to find out *who* cares in the American political system about political issues and *why* they care.

In order to do this, I looked at various surveys in which Americans were asked to express their opinions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. I found, for example, that according to the polls, the majority of Americans were sympathetic to the idea of a Palestinian state, which has been the case ever since the 1980s. So why was it that American policy did not reflect this support?

Along with John Krosnik, I designed a public opinion poll in order to discover how deeply Americans care about such issues, taking into account that in the American political system, Americans are only going to make a difference when it comes to issues they care about. We asked: "How important is the Arab-Israeli conflict to you personally? Is it among the top three issues? The top five issues? Or is it not among the top five issues?" We soon discovered that the majority of Americans claim to care about the issue and have opinions on the issue. If you ask people "Would you like to see a Palestinian state?" many will answer yes, whereas, if you ask them, "Is this an issue that matters to you?" they will answer no, so I went one step further and asked, "Is this an issue that you take into consideration when you vote for a candidate?" to which the vast majority replied 'no,' as they did to other important questions, such as "Is this an issue that would encourage you to give money to a political candidate because of his/her position?" or "Is this an issue that would cause you to write to your Congressman/ the editor of a newspaper to express your views?" or "Is this an issue that you would call a radio chat show to discuss?" The answer was always 'no', which means that the majority of people do not have a reaction: they have opinions, and they listen, but they do not really care - in other words, they are irrelevant.

In general, then, politicians do not care about the majority of Americans, whereas they care very deeply about those who say, yes, this is an issue that we care about a great deal, an issue we vote on, an issue that would encourage us to make campaign contributions to candidates because of their position. This is the segment of the public that politicians care about, and when they are deciding what position to adopt on the Middle East, for example, they first look around to see what segments of the public are interested. In the US, the group that cares most deeply about the Arab-Israeli conflict is American Jews.

One of the most common misconceptions when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the idea that it is really one group, the American Jews, that controls in America. The fact is that there are other groups that also have influence. One good example concerns the decision to expand NATO. The vast majority of European and foreign policy experts say that NATO expansion is not a very good idea, yet the government decided to go with the expansion because most of the public does not really care, but certain segments care a lot, especially the Americans of Polish and eastern European extraction, and it was much more important for the government to be responsive to them. It is clear, therefore, that domestic political calculations are not made on the basis of majority views, and all the public opinion polling that we have done reveals that there is a difference between the opinions of those people who care a lot about an issue and the opinion of the majority. Moreover, there is a huge difference between the behavior of the people who care about the issue and the behavior of the majority, so by and large, the American political system is responsive to those people who care. This applies, of course, not only to foreign issues, but also to domestic issues: the agricultural lobby in America, for example, exerts substantial control over agricultural policy.

One could say that the fact that the American political system is responsive only to those people who care goes against the basic principles of democracy, but it all depends on what one means by democracy. A majority rule is not a democracy. If, on the other hand, one thinks a democracy is respectful of pluralism, that according to this system not everybody gets what they want, but most people get what they want most dearly and minorities are not discriminated against, then it is not necessarily a bad system.

There are of course issues about which most Americans care. Most Americans care when it comes to war and the possibility of Americans losing their lives. They care about economic issues too; the reason Clinton is popular now despite the Lewinsky affair is that the economy is doing so well and people vote on economic confidence. It is quite natural for people not to care about every single issue. How many Palestinians, for example, follow what is happening in Rwanda and Pakistan, and even if they care, how many are going to vote for the members of the Palestinian Legislative Council on the basis of what they think about Rwanda? How many are willing to write a check for human rights in Haiti? Why should the Middle East be the most important issue for Americans?

Basically, the US political system is all about bargaining: the Poles get what they want, the Cubans get what they want, and the Jews get what they want, and there is always somebody who pays some price. This is the way the system works even at the popular level and ultimately every power, including the power of Congress and the power of lobbies, depends on this basic rule at the popular level because it is a combination of pluralism and Republicanism and because ultimately, members of Congress need people to vote for them. AIPAC does not just deliver US\$20 million a year, it also delivers votes.

At this point I want to take a look at how a mobilized community can matter in the American political system. First, people talk about the percentage of American Jews being only 2.5 percent but American Jews are very involved in American politics. Whereas approximately 50 percent of all Americans do not vote in the elections - and the percentage is even lower at the primary level - the American Jewish voting percentage is double that of the general population. This means that essentially the 2.5 percent of the population become closer to 5 percent of the actual voting constituency, so at the grassroots level, first of all, the electoral power is bigger than it seems.

Second, the Jewish community is not spread all over America, but clustered in key states, i.e., the larger states; all the presidential candidates, when calculating where they are going to have to win to make it, first look at the big states, and California, for example, is the home of 45 members of the House of Representatives, which indicates how important it is in terms of size. New York is the second largest state and here, as in California and the other key states, you find a large Jewish population.

Third, the American Jewish community is one of the most philanthropic communities in the US. In the American political system, no one gives more than the American Jewish community. I am not just talking about giving to political causes, but also to libraries, art museums, social organizations and charities, which is one reason why Americans regard them as good Americans, aside from the Arab-Israeli conflict. They are also involved with politics and they give huge amounts of money to politics that are far in excess of what one would expect from only 2.5 percent, or even five percent, of the population.

One reason they give so much is that they learned from their experience as a minority that was persecuted throughout the 20th Century. The other reason is demographic. Looking at the percentage of Jews among the total population is sometimes meaningless; you need to look at the extremely high percentage of American Jews who belong to the educated upper income elite, because they are the ones who are active in politics, who make huge financial contributions, and who run for office. If one looks at the American legal profession, for example, which provides America with a large proportion of its politi-

cal candidates, you will find that a very large percentage of American Jews are lawyers while a very large percentage of lawyers are American Jews. That is the demographic reality. So in spite of the fact that American Jews represent only a tiny proportion of the total population, this is not reflected when it comes to their level of effectiveness.

As to the level of individual contributions above US\$1,000 to the National Democratic Party and to the National Republican Party, over 40 percent of such contributions come from American Jews. In fact, in the last election, the percentage for the Democratic Party was over 50 percent. American Jews are very involved in the political life in America, which explains the high level of contributions and the fact that so many of them run for office.

In 1950, over four percent of the American population was Jewish, but due to a gradual decline the figure is now somewhere between 2-2.5 percent. However, in the 1950s the Jewish community was not of the same class; it was not involved in politics and probably only about 1.5-2 percent of the members of the House of Representatives were American Jews. By 1990, however, the percentage of Congressmen who were Jewish had risen to ten percent. In short, one should not put too much emphasis on this grassroots percentage of 2-2.5 percent as being very important.

In order to understand how things work in Congress, one has to take into account the fact that Congressional business is done mostly through committees, which are extremely important, because it is through committees that laws are generated. A committee is the forum where policy is discussed and where expert witnesses or policy-makers are questioned. Thanks to the media, the public sees the transaction that takes place within the committee and that becomes the core focus of policy. But how do committees work? Who becomes a member of a committee? Who selects? In the old days of Congress, it was the leadership of Congress that was mainly responsible for deciding who should join the various committees. That still applies today to a certain extent, especially with regard to committees where there is much competition for membership. Take, for example, the Appropriations Committee; everybody wanted to be a member and the leadership had to decide whom to appoint because there was so much competition. Other committees, however, witness very little competition. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been one of the least popular, at least since the end of the Vietnam War; either members have to have a personal interest in foreign affairs or they have a constituency that cares a lot about foreign affairs. Most members do not want to sit on it. Another committee, the Agricultural Committee, has about 45 members, all of whom are farmers or from a farming district, which is not particularly surprising; after all, who else is going to become a member of a farming committee? In general, one can tell the leadership that one would rather be on a certain committee and most of the time, assuming there is not much competition, it will approve the appointment.

Congressman Lee Hamilton was the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and yet he comes from Indiana, a state where, supposedly, people do not care about foreign policy. Joining the committee had not been his choice: he had originally asked the leadership to put him on the Appropriations Committee, but they told him in no uncertain terms that there was no way in the world they would do that because of his relatively young age and so they 'stuck' him on the Foreign Affairs Committee instead. Eventually, he discovered he actually liked it and people thought that he was good at his job, which gave him some clout at the national level and encouraged him to stay. Most people are not like that and therefore, because of the self-selection, a fourth of the Foreign Affairs Committee members are Jews who mostly come from Jewish districts. Indeed, you suddenly find that the 2.5 percent of the population that is Jewish has 25 percent representation, or about 45 members, in the Foreign Affairs Committee. On the other hand, of the three or four members of the House of Representatives who are of Arab origin, none are members of the committee.

With regard to the few Congressmen of Arab origin, Senator Spencer Abraham from Michigan, which has a fairly large Arab district, is interested in foreign policy and appears to make a difference. At the same time, Nick Khayat, another Arab American representative in the House, has also tried to be outspoken on Arab-Israeli issues.

I once conducted a survey among members of the House of Representatives asking how much they, their voting constituency and their fundraising constituency cared about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those who cared deeply about such issues were far more likely to be members of committees that dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, the Representatives who did care represented 25 percent of the Foreign Affairs Committee and close to 40 percent of the Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle East, which was the Sub-Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1990. I then went one step further and, bearing in mind that it is not membership alone that indicates interest, it is also who attends meetings and speaks, I examined Congressional hearings over a period of a few years and counted every single sentence that every single member had spoken to see who had spoken the most. Those

people who ranked the Middle East issue highly in their priorities were the ones to speak the most, and so what was originally a very small percentage was responsible for 60 percent of the total content of the speech produced by a hearing. The American political system is about the groups that care most deeply about an issue and American Jews are not an exception to the rule (which goes against the general belief in the Middle East that they are).

Most members of Congress first and foremost want to be reelected. In this respect it is interesting to note that the vast majority of members get reelected no matter how badly they do. Public opinion polls show that the vast majority of Americans do not respect members of Congress and see them as the 'pits' of the political system and yet 90 percent of the members get reelected. Because of this, members know that the rest of the public is not all that important as long as they get certain groups to vote on issues with which they are involved.

When it comes to the question of whether, for example, we should move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, one has to take into account that a Congressman, if he wants to be reelected, must decide upon both the benefits and costs of that decision. He will think to himself, if I vote for it, people will vote for me and I will have a good chance of getting some campaign contributions, whereas if I do not vote for it, not only will I lose out on votes and contributions, but I will pay a cost. What is the logic of voting against it?

I actually interviewed Lee Hamilton, who was one of only 30 members out of a total of 435 who voted against moving the embassy and asked him what kind of logic he had used and why other people had not used the same kind of logic. Before even answering my question, he told me that his decision had cost him around US\$100,000 in terms of campaign contributions; remember, he gained no one's vote. So why did he do it? "Because," he said, "I thought it was in the national interest." When I asked him what he thought the national interest was, he told me that he had talked to State Department professionals, Defense Department professionals, the intelligence community and the President and had made up his mind on the basis of what he heard from them. "Their conclusion is that it is a bad idea," said Hamilton, "and having thought about it, I see that it is a bad idea and I am willing to pay the price." Hamilton, who had neither American Jews nor American Arabs in his community, was a very secure member who had been elected by landslide after landslide and was not affected by his decision. He did mention, however, that he would be forced to explain himself to the churches - his is a very low income, religious community - because as churches they would undoubtedly approve of the idea of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

When trying to understand the relative ineffectiveness of the Arab American community in the American political process, it cannot simply be attributed to the fact that theirs is an ineffective lobby; a lobby is not able to deliver votes and a lobby is not able to ultimately affect elections. AIPAC is effective because it has grassroots support; a US\$20 million budget does not buy elections, and a win or defeat could be guaranteed by the oil companies at any time if that was the only issue. You must have grassroots politics. At the institutional level, there are Arab American organizations that are doing reasonably well given their limitations, such as the National Association of Arab Americans, the Arab American Institute, and the Anti-Discrimination Committee, etc., all of which are well-organized and increasingly in tune with the political scene in America, even though this was not always the case. They know Congressional politics, they know public opinion, and they speak as Americans, which again was not always the case. One of the problems that Arab Americans had over the years was that they continued to think of themselves as Arabs living in America as opposed to Americans of Arab origin and so they did not speak the language of America; they kept speaking in terms of 'us Arabs versus you Americans', which certainly did not help their cause. Whereas an American Jew understands very well that he or she is an American and has the right as an American to speak as an American and to be a Jew in America, Arab Americans have only just begun to learn that not being American enough is part of their problem.

At the institutional level, however, Arab Americans are more American and they are able to speak the language of America. The problem is at the grassroots level, and it is very complicated. One part is demographic: Arab Americans have lower income than American Jews and lower income people tend to vote less, contribute less, and participate in political life less; they are not part of the politically active elite, so that is clearly a problem statistically. There is also a cultural problem. Perhaps because Arab Americans come from non-democratic traditions, some, but certainly not all, do not recognize that they have the capacity to affect politics. In the Arab World, by and large, there are no democratic traditions of consequence that will allow people to think that they can make a difference, and there is tremendous apathy. And then, of course, there is the problem of contributions. When Arab Americans first arrived in America, particularly the first generation, they did not contribute to politicians much, and the same could be said of Arab Americans today. In fact, they have a very poor record of contributions, and not only with regard to this or that member of Congress. The Arab American Institute will tell you, for example, that it has a really hard time getting even its dues from members! Most organizations have to resort to

foreign countries for funding, and it is clearly preferable to get funding from Arab Americans than to receive money from industrialized oil countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, or another foreign country.

The bottom line is that Arab Americans are not yet a force, although it is clearly only a question of time because we know that these things are generational. Irish Americans, for example, were also irrelevant at some point in American politics whereas they now play a very important role. Acceptance and a voice are things that American Jews earned over time and things that Arab Americans could also earn over time, but it is going to take time and effort.

Another problem is that Arabs are not united. They do not have the same issues: Lebanese Americans do not necessarily have the same agenda as Palestinian Americans and so forth. American Jews, on the other hand, in spite of their religious backgrounds, are culturally and ethnically Jewish, which lessens the damage that could be caused by the fact that they are not totally united. They do not all feel the same way about issues: some are on the left, some are on the right, the majority are Democrats but others are Republicans and so forth. They do not even agree on the various issues surrounding the peace process, but they have institutional mechanisms for organization. The synagogue is the cultural institution where they get together - even the non-religious community attends during the holidays - and there they share not only their culture but also information. In fact, in the survey that we did on public opinion, we discovered that by and large, people who care a lot about an issue do not get their information from the media, but by being members of a certain political or religious organization, which makes institutional mechanisms extremely important. In that sense the American Jewish community is extremely organized at the grassroots level. Arab Americans, on the other hand, many of whom do not attend uniform mosques or churches on a regular or even irregular basis, do not have that kind of mechanism for political mobilization at the grassroots level.

Moslem Americans are more likely to be a political force than Arab Americans, partly because of their numbers. The Moslem community in America is growing rapidly and will probably outnumber the Jewish American community in a very short period of time. There is, however, a problem, inasmuch as whereas the Arab American community is diverse, the Moslem American community is even more diverse, being mostly non-Arab and comprised mainly of Pakistanis, Indian Moslems and Black Moslems. It is a community that rarely shares the same view, except when it comes to issues pertaining to discrimination. It should be noted that we are still talking about the same demographic factors in terms of the low income and diffusion and division that apply to the overall Arab community.

Moving on to the ability of Arab Americans to influence foreign affairs, the first thing that one has to take into account is that Arab Americans constitute a smaller percentage of the population than Jewish Americans. However, even if the numbers were equal, the bottom line for a politician would not be whether the voters were Arab or Jewish, but whether they were going to give him their votes and get him reelected. You have to be part of the political game; if you are not, nobody is going to pay attention to you. Native Americans, for example, do not have a significant share in the political system, again, because they are not using the system properly and because their socioeconomic status makes it difficult for them to be effective. They have some legal autonomy in various places in different states, but they do not play a big role at the level of national politics.

Congress is not the only factor or even the most important factor in foreign policy: there is also the executive branch. The President is elected and has to worry about being reelected like every member of Congress, but the bureaucracies, which have established traditions, are primarily professional and outlive presidents; their job has been to define the national interest, which the President will advocate in a bargain with Congress. It is not, therefore, that Congress prevails, but that the wishes of Congress are taken into account in a national bargain with the executive branch. The problem has been that in the past 20 years, i.e., since the epoch of the end of the Cold War, the executive branch of the American Government has become much more responsive to the same kind of forces that operate on Congress than it was before, which could eventually lead to some very serious problems.

In the short term, here is what it has meant: When you ask a scholar on American foreign policy "What is the American national interest?" he will ask the same question of the State Department. Most professionals have the same views as the State Department, the National Security Council and the Defense Department. They have the power to define what American national interests are. There was a time when people thought that these wise men and women - mostly men for a long time, now increasingly women - had the absolute right to determine the American national interest, partly because people thought that there was something objective about the national interest, that if you were smart enough, you could simply sit back and think, oh yes, America's national interest is so and so. That was the case during the Cold War because everything was structured - we had certain parameters that nobody could cross and people accepted that containing the Soviet Union was important - but when the Cold War ended people

discovered that it is not easy to decide what the national interest is because even all the wise men and women in Washington were having trouble deciding. And of course, they are still having trouble today.

So who ultimately decides? Now, the accepted norm was for the bureaucracies to decide together with the President, and that is what we see today. In fact, during the Cold War, the bureaucracies were given semi-autonomy; they were insulated from the political process, and it was not legitimate for interest groups to lobby them directly. They were given freedom to write, discuss and come up with ideas for good or for bad; that is what emerged. What has happened in the increasing pluralization of the American political system is that once the Soviet threat diminished, people realized that the autonomy was only temporary, that always in the history of the US bureaucracies they were not autonomous in areas that did not pertain to national security, which was something interest groups could not interfere with because of its secretive nature.

What has actually happened in the past couple of decades is that people have come to realize that individuals matter, that who is in the State Department matters a lot for the political process because people have different views; there is no such thing as an objective national interest. So what happened was that lobbies began working with presidents to demand having individuals they liked in the political system and presidents responded by appointing personnel from outside the bureaucracies to lead them, not only at the levels of the Cabinet and the Secretaries and not only at the level of the Undersecretary, but in the lower echelons too. At the same time, the lobbies began taking great care to ensure that their men and women were appointed to those positions. As a result, the way the bureaucracies now work is much more responsive to political demands, partly because it also became legitimate for lobbies to meet with bureaucrats, to share their opinions directly, to meet with the Assistant Secretary of State and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and tell them, "We would like you to do this and that."

Clearly, the changes mentioned above have diminished the friction between the Executive and the Legislative on foreign policy issues, although there is still autonomy today in the executive branch. Clinton, for example, still recommended against moving the Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in spite of the fact that he is seen to be very friendly to the State of Israel. When the executive branch attempted to justify the President's decision, the argument used was that to move the embassy would be bad for the US because it would have repercussions in the Arab and Moslem World, which would have a negative effect on the American interest. Members of Congress did not say, "We are going against the national interest," but they did say, "You are wrong; it would not have these repercussions. You are just exaggerating, you do not know the facts." And of course, they found experts to testify that what they were saying was true.

To conclude, a little should be said about the think tanks in America. Think tanks are institutes that market ideas and they are very important in the political process because they help define the national interest and they help define the debates. It used to be the case that you had very few dominant think tanks like the Carnegie Institute in Dartmouth, the Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings Institution and the Council of Foreign Relations, all of which were comprised mainly of professional journalists who did not depend on the political system in any way. In many ways the think tanks were like exclusive clubs, where membership depended on success, career and money; they did not depend on contributions to any great extent because they had substantial funding from endowments, which allowed them freedom to think independently from the political process. In recent years members of Congress and others discovered that they needed people to market their own ideas. That kind of demand led to the proliferation of political think tanks; ideological think tanks, which are issue-specific and focus on one issue at a time, such as Middle East policy and economic issues, and which depend heavily on contributions from constituents who care about these issues. As a result, the ideas that are in the marketplace have become increasingly more diverse and increasingly more responsive to the political process.

The bottom line, however, remains the same, namely, that it all starts with grassroots politics and with the public. One must always remember that small numbers at the bottom could be big numbers at the top assuming they care enough; that is why the American system works.



The US Political System (III): Foreign Policy-Making and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

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In examining American foreign policy in the Middle East and the relationship between America's domestic components and its international interests, I would like to pay particular attention to two major issues, namely, the current US position toward Iraq and the American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

First, however, it should be clear that all American foreign policy is motivated by domestic politics. Although domestic politics represents an important component of American foreign policy, it is certainly not the only one. In fact, the dominant theories of foreign policy during the Cold War were international and not domestic theories. The school of thought that has dominated American academic ideas about international relations for almost 50 years has been the realist school, which involves an assumption that states have objective interests that result from the relative position of the State in the international community. The assumption begins with the idea of the world as an 'anarchic world' without a single central authority, in which each state must depend on itself or create alliances to protect its interests. Against such a background, power is the most important commodity in international relations, and there is a general belief that powerful states get away with a lot, while weak states do not.

Most followers of the realist school of thought believe that all states behave in a way that is conducive to the formation of balances of power, according to which no single state will allow another to become too powerful. They also argue that after World War II, it was natural to have competition between the US and the Soviet Union as there was no way the latter was going to allow the former to dominate. Indeed, no state is going to be comfortable as long as there is a dominant state in the competition for power, and in that sense the balance of power is a very important component in the foreign policies of countries, especially the major powers.

In this context, I would like to recall a speech made by Saddam Hussein before the Arab Cooperation Council consisting of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen in Amman, Jordan in February 1990, which was several months before Iraq invaded Kuwait. It was an interesting period because people were not yet referring to it as the end of the Cold War, even though it was, and there was a lot of frustration in the Arab World because with the Soviet Union going through a period of decline, people were concerned that America would become too powerful and there would be no other power capable of balancing it in the Middle East. Also during this period, a large number of Soviet Jews were coming here, which was creating fears that the Jordanian option was going to be implemented and large numbers of Palestinians would be sent to Jordan. Saddam's speech reflected a totally realist point of view; in fact, it looks to anyone reading it as if he had just read a textbook on international relations.

The speech went like this: "States will never allow a single state to dominate. At the present time, the Soviet Union is in decline, and the US is the only power, a hegemonic power, which is bad for the whole world, not just for us. And now we must wait until there is a new balance of power." Saddam predicted in that speech that it would take five to seven years for other states to come together to balance American power, and he even went so far as to suggest that those states would be European states and Japan. He clearly believed that Europe and Japan had conflicting interests with the US but had been hiding them because of their fear of the Soviet Union, and that now that the Soviet threat was gone, they would come to balance the American power. He also believed that Russia could possibly return as a balance once the Russians had realized how stupid they had been to pull out from the balance of power system. Saddam's way of thinking, which is not different from that of many theorists in international relations, was therefore not unusual. What happened, of course, is that since the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War, the US has remained the most dominant power in the world and in the Middle East and no one state has yet emerged to balance American power.

In spite of its unique status, America continues to pay a great deal of attention to what goes on in other parts of the world. There are a couple of things that the American political elites always keep in mind:

one thing in particular, which resulted from the Cold War era, still dominates the strategic thinking of American elites across the board, and that is the importance of the so-called deterrent, i.e., the strategy of making an example of anybody who challenges American power in order to diminish the chance of this power being challenged. The logic of the Cuba example during the Cold War for example was not so much that the US gained directly from isolating Cuba - in fact, in some ways it lost because it cost the US resources to isolate Cuba and Castro still remained in power, and the US lost a lot of business with Cuba through the enforcement of sanctions without making any apparent gains - but that the US was making Cuba an example so that other Latin American countries would not consider becoming another Cuba. It was logic based on the idea of deterrence.

The reason for America's extremely negative position regarding Iraq since 1990/91 is that it feels it was totally betrayed by Saddam Hussein. One has to take into account the fact that the Bush administration and many American bureaucrats spent much of their leverage during the 1989/90 period after the Iran-Iraq war defending Iraq in front of Congress, mainly because they were seeking to protect the relationship that they had developed with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. When Saddam Hussein betrayed them by invading Kuwait, he effectively challenged the most vital US interests as they are viewed by elites, and it cost the US dearly, considering that half a million troops were deployed. As a result, America decided that Saddam should be taught a lesson that he would never forget. It also decided to make an example of Saddam in order to show anyone who dares challenge America in the future what kind of price they are going to have to pay. The American tendency to go for deterrence is a kind of instinctive reaction that has remained well-engrained in the American political system since the end of the Cold War, and I think that when it is wedded with domestic political interests - which it is, in this case, not least of all because of widespread American support for Israel - one is left with a powerful momentum that is unstoppable.

No one in America actually believed that Iraq would invade Kuwait, and it was against that background that the American Ambassador in Iraq was busy conveying to Saddam Hussein the message that she wanted the border issue to be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation efforts. When Iraq invaded, the US soon realized that it was in a very difficult position; quite frankly, had it not been for an unbelievable set of circumstances that enabled the US to get together with the international community and Arab governments to allow American forces on Arab soil, it would have been very difficult if not impossible for the US to reverse Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, if Saddam had gone to Saudi Arabia and taken the oil fields on the eastern side, no one would have been able to stop him.

At the time, there was nothing to indicate that Saddam was about to invade Kuwait. The thing one has to remember is that in the 1980s, no one had believed that Iraq was going to win the war with Iran. The only reason why the US tilted toward Iraq was that there was a strategic assessment in Washington that Iran was going to win. Once Iraq had invaded Kuwait and it was clear that the CIA had really messed up, the President went to all the intelligence agencies and asked, "What are the chances that he is going to invade Saudi Arabia now that he has invaded Kuwait?" Most of them had to say that there was a chance because they would have looked inept if they had said there was not and then he invaded, especially in light of their failure to predict his invasion of Kuwait.

If you look back at the situation during that era, the only issue that appeared to have the potential for confrontation was the Arab-Israeli issue, due to the fact that the threats being made against Israel were potentially dangerous from a political point of view. The theory that prevailed in Washington was that Saddam was using the threat of displaying his military capability at a time when the political process had failed because he was nearly bankrupt and keen to extract money from the Gulf states, and it was this threat that led to fears about a possible Israeli-Iraqi confrontation.

When Senator Robert Dole traveled to Baghdad in 1990, he had absolutely no idea about the extent to which there was a lot of sympathy with Iraq because it appeared to have been targeted. In order to get an idea about this sympathy, one only has to take a look at the Kuwaiti, Egyptian, and Saudi newspapers of May and June 1990; the Kuwaiti press, for example, was saying that the pro-Zionist US was targeting Iraq, a 'brotherly' state that was just emerging from a war, and that it was the duty of every Arab to confront the American enemy.

Certainly, the US does not want any country to be in a position to threaten Israel because American politicians are unable to ignore any conflict in which Israel is involved, so it has made every effort to prevent conflicts from developing. The American policy in the Gulf throughout the Iran-Iraq War was to maintain a balance of power between the two countries; it did not want either state to be more powerful than the other. Nevertheless, the war ended very suddenly and Iraq emerged to be more powerful and invaded Kuwait. At that point, the major American objectives were to make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait

and to reduce its military capabilities. I am personally not aware of any American scenarios for reducing the military power of Iraq prior to the invasion of Kuwait because at that stage, America still did not think of Iraq as a threat. Even when the Iraqis sent a private message to Israel in 1990 saying that if Israel were to contemplate attacking Iraq, Iraq had the capacity to retaliate, the Israelis were not that concerned and it was more a political issue in Washington.

Does the US worry about Arab public opinion? Take the May 1998 crisis with Iraq: Were American leaders ignorant of the possible consequences of further military action against Iraq? If one looks at public opinion, one finds that in every Arab state, the public is entirely opposed to the war whilst the majority of Arab leaders also feel the same. Americans should remember that when Saddam Hussein first challenged the sanctions regime and the US started making noises about going to war, the Russians clinched a deal with the Iraqis, which was essentially an unconditional Iraqi agreement to comply with the UN resolutions. This of course was regarded in Washington as a defeat for the US because it was seen to be a case where Saddam challenged, was not punished and then asserted himself, got attention, and created closer relations with allies like Russia at the expense of the US. That was the interpretation in Washington.

Occasionally someone will write an article in the newspaper and say, if America goes to war with Saddam Hussein it is going to be a mess for X, Y and Z. The author might even mention the human suffering of the Iraqis, but people do not listen. They do heed the warnings, however, for two basic reasons:

1. There is a tendency for the American Government to run on automatic pilot; in other words, it wants to do it and as long as it thinks it can do it cheaply and it will not be costly in terms of human life because of our technological resources, it will go ahead and do it.
2. America thinks that not taking action will allow Saddam to win, which would be a disaster in terms of the American deterrence policy that I have already mentioned. As a result, America views the idea of not doing anything as having far worse potential consequences than those to be expected by hitting Saddam/Iraq.

The vast majority of Americans do not know or do not want to know about Iraqi human suffering. Remember in 1991 how many people said Arab public opinion would be on the side of Iraq if it was attacked by the allies, only to turn around later and say, "You know why the Arab street did nothing? Because we are the only game in town: Mubarak needs us, King Fahd needs us and Abu Ammar needs us, so even if we attack, what is going to happen? They can go with us, or they can go against us, but if they go against us Mubarak is going to lose his two billion dollars a year, Syria will be vulnerable to an Israeli attack, and King Fahd will always be worried. On the other hand, if they go with us, all they have to worry about is public opinion, which they can easily control by justifying what we did whilst making Saddam out to be the bad guy." Most Americans assume that public opinion will not erupt because in these countries the governments control the media and the security forces and ultimately, everybody is going to have to come on board. The Bahrainis now, for example, are unable to take a position in support of the States, but after the attack, when there is already an American naval fleet there, what is going to be easier for them: to order the American fleet out of Bahrain or to try to persuade the public that the US did the right thing?

The real aim could not be to destroy Iraqi capabilities because frankly, Iraq does not have incredible capabilities right now. The American dilemma is on the one hand, the US wants Iraq to comply with the UN resolutions, whilst on the other, it wants to undermine the Iraqi Government. Consequently, every time there is an improvement in the Iraqi position, America views it as a defeat, which is why it behaves the way it does.

When I write articles, I can say that military attacks are wrong, damage American interests and hurt people unnecessarily. It is my prerogative as an American to tell my government through the media that a military attack is a bad idea and to try to persuade people that there will be repercussions. It is my responsibility to write to engage Americans in the debate in a democratic manner and to bring in issues that are not on the table, in order to give an idea about the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people, but I understand that not everyone is going to listen. I have to understand where people are coming from and I have to understand what their assumptions are if I want them to listen. All this talk about a conspiracy theory is useless; in my opinion, this particular theory is the worst form of escapism in the world, which sort of comes with the territory of not having control.

Immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, any talk of democracy in the American political agenda disappeared in favor of discussion of what was seen to be a larger interest. If one looks at the history of pub-

lic opinion in the US before the crisis, there was rarely any support for military options. Public opinion polls showed that 50 percent of the population supported the government, which is the highest pre-crisis support in history. Other polls, meanwhile, put support at much more than 50 percent. It all depends on the question. If you ask, "Would you still support military action if the US is going to go it alone?" you will get a different answer than if you ask, "...if the US goes with other nations?" etc. It is a mistake for the President to think that there is deep support; there is broad support, but it is not deep, by which I mean the public is supportive only to the extent that they assume there will be no cost. When they finally awake and find Saddam still in power, they are going to turn around and say that the President really messed up. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the Congressional opposition is going to turn around and say to the President, "Thank you for listening to us and invading"; it is far more likely to say, "You did not do enough."

Conventional wisdom dictates that before the US Government enters a war, its politicians should prepare the public by selling their decision domestically and then internationally. Looking at the past tells us that in every single instance, including instances where there is no prior support, the minute the conflict begins support rises to maximum, simply because people wave the American flag when American lives are in question. But, when the crisis is over, people always start asking questions.

One document that was prepared and presented was the work of a State Department official, Steven Grummon, and a professor at Ohio State University, Richard Herrmann. Both were in policy planning as midlevel people specializing in Iran and Iraq. They gave the paper to Dennis Ross in early 1990 when he was the Head of the Policy Planning Department at the State Department. The paper challenged conventional wisdom on Iraq, which said more or less not so much that Iraq was going to threaten Kuwait, but that Saddam Hussein is not a nice man and that Iran in fact may be even friendlier if you consider the strategic interest of the US. The two men made it clear that the US should rethink its relations with Iraq and Iran. Ross insists that he gave the paper to James Baker to read, although Baker claims he never saw it.

Right now, Saddam Hussein's calculations are predictable. He assumes that the US aims to get him, not to have him comply and he assumes that the US is never going to be satisfied no matter what he does, which means the sanctions will never be lifted. As a result, he is also assuming that the only way that he can get himself out of this mess is by taking some risks whilst trying to highlight the contradictions in American policy and trying to undermine the coalition around him. There has to be a decision at the coalition level that clarifies the fact that when Saddam complies, there will be a lifting of the economic sanctions. However, American foreign policy is defined in terms of never allowing Saddam Hussein to improve his situation. Imagine if he complied and the sanctions were lifted; would not this enable him to start collecting money and gain strength? That is the dilemma from an American point of view.

Regarding the position of Europe, both France and Russia are against the US, but the bottom line is this: Is Russia going to sacrifice all its economic relations with the US for the sake of Saddam Hussein? Is France going to sacrifice its relations with the US for the sake of Saddam Hussein? The answer is no. If the US goes ahead and does what it wants to do, which it probably will, what are these countries going to do?

If Iraq is weakened further, the US will eventually look around and say, "My God, Iran is now too powerful." The difference between the balance of power policy and dual containment policy is that the balance of power will arm Iran and Iraq equally while dual containment will disarm them equally. There are just too many differences that run far too deep for any serious strategic relationship to exist between Iran and Iraq. Some countries in the Arab World, particularly Egypt, have been thinking about relations with Iran as possibly counteracting the Turkish-Israeli relationship and Syria is trying to bridge the gap between Egypt and Iran on that issue, but that would presuppose a worsening of the US-Egyptian relationship, which I think is unlikely to happen in the short term.

If the US attacks Iraq, it will not help the Palestinian issue. Presidents who are trying to distract attention from personal and domestic problems usually engage in popular foreign policy activities, not unpopular foreign policy activities, and putting any effort into the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a popular activity. Having said that, once the war is over we could end up with a far more active peace process because the US is going to have to try to revive the public opinion issue like after the Gulf War, when we had the Madrid Process. The administration does not appear capable - certainly now - of pressing the Israeli Government in a serious way. The domestic political environment will not allow it, nor does the US consider there are major strategic benefits to be reaped from pressing Netanyahu.

There is a segment within the political system that supports the idea of a unilateral American position regarding the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, that is, the US would announce its preferences in an American plan. Ideally, America would state outright that the aim of negotiations would be ultimately to reconcile a Palestinian state with Israeli security, and there is a segment of the bureaucracy that supports the idea of stating that outright, even though it is understood that a lot of people will disagree.

The US has sort of been aiming at the Israeli political system in order to weaken Netanyahu domestically. Of course it would never admit this to be true because it is not supposed to do such things, but look at the way it helped bring down the Shamir government. Certainly the US would like to see the collapse of the Israeli Government and the election of a different kind of government. That is the only arena where they can actually work, there being no arena where they can work to achieve an agreement with the limitations that exist within Israel today.

The interesting thing is that this is now a mainstream idea. Five years ago, it would have sounded outlandish. The Council of Foreign Relations, which is the dominant American think tank, is as mainstream as you can get, and the report of the Council, which consists mainly of American Jews, recommends very clearly that the US should support the creation of a Palestinian state. Over the past year, there have been three independent editorials in *The Washington Post*, which is one of the most important newspapers in America in terms of the elite, who have encouraged US support for a Palestinian state. Now, that is a huge change.

The Council on Foreign Relations report said the following: "There should be a demilitarized Palestinian state in the majority of the West Bank and Gaza with contiguous territories." It was noted that if, for example, 90 percent of the settlers live on ten percent of the land, this would mean that even if you carve out ten percent of the land, you are keeping out 90 percent of the settlers. The suggestion was along the lines of the agreement between Abu Mazen and Beilin. One must remember that this is a mainstream American organization and that there are a lot of mainstream American Jews supporting this position, which is what makes it important.

With regard to Jerusalem, it turned out to be the most intensely debated issue of all. We agreed eventually that the Jerusalem issue should be resolved in the next stage, it being clearly understood that the interests of both Arabs and Jews would have to be taken into account and that we need to meet the national aspirations of both in Jerusalem. So, the issue of Jerusalem was not resolved, but at least it was agreed that it would eventually be discussed.

This report actually focused on the people because it said that any solution must guarantee Palestinian residency in Jerusalem, even in the parts that remain under Israeli sovereignty. As far as America is concerned, our position at present is that we support the establishment of a Palestinian state but Jerusalem will have to be resolved by the Israelis and Palestinians; it is wrong for us to take any other kind of position at the current time. In short, the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not in the hands of the US.



Canada's Political System: Foreign Policy Analysis

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When looking at the foreign policy of a state, two dimensions need to be considered. First, one needs to look at who makes and enacts a state's policies, that is, the government and its bureaucracy. Second, one needs to consider the environment in which decision-makers operate and the constraints that act on their decision-making process. But before looking how Canadian foreign policy is made, let us briefly consider the historical context from which it emerged.

Historical Background

The French colonized Canada in the 16th Century. In 1759, British forces attacked Quebec City and defeated the French. Following their victory, the British ruled and further settled the conquered territory and Canada became a British colony. "To a great extent, the history of Canada's external relations is the history of the development of a British colony into an independent nation within the Commonwealth."¹

Canada's birth as an independent nation-state is generally traced back to 1867, when the British North America Act united the colonies of upper and lower Canada into one confederation. Although self-governing in internal affairs, the new confederation's external relations – boundary disputes, trade negotiations and the ratification of treaties - continued to be carried out by Britain. To some extent, therefore, Canada was not entirely sovereign since it was not, as such, recognized by other states. The signing of the Washington Treaty in 1871 was a first step towards Canada achieving international status. Not only was Canada's Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, sent as member of the British delegation but it was also the first document in which the US acknowledged the existence of its northern neighbor. In 1909, a small Department of External Affairs was instituted. Its tasks were nevertheless limited and it remained bound to the British Colonial Office. In 1912, the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs was created and given to the Prime Minister of Canada. Canada's Prime ministers would hold this dual function until 1946.

World War I was a turning point in Canada's relations with Britain and in its quest for international sovereignty. Since 1867, Canada had regularly pressed London to give it greater control over foreign policy matters, a struggle that was more forcibly pursued by Prime Minister Borden (1911-1921). His efforts came to fruition in 1917, when Britain finally accepted to grant Canada, along with the other dominions, increased autonomy and more substantial powers in external affairs. British Prime Minister Lloyd George realized that the dominions could not be expected to continue to contribute troops and incur losses in the name of the empire without their respective governments participating in the decision-making process. The Imperial War Conference passed a resolution that recognized the dominions as 'autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth', and gave the dominions and India 'an adequate voice in foreign policy'. The word Commonwealth was used to describe the self-governing (later independent) part of the British Empire. In 1919, largely as a result of Prime Minister Borden's insistence, the dominions were given what amounted to dual representation at the Paris Peace Conference, both as nations in their own right and as units of the British Empire. It was in both capacities that Canada signed the Treaty of Versailles and became a member of the League of Nations.²

In 1921, Prime Minister Mackenzie King was elected to power after the Liberal Party won all of the seats in the province of Quebec. The Conscription Crisis of 1917 dramatically highlighted French Canadian reluctance to support the British Empire. Taking into account Quebec's sensitivities in external affairs, which were seen as having contributed to Borden's downfall, Mackenzie King sought to further distance the country from the British Empire. He adopted an essentially isolationist policy so as to avoid jeop-

¹ C.P. Stacey, Norman Hillmer, 'External Relations', in: *The 1998 Canadian and World Encyclopaedia*, McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1997, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p.2.

ardizing Canada's national unity.³ At the Imperial Conference of 1923, the Commonwealth abandoned the practice of unified diplomacy and, with Britain's assent, Canada introduced a separate external policy.

As has been illustrated, Canada achieved control over its own external affairs very gradually. Full independence came only in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster gave the dominions complete legislative independence so far as they desired it, although in Canada's case this stopped short of the right to amend its own constitution. In fact, it was only in 1982 that the Canadian Government finally asked the British Parliament to give it the means and right to amend its own constitution domestically. It could therefore be said that Canada formally severed its colonial ties to Britain when the Constitution was 'patriated' 16 years ago.

1. Decision-Makers

Canada is a constitutional monarchy, a federal state and parliamentary democracy. Its constitution includes a number of documents; together they are referred to as Canada's Constitution Acts. The most important of these documents is the British North America Act of 1867, or as it has been called since 1982, the Constitution Act. This document includes a section that spells out the division of powers. Power in Canada is distributed vertically, between the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, and horizontally between the central government, usually referred to as the federal government, and the provinces. "The responsibilities of the central, or federal, Parliament include national defense, inter-provincial and international trade, the banking and monetary system, criminal law. The courts have also awarded to the federal Parliament such powers as aeronautics, shipping, railways, telecommunications and atomic energy. The regional or provincial legislatures are responsible for education, property and civil rights, the administration of justice, the hospital system, natural resources within their borders, social security, health and municipal institutions."⁴ Because of Canada's historical ties to Britain and to the British Crown, the division of powers, contrary to what prevails in the US, is not always explicitly or clearly defined, and this is particularly the case in relation to international affairs. The existence of 'gray areas' in Canada's constitution is a potential source of conflict between contending actors. However, as will be discussed shortly, foreign policy decision-making has tended to be concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and a few key cabinet ministers.

1.1 Vertical division

The executive branch is composed of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The Legislative or Parliament includes the House of Commons, the Senate and the Governor General. While the House of Commons is composed of elected representatives, the Senate, by contrast, is non-elective. The third and final branch is the judiciary, that is the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Monarch

If the Prime Minister is the head of government, Canada's head of State and sovereign is the Crown, that is the Queen or King of Great Britain, represented in Canada by the Governor General. The Crown has the legal authority to conduct foreign policy. "Canada's head of state - Queen Elizabeth II - is thus vested with the formal constitutional authority to make all those decisions that shape the country's role in world politics. As in Britain, the powers to negotiate and ratify treaties with other sovereign powers, to conduct diplomatic relations, and to wage war are all part of the royal prerogative."⁵ Although formal authority may rest in the Crown, the Queen's role remains essentially symbolic, both in Canada and Britain. It is often said that 'the Queen rules but does not govern'; that in essence is the meaning of a constitutional monarchy. Although the monarch's role may be symbolic, it is nevertheless important to bear this legal framework in mind for it explains why foreign policy in Canada is the responsibility of the political Executive, and more specifically that of a central core of ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Thus, while Parliament and the provinces may at times influence the shaping and conduct of foreign policy, their role remains somewhat constrained by this constitutional legacy.

³ Denis Stairs, 'The Foreign Policy of Canada,' in James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thomson and Gavin Boyd (eds.), *World Politics. An Introduction*, The Free Press, 1976, p.190.

⁴ Government of Canada, 'The Government', http://www.canada.gc.ca/canadiana/faitc/fa15_e.html

⁵ Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, (3rd Edition), Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1997, p.175.

The Executive or Cabinet

The Cabinet formulates government policies and priorities; it is responsible for the introduction and passage of government legislation, the execution and administration of government policies and the finances of the government. Although substantial, the Cabinet's powers do not have any formal constitutional basis but are derived from the Cabinet's legal status as the Crown's representative.

The Cabinet is formed and led by the Prime Minister, who chooses members from the legislative branch and gives them ministerial and departmental responsibilities. Although Cabinet ministers tend to be elected representatives of the House of Commons, it is not infrequent for the Prime Minister to recruit from the Senate. Until 1993, all ministers were included in the Cabinet. With the expansion of government activity throughout the years, the number of ministers sitting in Cabinet progressively rose and reached 40 under Mulroney in 1987. In order to keep the numbers in the Cabinet more manageable, Jean Chrétien decided in 1993 to reorganize the Cabinet and create a distinction between the Ministry and the Cabinet. The Ministry now comprises 30 ministers, of whom 22 are members of the Cabinet. The remaining eight are called Secretaries of State and can be compared to what in Britain are called 'Junior Ministers'.

The political capacity of the Cabinet to govern depends on its ability to secure and maintain majority support in the House of Commons. When a political party wins the elections with a strong margin, party discipline will insure that Cabinet decisions are not challenged in the House of Commons. Difficulties may arise when the winning political party has not secured a sufficiently strong majority and if when opposition is well organized. Party politics has seldom influenced Canadian foreign policy in the past. Two parties have traditionally dominated Canadian politics: the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party. Both parties shared similar views with regard to Canada's foreign policy objectives and military alliances. Although the Liberal Party opposed the Conservative government's decision to implement the Canada-US free-trade agreement in the late 1980s, their 'anti-American' position was considerably softened once they were elected to power. After the 1993 elections, and even more so since 1997, the Conservative Party lost considerable support and the balance of power is now held by two regionally based parties: the Bloc Québécois and the Western-based Reform Party. Although both parties have on several occasions expressed their opposition to particular issues, such as the decision to get Canadian troops involved in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Accords,⁶ it is still too early to evaluate what their impact on Canada's foreign policy more broadly might be.

In theory, Cabinet decides on foreign policy. But while it is clear that most major foreign policy decisions are taken after consultation with the Cabinet, this is not always the case. Cabinet decisions are not necessarily taken by majority vote and while the Prime Minister may consult the Cabinet he is not bound to follow its advice. There have been attempts to further ensure greater Cabinet participation in foreign policy matters so as to avoid decisions being taken solely by the Prime Minister. Although theoretically laudable, broad Cabinet participation is deemed to be impractical in foreign policy matters. The reason for this is that most foreign policy decisions are seen to fall in either two categories. Either they are taken in crisis situations and therefore need an immediate response, thus precluding the possibility for consultation, or they are seen to require technical expertise of a level not expected from Cabinet ministers. Whether these reasons are deemed valid or not, the fact is that most foreign policy decisions tend to be made by the Prime Minister and those ministers whose portfolios are more obviously related to foreign affairs.

The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister is the chief minister and effective head of the Executive in a parliamentary system. He is generally the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons. If there is no majority, the Prime Minister is the leader of the party most likely to win support from other parties in the House. The position and responsibilities of office are not created and defined by any statute or constitutional document but are recognized by law. Throughout the years the Prime Minister has become the most important person in Canadian politics. As Chair of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister controls the agenda at meetings and selects the members of Cabinet committees. Because of this and party solidarity, he has great influence over the Parliament. He can ask a minister to resign and advise the Governor General to dissolve Parliament and call elections.

Since 1867, Canada has had 20 Prime Ministers, some of whom were re-elected several times and have thus left a lasting imprint on Canadian foreign policy. The distinct eras identified in the country's

⁶ Nossal, p. 284.

foreign policy tend to correspond to these Prime Ministers' tenures. Although the Prime Minister ceased to be in 1946 the sole person responsible for the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, his impact on the country's external relations remains nevertheless considerable. One of the Prime Minister's first responsibilities is to create the government; he not only appoints the Cabinet ministers, but also selects the Clerk of the Privy Council, the most senior civil servant and bureaucratic head. In deciding who will occupy foreign policy-making positions, both at the governmental and bureaucratic levels, the Prime Minister influences the kind of advice on foreign affairs the government will receive.⁷

The increased popularity of summit diplomacy since the end of World War II has provided the Prime Minister with an additional forum in which to exert his influence on international matters. Some summits are one-off events and deal with a particular issue or crisis. Others are more institutionalized, such as the G-7 meetings, the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings, and the Summit of Heads of State having the use of French in common (La Francophonie). Last but not least are the frequent summit meetings held between the American President and the Canadian Prime Minister. A clear indicator of the increased importance of summit diplomacy is the record number of visits abroad undertaken by Prime Minister Chrétien in his first year in office.⁸

Given the Prime Minister's preeminence as a foreign policy actor, his personality and beliefs will strongly influence the country's orientations. Pearson's internationalism and vision of Canada as a middle power account for the country's active involvement in multilateral organizations during his premiership in the 1960s. Trudeau's more nationalist inclinations led him to adopt policies such as the National Energy Policy (NEP) and the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) which, as he saw it, would guarantee greater national control over the country's economy and further insure Canada's independence. Mulroney, on the other hand, was strongly impressed by the American system. He sought, through the establishment of the Canada-US free-trade agreement and a closer partnership on security matters (increased Canadian participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative), to reverse the previous Liberal government's anti-American tendencies.⁹ But while the Prime Minister plays a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of Canada's foreign policy, he is assisted by a number of Cabinet ministers and more specifically, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

The minister who has the statutory authority to conduct Canada's foreign policy is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or, before Prime Minister Chrétien changed the name of the portfolio in 1993, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Until 1946, the Prime Minister also occupied the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Both Prime Minister St Laurent (1948-57) and Prime Minister Pearson (1963-68) previously occupied the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs before being elected Prime Minister. This testifies to the perceived importance of the position of Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time. The most famous Secretary of State for External Affairs in Canada is Lester B. Pearson. Pearson held this position from 1948 to 1957; his involvement in international affairs and more notably his role in the establishment of United Nations peacekeeping operations won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. After 1968, the Secretary of State for External Affairs came to assume a less preeminent status. Because the Prime Minister plays such an important role in international affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has tended to remain in the Prime Minister's shadow. The extent to which the Minister of Foreign Affairs is able to influence Canada's foreign policy not only depends on his/her relationship with the Prime Minister but also on what issues acquire saliency.

Appointed in January 1996, Lloyd Axworthy quickly made it known that under his leadership, Canada could be expected to play a greater role in issues such as human rights, democratization and development assistance. As a member of the Opposition he frequently expressed anti-American views, but it may well be that now that he is in government he will have to alter his stance to a certain degree. Of course, his appointment could also be interpreted as an attempt by Ottawa to signal its desire to distance itself from the previous Conservative government's strong pro-Americanism.

⁷ Nossal, p. 185.

⁸ John Kirton, 'Une Ouverture Sur le Monde: La Nouvelle Politique Etrangère Canadienne du Gouvernement Chrétien,' *Revue Etudes Internationales*, vol. XXVII, no.2, pp. 263-5.

⁹ D. Layton-Brown, 'Canada-US Towards a Closer Relation,' in: M.A. Molot and B.W. Tomlin (Eds.), *Canada Among Nations. 1958: The Conservative Agenda*, James Lorimer & Company, 1986.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

As mentioned earlier, the Department of External Affairs was first instituted in 1909. It then progressively grew as Canada's international status and needs steadily increased. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, economic issues acquired increased importance. Canada's traditional reliance on foreign trade made it particularly sensitive to growing international economic interdependence. Several departments or ministries (such as the ministries of Agriculture, Industry, Communications or Fisheries) began to develop their own international divisions. It was then perceived that the Department of External Affairs needed to be restructured so as to integrate these new international economic dimensions. The Department of External Affairs underwent a succession of bureaucratic reorganizations and in 1982, international trade and export promotion was brought under its umbrella. Under Mulroney, the Department of External Affairs was formally renamed the Department of External Affairs and International Trade. In 1993, under Prime Minister Chrétien, the investment development division of Investment Canada was integrated into the department, now renamed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Three ministers now head the department: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International Trade and the Minister for International Cooperation who is also responsible for La Francophonie.

It is often said that civil servants are very influential in formulating a country's policy; this is seen as being particularly the case in foreign policy matters. Civil servants have several advantages, the most important of which is a virtual monopoly over information and analysis of that information. In foreign policy this is all the more significant, for most of the intelligence that is used in formulating bureaucratic recommendations is shrouded under the veil of secrecy. Moreover, if the Prime Minister has the prerogative of defining long-term policy goals in the white papers, the implementation of such policies requires the appropriate knowledge and expertise, which is where the bureaucracy often comes in. In addition, because foreign policy covers such a vast array of issues, it is difficult for the ministerial representative to keep abreast of new developments, which means that given their expertise and access to information, the bureaucracy cannot be easily bypassed.

The extent to which civil servants are able to influence the foreign policy agenda should nevertheless not be overrated. This depends on a series of factors, namely the confidence or strength of the responsible ministers and the degree of competition between the different bureaucracies. "The play of bureaucratic politics is muted to some extent also by the nature of the Canadian Cabinet system. For between the bureaucrats and the constituency they serve are the ministers of the Crown, who collectively (not individually) are responsible to Parliament for the full range of governmental behavior, and by whom serious conflicts among sometimes competing departments are ultimately settled."¹⁰ It may perhaps be safe to say that while civil servants can try to influence or persuade ministers, the latter are ultimately responsible for formulating the policies. An illustration of how things operate on the ground is provided by the case of the Canada-US Free Trade talks. Civil servants in the Department of External Affairs were strongly opposed to the establishment of such close bilateral ties with the US, as they feared this might compromise Canada's independence and trade relations at the multilateral plane. Yet in spite of their opposition, negotiations went ahead and the bureaucracy was left with the task of implementing the wishes and policies of their ministers.

The Legislative

The Legislative is composed of two houses: the Senate, or Upper House, and the House of Commons frequently referred to as the Parliament. Whereas the Senate's 104 members are appointed, the 301 members of the House of Commons' are elected. There are therefore as many members to the House of Commons as there are electoral districts or constituencies. Elections in Canada are conducted every five years, as defined by the Constitution. The candidate that obtains the majority of votes, irrespective of whether or not this represents more than 50 percent, is then elected to the House of Commons. Although some candidates run as independents, most belong to one of the recognized political parties. The party that obtains the majority of seats in Parliament will generally form the government and its leader will become the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is therefore himself an elected Member of Parliament although there have been exceptions to this rule in the past.

While Parliament's main function is to provide legitimacy to the Cabinet's decisions it is generally agreed that its role in foreign policy-making is minimal. Thus, "while every government naturally seeks to avoid embarrassment in the House, and while this doubtless has an 'anticipated reaction' effect on

¹⁰ Stairs, 1976, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

policy deliberations at the executive level, there appear to be relatively few cases in which parliamentary debate in the formal sense can be said to have had a decisive impact on government behavior in the foreign policy field.”¹¹ Apart from a number of bills on economic or environmental matters, including the one that instituted the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, most foreign policies are taken outside the legislative realm of Parliament. Canada’s decision to commit troops to the Gulf War coalition, for instance, was made by Mulroney after a dinner with President Bush at the White House. The decision was therefore taken without consulting Parliament, although it should be noted that Parliament was then in recess, as is generally the case in August, and it would have been impossible to wait until all the ministers were brought back to Ottawa. The executive branch has tended to keep Parliament out of the foreign policy decision-making process unless, of course, a delicate situation arose in which case they would consult Parliament as a means of deflecting responsibility.

Although its powers are limited, Parliament does nevertheless play a role in the foreign policy process. Members of Parliament may probe or challenge government policy on the floors of the House of Commons and the Senate. Because the question period in the Parliament is so well-covered by the media, it allows the Opposition to force certain foreign policy issues on the agenda, which in turn will serve to inform public opinion on such matters. Such was for instance the case in 1968 when Trudeau’s government was forced to soften its anti-secessionist stance and provide humanitarian assistance to Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. The government was similarly pressured by Parliament to alter its policy towards the US when the Nixon administration decided to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972. “The government in Ottawa, like many other allies of the US, dispatched diplomatic notes expressing concern over what was seen as an excessive use of force. The new Democratic Party (NDP), however, wanted a stronger and more public expression of Canadian sentiment, and announced its intention to introduce a motion ‘condemning’ the US when Parliament opened on 5 January 1973. Even though the bombing had by then terminated, the Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, moved a government motion ‘deploring’ the American action. It was a preemptive measure, for the NDP held the balance of power in this minority parliament, but it shifted the government’s position considerably.”¹²

Parliamentarians may also voice their opinion on particular issues and try to influence government policy in Party caucuses. Such was the case in August 1982 when a group of parliamentarians challenged the Liberal Party’s Middle East policy. “A group of MPs who opposed Israeli action in Lebanon strongly urged the government to apply sanctions against Israel and extend recognition in some form to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). According to reports, there was heated debate and only the intervention of influential ministers prevented a fuller and more forceful expression of dissent. Although the Cabinet rejected a change in policy, a comprehensive re-evaluation of Canada’s Middle East relations was undertaken.”¹³ In addition to the above, parliamentarians may exert some influence on the foreign policy process in committees, such as the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs or the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and in international parliamentary associations. On foreign policy issues, the main activity of the Senate does not take place on the floor itself. Rather, senators with international interests participate in the work of the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Although the Committees do not necessarily influence or challenge existing policies, they nevertheless perform an important investigative function, which may affect future decisions.

The number of foreign policy issues debated at the House of Commons has steadily increased over the last decade. Emergency debates were held for example on the Beijing massacre in June 1989, on the Gulf War crisis in the autumn of 1990 and on the Canada-US free-trade legislation in July 1988. Because of Mulroney’s failure to consult with Parliament on issues that involved the lives of Canadians, an example being his decision to commit troops to the Gulf War coalition and to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia, Chrétien promised to further include the House of Commons in the decision-making process. The government’s 1995 foreign policy statement thus highlighted the need for increased parliamentary debate and input on foreign policy matters and asked that the government “turn to the House of commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade and to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs to involve Canadians in providing the government with advice on updating the directions of [the country’s] foreign policy.”¹⁴ Although more time has indeed been spent on foreign policy discussions in Parliament since Chrétien’s election, it is still too early to judge whether or not Parliament has indeed been given greater powers in foreign policy matters.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 188.

¹² Nossal, op.cit., p. 271.

¹³ David Taras, ‘From Bystander to Participant’, in David Taras (Ed.), *Parliament and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985, p. 12.

¹⁴ *Canada in the World, Government Statement*, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 1995, pp. 48-9.

1.2 Horizontal Division: The Federal Government and the Provinces

Canada's federal structure was established in 1905. Over the years, and more so since the 1960s, the role of the provinces in the foreign policy-making process has gradually increased. Canada is composed of ten provinces and two territories and has two official languages: English and French. Ontario and Quebec are the two oldest and more populous provinces; Ontario is home to 37 percent of the Canadian population and a quarter of Canadians live in Quebec. British Columbia and Alberta are the westernmost provinces and main producers of oil and gas, while Saskatchewan and Manitoba lie in the prairies, and are often regarded as the granary of Canada. In the East are the maritime provinces: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, the last province to join the federation in 1937.

Even in the most decentralized federal states, external relations are traditionally considered to be the preserve of the central government. The constituent units are not to engage in foreign relations unless authorized by the central government. But as mentioned earlier, Canada's constitution does not always clearly spell out and define the division of powers. "The provisions of the BNA Act (since 1982, called the Constitution Act, 1867) that specify the division of powers - sections 91 and 92 - did not explicitly assign competence in foreign affairs to either the federal level or the provincial level. Nor, notably did the BNA Act deny the provinces the possibility of an international role as other constitutions do."¹⁵ Since no amendment was made to Canada's constitution, any attempts made by the provincial governments to acquire further leverage on the country's external relations could therefore not be formally prohibited. In the early days of the confederation, when classical patterns of diplomatic intercourse characterized inter-state activities and when Britain was still responsible for the dominion's external relations, no need was felt to further clarify the matter. But over the last three decades, international relations have become increasingly complex and dominated by economic issues. Highlighting their economic international dependency, provinces have expressed their desire to participate more actively in international affairs appealing to their own interests and developmental needs.

Provinces have at their disposal two means of influencing the conduct of their state's foreign policy. More traditionally, they may exert pressures on the central government so as to insure that their interests be taken into account during international negotiations. More recently, some provinces have established their own diplomatic or para-diplomatic¹⁶ channels, which are essentially economic in nature and whose goal is to favor financial investments and commercial trade. "After Mulroney began the free-trade process in 1985, the provinces moved to make their positions known, not only through ministers' conferences but also at the official level through representatives to the Committee on Trade Negotiations. The richer provinces hired high-profile consultants to represent their free-trade views in Ottawa, while the smaller provinces sent officials drawn from their own bureaucracies."¹⁷ Smaller provinces such as Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland have not created large bureaucracies to manage their international activities. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba and British Columbia have become somewhat more institutionalized in this sphere, but their governments are nonetheless content to conduct their international relations in an *ad hoc* fashion. Ontario and Alberta have for their part increased their provincial representation abroad through modest intergovernmental affairs agencies. Finally, Quebec has sought to institutionalize the support system for its foreign relations in a way that its foreign office is practically a fully developed foreign ministry. Created in 1965, Quebec's foreign office expanded to such an extent that by the early 1990s, it was given the name of Ministère des Affaires Internationales, a micro version of the External Affairs Department in Ottawa. Quebec, whose diplomatic activities are not confined to economic issues but also include cultural and educational treaties with France, is considered to be one of the most active sub-national actors in terms of foreign policy.

This phenomenon is by no means confined to Canada. Indeed, sub-national actors worldwide, whether they be provinces regions or cities, have progressively become more active on the international scene. Whereas only four US states were represented abroad in the 1970s, in 1985, 29 states held 55 permanent legations in 17 different countries.¹⁸ This phenomenon of segmentation,¹⁹ more frequent among federal states but also present among unitary ones, is the natural extension of sub-national traditional spheres of competence on to the international scene. It stems not only from the growing complexity of

¹⁵ Nossal, *op.cit.*, p.295.

¹⁶ I. Duchacek & P.Soldatos, 'An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as Foreign-Policy Actors,' in: Michaelmann, H.J, and P. Soldatos (Eds.), *Federalism and International Relations*, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 37.

¹⁷ Nossal, *op.cit.*, pp. 299-300.

¹⁸ Duchacek, I., 'Perforated Sovereignities: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations,' in: Michaelmann, H.J, and P. Soldatos (Eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁹ This term was coined by I. Duchacek and P.Soldatos, 'An Explanatory Framework...', *op.cit.*, p. 36.

world affairs but also from the central states' growing inability to adequately manage national politics. Although a potential source of conflict with the central government, sub-national actors para-diplomatic activities tend to be increasingly seen as part of a process of rationalization and cooperation between the two levels of government, established in response to the demands of increased interdependence.²⁰

2. External and Domestic Influences

While it is important to examine the political structure of a country in order to determine which actors are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, it is nevertheless necessary to consider the broader context in which they operate. Since Canada's foreign policy does not change drastically every time a new Prime Minister comes into office, there must be factors that underpin the State's general policy orientations and constrain the range of options available to policy-makers. Among those factors that are generally singled out as having an influence on foreign policy-making are geography, economy, culture, military capability and the international context. These, in turn, will affect the choice of allies and membership to regional and international organizations. Another factor that is frequently considered in the foreign policy analysis literature is public opinion. One would indeed be inclined to believe this to be an important factor in a country like Canada where there is such a strong democratic tradition. And although foreign policy is often seen as the policy area least influenced by domestic constraints, contradicting evidence forces us to consider how domestic concerns and public opinion may in fact influence the decision-making process.

2.1 Geography

Canada is the second largest country in the world. With almost ten million square kilometers, it is 18 times larger than France is. Although the Canadian territory is vast, its population is relatively small with only 30 million inhabitants. Partly because of the climate, the great majority of Canadians live in the southernmost parts of the country, within a 300-kilometer band along the US border. This physical proximity to the US has greatly affected Canada both domestically and in its foreign policy orientation, and the fact that most Canadians are either native English speakers or at least understand the English language has also made them particularly receptive to American culture. While Canada's remoteness from Europe may have allowed for a more isolationist foreign policy prior to World War II, its geographical location made it particularly vulnerable during the Cold War. Indeed, when looking at a polar projection, one realizes that Canada is positioned directly between what were the two rival superpowers. Because of its relatively moderate military capability, Canada was therefore obliged to find alternative means of fending off any threat to its territory. It did so by actively participating in the establishment of multilateral institutions designed to maintain international order: the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²¹ In addition to these, Canada also entered security agreements with the US, which were formalized in 1958 by the North American Air Defense Command or NORAD. With the end of the Cold War, Canada's geographic location has lost some of its strategic significance and direct threats to the country's security are no longer imminent.

2.2 Economy

One way of finding out what objectives a new government has set itself and what its priorities are, is to take a look at a government's official policy statements. While these may not necessarily offer an entirely accurate and detailed picture of a government's future activities, they nevertheless constitute a valid indication of its overall orientations. *Canada in the World*,²² which is the government's 1995 foreign policy official statement, identifies three key objectives, the first of which is the promotion of prosperity and employment. This, it states, is at the heart of the government's foreign policy agenda. It is interesting here to note that ever since Trudeau's statement in 1970, concern for Canada's national economic prosperity has figured in Canada's foreign policy priorities.

To ensure that Canada be competitive and prosper in the world economy, the 1995 white paper identifies four strategies:

- a supportive domestic economic policy framework;
- access for its goods and services abroad (through bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states);

²⁰ Ibid., p. 51.

²¹ Stairs, op.cit., pp. 190-93.

²² *Canada in the World*, op.cit, 1995, p. ii.

- an open, fair and predictable set of rules governing trade and investment; and
- the means to ensure that Canadian firms are able to take advantage of promising foreign market opportunities.

The second and third stated objectives, the promotion of global peace as the key to promoting Canada's security, and the projection of Canadian values and culture, also both emphasize the importance of economic concerns. Indeed, stability and security are listed as prerequisites for economic growth and development, whereas the vitality of Canadian culture is seen as an essential component to Canada's economic success. What therefore transpires from this foreign policy statement is how the current government not only sees Canada's foreign and domestic concerns as interconnected but also the extent to which the country's national interest is defined in economic terms.²³

But why do economic concerns occupy the center stage in Canada's foreign policy?

Canada is first and foremost a trading nation. In fact, one of the most important features of Canada's economy is its dependency on foreign trade. Canada has never been self-sufficient and it is increasingly relying on international trade for its economic prosperity. For most of the 1990s, 40 percent of the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) has been generated by the exports of goods and, to a lesser degree, the export of services.²⁴ Canada is a country rich in raw resources, and products based on Canada's natural resource industries (agriculture, fishing, energy, forestry and mining) make up 54 percent of its exports. Because of its reliance on international trade for its well being and prosperity, Canada's diplomacy is to a remarkable extent driven by economic considerations. One could in fact almost argue, that Canadian foreign policy is in major part, trade relations policy. The fact that since the 1980s, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Trade have gradually been merged into what is now known as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade testifies to this. Canada's reliance on foreign trade means that the country is particularly vulnerable to economic pressure. This was illustrated in 1979 when the combined pressures of the Arab states and the Canadian business community forced Prime Minister Joe Clark to back away from his policy of moving the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Canada's dependence on foreign trade therefore acts as a major constraint on decision-makers and greatly determines the orientations of Canada's foreign policy. This, more than any other factor, explains why the US constitutes one of the main sources of influence on Canadian foreign policy.

2.3 American influence

The greatest feature of Canada's economy is its overwhelming vulnerability and dependence on the American economy. The US, which purchases about 80 percent of Canadian exports and which supplies nearly 76 percent of its imports, is Canada's most important trading partner.²⁵ Until World War II the US and the UK frequently exchanged positions as the first and second most important destinations for Canadian exports. However the US now imports only 1.5 percent of all Canadian shipments abroad and only 2.6 percent of Canadian imports come from the UK. Japan has in fact supplanted the UK as Canada's second trading partner, although its share remains largely below that of the US, with four percent of exports and three percent of imports. The European Union, including the UK, accounts for only 5.5 percent of Canadian exports.²⁶ Not only has the US become an increasingly important destination for Canadian exports, but it also has become one of Canada's major sources of foreign investment. In 1995, 40 percent of American investment was direct. By contrast only 16 percent of non-American investment in Canada was direct, reflecting the lesser role in the Canadian economy of non-American business firms. As these figures indicate, Canada's economy is intrinsically bound to and dependent upon that of the US. But while access to US markets, investment and technology have benefited Canadians, the resulting arrangements, along with the great disparity in population between the two countries, have created serious problems for Canada and led to fears for loss of its sovereignty. Canada's relations with the US have thus periodically oscillated between the need for greater economic cooperation and the desire to maintain its independence.

As was mentioned earlier, the Americans were the first to grant Canada some form of international recognition with the signing of the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Trade negotiations came to characterize

²³ For a discussion of how the current government's foreign policy statement compares with that of previous administrations see: John Kirton, 'Une Ouverture Sur le Monde...', *op.cit.*, pp. 259-63.

²⁴ Statistics Canada, *Gross domestic product (expenditure-based)*, CANSIM, Matrix 6548. Canada's GDP at market prices for 1997 amounted to \$855,103 million while its revenues from exports in goods and services were of \$343,536 million.

²⁵ *Statistics Canada, Imports and exports of goods on a balance-of-payments basis*, CANSIM, Matrices 3651 and 3658.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

the nature of the two countries' relationship almost immediately. In 1911, President William Taft and Prime Minister Laurier reached an agreement providing for a limited free-trade pact. But public opinion was then already fearful that further economic integration would eventually lead to Canada losing its sovereignty to the US. Conservative opposition blocked the free-trade legislation in Parliament and Laurier went on to lose the elections because of this. In the early decades of the 20th Century, the US began to invest in Canada's industry thus increasing Canada's dependency on American capital. After the Great Depression, Canada made various attempts to 'de-link' its economy from that of the US, but these were short-lived. In 1934 trade relations between the two countries resumed. In order to shield its economy from any future American protectionist policies, Canada began once more to negotiate with the US an agreement on tariff reductions and increased trade, which was signed in 1938.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, US corporations increased further their penetration and control of Canada's economy by massively investing in the country's natural resources. In 1948, Canada once more began negotiations with the US on a free-trade agreement but ultimately decided to back down from it. "In an attempt to avoid a return to bilateral negotiations with the US, which exposed Canada to the possibility of having to make concessions in one area to obtain US concessions in another, Canadian leaders turned to multilateral arrangements, such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in international economic relations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in military relations, believing they offered greater opportunity, through alliances with other countries, to curb the unilateral exercise of power by the US and to reduce the danger of direct Canada-US confrontation."²⁷ In spite of these attempts, the process of economic integration continued inexorably and in 1965, Canada and the US signed the Auto-pact Agreement, which created for manufacturers a conditional free-trade zone in motor vehicle and motor vehicle parts production in Canada. The period that followed was marked by conflict, as Canadian governments adopted protectionist measures that angered Americans. One such clash occurred after the OPEC crisis of 1973-74, when Canada raised the price of its oil exports. Tensions rose once more in the 1980s, following the introduction by Trudeau's government of the National Energy Program and the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency. Both measures were adopted as means of guaranteeing Canada's control of its own economy and therefore reducing American encroachment.

With the election of Mulroney in 1984, Canada began a new round of negotiations with the US, which led to the signing of a comprehensive free-trade agreement in 1987. The trade agreement quickly came into effect in January 1989, and Canadian-American economic relations were fundamentally changed. In 1994, the agreement was extended to Mexico and became known as NAFTA (North American Free-Trade Agreement). Although opposed to the Canada-US trade agreement while in opposition, the Liberal Party has not sought to cancel it. Instead, it has attempted to bring into the agreement several other South American countries. Their presence, it is hoped, would help to further diffuse American preponderance.

How has this affected Canada's foreign policy?

As we have seen, Canada's economy, history, culture and security are intrinsically bound to the US. This vulnerability to American policy and economic cycles explains why it is vital for the country to maintain good relations with its neighbor and why "ever since Mackenzie King's first meeting with President Coolidge in Washington in 1927, Prime Ministers have sought to establish a personal relationship with their American counterpart."²⁸ It follows therefore that most Canadian foreign policy decisions tend to be based on a calculation of the degree to which the issue may affect Canada's relationship with the US. "On numerous occasions, Canadian policy has been determined not directly by the American Government, but by Canadian officials' assessment of how their stance on an issue risked damaging Canadian-American relations."²⁹ Thus, when the Canadian Government decided in 1949 to recognize the Kuomintang (KMT) rather than the Peoples Republic of China as the legitimate Government of China, they were motivated not so much by ideological or other concerns - in fact it would appear that most Canadian officials would have preferred to recognize the PRC - but by the realization that this matter did not warrant crossing the US on an issue that the Americans perceived as important for them. The advantages of recognizing the KMT did not counterweigh the potential disadvantages that would have followed from American discontent, had Canada decided instead to recognize the PRC. The US bombing of Libya provides another example where Canada decided to back American decisions because not doing so may have jeopardized the Free-Trade Agreement, which was then being considered for ratification by the US Senate.

²⁷ David Crane, 'Canadian-American Relations,' in: *The 1998 Canadian and World Encyclopaedia*, McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1997, p. 1

²⁸ Nossal, p.185.

²⁹ Nossal, p.34.

In spite of these constraints on Canada's foreign policy, there have nevertheless been some instances when the Canadian Government opposed or challenged American actions on international matters. Although he committed Canada to the Plan for Joint Defense (NORAD) in 1958, and his rapport with Eisenhower was good, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's personal relations with President J.F. Kennedy were poor. When the Cuban missile crisis began on 22 October 1962, the Canadian Government, informed only one and a half hours in advance of Kennedy's intentions hesitated to back the American Government. The issue as far as the Canadian Government was concerned was whether it should comply with an US request to move Canadian forces to an alert status known as 'Defcon 3'. With the approval of the Minister of National Defense, Douglas Harkness, Canadian units obliged, but formal authorization was delayed while the Cabinet debated. Fearing a Canadian alert would provoke the USSR and believing the American Cuban policy to be generally unbalanced, angered by the lack of advance consultation and concerned about the implications for Canadian policy on nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green were reluctant to acquiesce to Kennedy's demands. Approximately half of Canada's ministers remained undecided, but as Soviet ships approached the quarantine zone later in the week, Harkness' position gained support and on 24 October, the government authorized the Defcon alert. Canada's hesitation reflected in part the desire of the Prime Minister and others to preserve the independence of Canadian foreign policy and to maintain a balanced posture in crisis conditions. The delay, however, was widely criticized and exacerbated already difficult relations with the Kennedy administration, which accused Diefenbaker of failing to carry out his country's commitments.

In 1965, relations between the two countries did not improve in spite of a change in government. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson not only failed to give the US the support it demanded during the Vietnam War but in 1967, the Canadian Government openly expressed its disagreement with American policies in Southeast Asia. Public opinion in Canada was strongly critical of the US policy in Vietnam and as the years went by this developed into a general anti-American feeling. It was in this period that Prime Minister Trudeau risked American opprobrium on a number of issues ranging from Nixon's decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, to the energy and foreign investment policies of the 1980s mentioned earlier. One of the pledges of the Mulroney government, overwhelmingly elected to power in September 1989, was to refurbish the relationship with the US, bruised by the many disputes of Trudeau's last term. Mulroney cultivated his relationship with Reagan, abandoned the National Energy Program, weakened the Foreign Investment Review Agency and signed the comprehensive free-trade agreement. But even Mulroney sought to distance himself from his American counterpart on a number of issues such as that of the support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, or on South African policy. Prime Minister Chrétien has more recently also opposed US policy in certain instances, such as in relation to Bosnia, the refusal of the US to pay its debts at the UN, and Cuba.

What all these examples serve to illustrate is that while Canada's foreign policy may be to a great extent constrained by its dependence on the US, it must nevertheless not be assumed that Canada will automatically align itself with the US. If geographical proximity, cultural affinities and economic necessity account for the two countries' historical ties, other factors will affect foreign policy-making; these may be the personality of Canada's Prime Minister, the ideological stance of the government in power, public opinion and the international context.

2.4 *Multilateral institutions and regional alliances*

Canada belongs to numerous formal international organizations. Some are universal while others have restricted membership. Among those that play a greater part in Canadian foreign policy are of course the UN, NATO, the G-7 (8), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), and to some extent the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. Canada's membership in such diverse multilateral institutions not only illustrates what has been coined Canada's 'liberal-internationalist' inclinations but also the variety of its allegiances, interests and commitments. Whereas membership in NATO was dictated by Cold War security concerns, Canada's involvement in the Commonwealth and in La Francophonie is a reflection of the country's colonial legacies and linguistic makeup. The extent to which membership to such organizations exerts an influence on Canadian foreign policy varies according to the international context. It should moreover be born in mind that such membership does not only act as a constraint but is also an instrument of Canadian foreign policy. Canada's participation in these multilateral organizations should therefore also be understood as being dictated by the need to preserve international order propitious for its trade and as a means to curb Great Power influence.

Canada played an active role during the San Francisco Conference that led to the creation of the UN in 1945. It saw the new organization as a forum in which it would be able to voice its needs more forcibly. Canadian officials hoped that the new organization would enable greater participation in world affairs

from those 'lesser' powers. Their doctrine included two components: the functional principle and the concept of middle power. "In concrete terms, this meant that a state would have a particularly strong case for gaining access to a UN institution or decision-making process when it had either a substantial stake in the problem at hand, or a significant store of the resources relevant to its management or resolution."³⁰ As the Cold War unfolded, it became evident that the UN's capability was constrained by the Great Powers' veto in the Security Council. Although the original optimism waned, Canada nevertheless continued to participate actively in the organization.

Among its best-publicized achievements is Canada's role in the creation of UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has certainly helped Canada to develop an independent role and identity in the international scene that distinguishes it from the Americans. In addition, Canadians are acutely aware of the fact that their national security is linked to international security. Canada has never fought in a unilateral war, and the five wars in which it was involved were all fought in concert with other powers.³¹ Canadian public opinion is very favorable to peacekeeping and although support sometimes declines, the majority of Canadians have this idea that peacekeeping is one of their main international assets or characteristics. Considering the limited defense budget and capability, the Canadian contribution to peacekeeping compares very well with other countries. Tens of thousands of Canadians have served in UN peacekeeping forces since the early 1950s in 40 separate missions. Canada's participation involved not only members of the Canadian forces, but also members of the Royal Police, the Canadian Red Cross and governmental and non-governmental agencies. Peacekeeping, of course, is not merely based on idealism; the need to protect world peace is a prerequisite for the economic prosperity of Canada.

Canada's promotion of NATO was dictated by the realization that the UN could not by itself adequately guarantee world security, particularly with the advent of the Cold War. "In fact, the creation of NATO was largely an Anglo-Canadian initiative, in alliance with the US State Department, to design a multilateral organization that would give France in particular and Europe in general the political stability needed to ward off Soviet encroachments. Canada's main objective was to use the combined associations of the UN to create a fully multilateral framework for NATO, rather than a merely European-North American base, and to set up reciprocal guarantees among all NATO members that would make the NATO arrangements directly relevant and complementary to Canada's growing bilateral defense cooperation with the United States."³² Given that the US is a powerful member of the organization, NATO has at times been perceived to have a negative effect on Canada's independence in foreign policy and some commentators have suggested that Canada withdraw from the alliance. Although NATO's importance as a military alliance has somewhat declined since the end of the Cold War, Canada continues to play an active part in it. NATO is still important in securing a more stable world order and Canada's presence in the organization allows it to maintain friendly relations with Europe.

Canada's membership to the Commonwealth and to La Francophonie emerged out of the country's historical ties to Britain and France. On the whole, membership to such organizations as the Commonwealth or La Francophonie does not impose any generalized set of obligations on Canadian governments, and rather than acting as constraints they could be viewed more as instruments at the disposal of Canada to forward its interests and views. "The Commonwealth framework enables Canadians to pursue certain economic interests while reflecting a broad social democratic interest in international cooperation and a domestic value consensus. The Commonwealth is outside the US orbit, it embodies cooperation, and it does not cost a great deal either in financial or political terms. (...) This structure provides an opportunity for meeting economic goals and for asserting sovereign independence while fulfilling an important part of the national self image."³³

2.5 Domestic concerns, public opinion and pressure groups

Domestic concerns may be expressed directly, via elections, polls, representatives, the media or pressure groups, or indirectly, in the way in which they are perceived by policy-makers. It is often said that public opinion plays little role in the shaping and conduct of foreign policy even among the more democratic states. The assumption is that international affairs are of no real interest to the population in general and that when the public does express itself on such matters, its opinion is fickle and dictated by the moment. Moreover, even in those instances where international affairs may directly affect the

³⁰ Denis Stairs, 'The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XV, no. 4, December 1982, p.672.

³¹ The five wars in question are the Boer War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War and the Gulf War.

³² D. B. Dewitt and J.J Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power. A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations*, John Wiley & Sons, 1983, pp. 52-53.

³³ Michael Clark and Brian White (Eds.), *Understanding Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems Approach*, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1989, pp. 102-3.

interests and daily lives of the population, as in the case of national conscription or free-trade agreements, it is frequently said that opinion will be fragmented to such an extent as to allow policy-makers to ignore it altogether. Although it is difficult to measure the impact that public opinion may have on the conduct of foreign policy, it would nevertheless seem hasty to dismiss it as irrelevant.

Canada's size and bilingual heritage have had an impact on its foreign policy orientations as the country's history has been marred by fears for the country's unity. These fears have been particularly heightened since the 1960s when part of Quebec's predominantly French speaking population began to express separatist feelings. More recently Canada's unity has been further threatened by the emergence on the federal scene of two political parties whose platforms are dictated by regional concerns - the Bloc Quebecois and the Western-based Reform Party - and the quasi-total demise of two cross-national parties, the Progressive Conservative and the New Democratic parties. Although the influence of the Western provinces' discontent on Canada's future integrity is considerable, greater attention has traditionally been granted to the issue of Quebec. As mentioned before, Quebec's reluctance to engage its troops during World War II greatly influenced the government's decision to sever its ties with Britain. Ever since that time Canada's successive governments have had to pay particular attention to this province's requests, bearing in mind that it includes a quarter of the country's total population. Canada's attendance to the biennial of the Summit of Heads of States having the Use of French in Common, or La Francophonie, illustrates the impact the Francophone population has on the country's international relations. And when Chrétien's Liberal Party was elected to power in 1993, due attention had to be paid to the forthcoming referendum in Quebec on separation when nominating the Cabinet ministers. Lloyd Axworthy, who had been external affairs critic when the party was still in opposition, should have normally been given the External Affairs portfolio. Instead Chrétien decided to appoint Andre Ouellet, a Francophone from Quebec, to the position. By thus doing, the government hoped to show its commitment to the province and rally as many Quebecois to its cause. After the referendum, in which the population of Quebec voted by a very slight margin against further moves towards secession, Ouellet was thanked for his services while Axworthy became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Although Quebec's role is felt in various foreign policy areas, one issue that is generally perceived as being overwhelming determined by Quebec's separatist threat is Canada's opposition to secessionist movements worldwide. This issue could in fact be used to illustrate the way conflicting domestic demands are filtered by the policy-making apparatus. In addition to the English and French communities, there are a large number of other ethnic groups in Canada, reflecting the country's multicultural heritage and successive immigration waves. Ethnic groups tend to give priority to the welfare of their members in Canada and to Canada's relations with their respective countries of origin. The Jewish community in Canada is particularly well organized and represented in foreign policy matters by the Canada-Israel Committee. Founded in 1967, the Canada-Israel Committee employs several full-time staff members in three offices - the national office in Ottawa, a Quebec regional office in Montreal, and a communications and research department in Toronto. Frequent and persistent contact is made with the civil service and elected representatives in Ottawa, to ensure a high level of awareness on Middle East issues. Contact with the political community is spread across all political parties. Other well-organized ethnic interest groups include the Canadian Arab Association, the Arab Palestine Association, the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian Polish Congress. Many members of the Armenian, Baltic, Palestinian, Sikh, Tamil and Ukrainian communities in Canada have been active in pressing the government in Ottawa to incorporate their concerns in Canada's relations with the 'occupying' state. But when Canada's ethnic communities have attempted to influence the government into supporting separatist causes, they have generally failed. The Canadian Government's reluctance to include these minorities demands is interpreted as being the result of its reluctance to give Quebec separatists any additional grounds to justify their cause.³⁴ But while the menace of Quebec's separation may indeed have an impact Canada's anti-secessionist stance, this dimension should nevertheless not be overstated.

As the case of the government's response to the Nigerian civil war of 1968-69 illustrates, a number of factors need to be considered. When Biafra's separatist claims led to the Nigerian Government's violent military retaliation and the suffering of millions of Nigerians, the government's initial stance on the advice of the Department of External Affairs was to ignore the issue by invoking the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. This traditional statist position was further reinforced by Canada's concerns over its own domestic situation as Quebec separatists were gaining momentum. Yet in spite of this dual constraint, International Law, and the domestic situation, the government was forced to reconsider its position because of Canada's mounting public indignation. Trudeau's offhand remarks on Biafra and the government's reluctance to provide assistance to the starving Biafran population generated a scandal in the media, which in turn prevented the Opposition in Parliament from challenging

³⁴ Nossal, *ibid.* p. 102.

the policy. While the case of Nigeria may have been somewhat exceptional, it nevertheless highlights the importance of public opinion on an issue that first hand may not have been deemed of public interest. If Canadian public opinion might to some extent be driven by events and media coverage, it nevertheless appears to display a certain consistency in its response to external events, notably in its belief that Canada should play an active role in peacekeeping. It was indeed because of public pressure that the Canadian Government, against the advice of its own military officials, decided to contribute troops to the 1960 Congo operation.³⁵

Given the paramount importance of the economic dimension in Canada's foreign policy it is therefore not surprising that groups organized to promote business, labor, agricultural, professional and consumer interests actively seek to influence governmental policy on these matters. A wide variety of business groups participate in the foreign policy-making process. These groups deploy considerable efforts and resources in order to have their interests represented at the different levels of government: the Cabinet, for example, and the Parliament (notably its standing committees, and the bureaucracy; it is indeed important to remember that today's Member of Parliament may be tomorrow's Cabinet minister. The foreign policy interests of most of these groups revolve around trade and tariffs issues, although there is a significant divergence of opinions within and among groups. "Of considerable importance are the umbrella groups that promote the interests of business as a whole. These include the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Business and Industry International Advisory Committee (CBIAC). (...) These associations are well-endowed by their members, highly institutionalized, and permanently embedded in the policy-making scene in Ottawa."³⁶ Although individually powerful, economic interest groups may not necessarily alter the government's policy on such given issues for their interests might not necessarily converge into one coherent and unified policy. Thus while some members of the business community approved the Free-Trade Agreement, others vehemently opposed it.

In addition to these economically oriented interest groups, there is also a wide array of non-economic or societal interest groups. Because of their enormous diversity, their abilities to exert influence in the foreign policy-making process vary considerably. Moreover, the work of many non-economic groups suffers from insufficient financial resources and fluctuations in membership. Among the various societal groups that try to influence the government on foreign policy matters are the National Committee on the Status of Women, various religious organizations (such as the Quakers, who push for disarmament), and the military organizations. Although the Canadian veteran and military interest groups are a well-organized lobby that makes representations to the government on matters pertaining to national defense and the health of the military establishment in Canada, they had had relatively little success in influencing governmental policies. Nevertheless, the recognition by the US of Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, an important goal of the lobby in the 1980s, can be attributed to their relentless efforts. Finally, there are several other groups who attempt to influence governmental policies on specific international issues; these include groups such as OXFAM Canada, the Canadian section of Amnesty International, the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian University Overseas Service, the Middle East Discussion Group, the Canadian Peace Congress, and Pollution Probe.³⁷

Conclusion

When trying to determine how a given country's foreign policy is made, it is important to consider not only who among the policy-makers yields the greatest influence but also what other factors affect the final outcome. If Canada's foremost priority is to secure the more propitious environment for its economic wellbeing, decision-makers may have divergent opinions as to how Canada's national interest may best be served. Some have emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the US; others have focused on the establishment of multilateral institutions destined to secure a more stable and predictable international order. While such decisions may be the result of a Prime Minister's personal beliefs and inclinations, the existing international climate and balance of power also affect them. Finally, at a time when international forces and growing economic interdependence increasingly impinge on the population's daily life, it only fair to expect that domestic concerns will more frequently permeate the foreign policy decision-making process.



³⁵ Pierre Martin & Michel Fortmann, 'Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World,' *International Journal*, Spring 1995, p. 381.

³⁶ Nossal, op.cit., p. 105.

³⁷ See Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, *The Domestic Mosaic: Domestic Groups and Canadian Foreign Policy*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985.

Lectures and Discussions Part III: **THE US, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PALESTINIANS**

The Historical Evolution of US Involvement in the Middle East

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Thank you for inviting me to discuss the history of American involvement in the Middle East. I should make it clear from the outset that I am an academic, not a US government spokesman. Although I come from Georgetown University in Washington, not very far from the State Department and the White House, I do not represent or advocate the views of the American Government. In fact, I have a rather critical view of many of the policies of the US Government in the Middle East.

I have divided the history of the US in the Middle East into two parts: the period before World War II, and the period that followed the war. I will carry the narrative up through the 1970s and attempt to deal with contemporary issues in our subsequent sessions. I have made this division because World War II marked a transition in the role of the US in the world. Before World War II, even though the US was becoming a major power, world politics were still determined by Europe, particularly by Britain and France. After the American victory over Germany and Japan, however, the US emerged as one of the two superpowers, and we entered into an era in which the US and the USSR and the competition between them dominated world politics.

In order to understand the way Americans think about the function of the US in the world, we have to go back to the American Revolution of 1776 and the subsequent development of the US as an independent country. The period from the 1770s up through the early 1800s was dominated by the Founding Fathers of the US, including Alex Hamilton and James Madison who were among the authors of the Federalist Papers, which is probably the most important single philosophical document outlining the cause of American independence and its system of government.

Part of the historical logic of the creation of the US had to do with the idea of dealing more effectively with the scourge of war, conflict and rivalry that the Americans felt had plagued European politics. The new American republic was meant to have a far higher purpose than the old European system of kings and classes. Indeed, the Founding Fathers were saying in effect: "We will not engage in rivalries and wars between the states; our mission is to have a higher civilization and we want to set an example for the rest of the world." One might believe that we had no business in setting ourselves such a task; nevertheless, this is what the people that created the American republic thought they were up to. On the other hand, one of the documents that Americans still study is George Washington's farewell address, in which he made it clear that the US should look to itself, and refrain from getting involved in world politics and engaging in entangling alliances with other parts of the world. There was a kind of a missionary quality among the Founding Fathers, and in fact if you look at an American dollar bill, it says under the picture of the pyramid *novus ordo seclorum*, Latin for 'a new secular order', which reflects the idea that the US wanted to set an example by becoming a new secular order and showing the other countries of the world what they should become. If you look at our leaders today, they are still acting in accordance with this noble but grandiose objective - laying down rules for everybody else in order to 'promote a better way of life'. Such idealism was a part of the historical methodology of the American Revolution.

On the other hand, there is another quite contrary tendency, which goes right back to the beginning of the republic and echoes the *Realpolitik* - power politics - philosophy of other European thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes. This is the thinking that is encapsulated in realist international relations theory: the idea that in a world where there is anarchy, every state has to look after its own interests. Some-

times this means going to war to protect those interests, but sometimes it means avoiding war even if high moral principles (rather than concrete national interests) are at stake. Both traditions - the idealist and the realist - are bound up in the way American politicians conduct American foreign policy all over the world, including in the Middle East.

Let us return to the very beginning of the American republic when the US under President Thomas Jefferson engaged in its first overseas war. Jefferson, a famous philosopher and gentleman farmer who believed - like Candide - in cultivating his own garden, sent the brand-new American navy all the way to the Western Mediterranean, off the coast of North Africa, where it fought the 'Barbary Wars - a series of naval engagements against the Barbary pirates from Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli, who were attacking American merchant vessels. Even then, America knew that it would always be dependent on foreign trade, and it was keen to protect its interests. It is interesting to note that our first real war, in the early 1800s, was actually against Arabs.

Another kind of contact had taken place in 1787, when the US had concluded its first foreign treaty, which was with Morocco. Yet a further kind involved the American missionaries, who were almost entirely Protestant and whose goal was to go to different parts of the world including the Middle East to try to convert the people of other religions - Moslems, of course, but also the indigenous Orthodox and Catholic Christians - to 'true' Christianity. They thought they could do this by educating the people, not only in religion, but also with regard to basic subjects such as reading, writing and arithmetic. Although the missionaries failed to convert many people to Protestantism, they succeeded in establishing educational institutes, some of which survived to this very day, such as the American University of Beirut, which was established in 1864. Here in Jerusalem, they established a school and a clinic that later became the American Colony Hotel. The involvement of the missionaries had no particular political aim and reflected the idealism of the American culture rather than of American political interests as such.

Over the remaining decades of the 19th Century, the US did not play a major political role in this part of the world. Trading American ships called here and there, and following the arrival of an Omani ship in New York in 1840, there began a longstanding relationship between the US and the people in Oman. One has to remember that during the second half of the 19th Century, the US was very much concerned with its own internal problems, not least of all the very brutal war that was fought between the North and the South in the early 1860s.

Nevertheless, there are other examples of American involvement in the Middle East during that period. In the early 1860s, for example, an American military mission went to Egypt to help train the officers of the Khedive of Egypt. This became the first example of an important aspect of American foreign policy, namely military assistance and certainly the first in this region.

We come now to World War I, which put Britain, France and Russia against Germany, Austria and Turkey. The war brought the US for the first time into a world war, whose treaties led to the redrawing of the political map in the Middle East amongst other places, and it witnessed the Americans for the first time taking a political interest in the political affairs of the Middle East. The one fact about World War I as far as the Middle East is concerned is of course that the remains of the Turkish Empire were finally destroyed: the British army and Sherif Hussein's forces (led by T.E. Lawrence 'of Arabia') pushed the Turkish army out of the Levant, out of Palestine, out of Syria, and back up into Anatolia. Although the US was not deeply involved in the redistribution of these territories, it clearly had an interest in the outcome.

Woodrow Wilson, who was President at the time, enunciated a document called 'The Fourteen Points'. One of the points called for self-determination for the nations of the world that were being dominated by foreign regimes. It is not clear that President Wilson himself would have favored the establishment of an independent state in Syria and Palestine as Sherif Hussein of Mecca was hoping to achieve, but the principle of self-determination became world-widely accepted on the popular level.

To further this principle, the US proposed to Clemenceau of France and Lloyd George of Britain, amongst other European leaders, the idea of sending a fact-finding commission to the Middle East to ask the people to decide who should now replace Turkey and rule them. The Europeans had their own interests in the former Turkish Empire territories and wanted nothing to do with this commission, so President Wilson sent the exclusively American commission - the 'King-Crane Commission' - to the Middle East in 1919, just after World War I had come to an end. Mr. Crane, a wealthy and religious businessman and philanthropist from Wisconsin and Dr. King, a college president, came up with recommendations that in effect said: 'The people in this region have been dominated by Turkey and now want to rule themselves, and we should respect that'. They also said that the people of the region were worried about the Balfour

Declaration and the Zionist movement, which meant that it might be difficult to establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. Moreover, they found, after interviewing what we would today call 'elite public opinion', that if the people of the region had to be ruled by any one country, they would prefer it to be America, because they felt - maybe as a result of the influence of the American missionaries - that America had no selfish intentions towards them. I should note that by the time King and Crane returned to Washington, President Wilson had suffered a stroke and was incapacitated; it is therefore very unlikely that he ever read the report, which only really came to light years later. In other words, the report came to nothing in terms of American foreign policy.

The Europeans, meanwhile, had their own plans for this region. Britain and France concluded a secret agreement called 'The Sykes-Picot Agreement' in 1916, which had been signed by the Russian Czar prior to the Russian Revolution. The agreement suggested the establishment of colonies, mandates and spheres of influence in all of the former Turkish territories, which is of course what actually happened.

Prior to the agreement, there was the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence: the letters that were exchanged in 1915 and 1916 between Sir Henry MacMahon who was the British representative in Cairo and Sherif Hussein and his sons Faisal and Abdallah, which led the Hashemites to believe that Britain supported the idea of independent Arab states in the Arab territories of Turkey once the Turks were gone. Eventually the Hussein-MacMahon correspondence gave way to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which established the British mandate territories in Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq and the French territories in Syria and Lebanon.

Yet another famous document is the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which called for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. It should be noted that the document approved by the League of Nations included word per word the text of the Balfour Declaration.

It is interesting to note that one of the very first official signs of US governmental support for the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine was not given upon the initiative of the US President but upon that of the US Congress. By a unanimous or mostly unanimous vote, the Congress in 1922 passed a non-binding resolution simply expressing the opinion of the US Congress that the Balfour Declaration was a very good idea and that the US supported the idea of establishing a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. One has to remember that many 'fundamentalist' American Protestant Christian churches interpreted the Bible as meaning that the ingathering of the Jews to Palestine would herald the approach of the Day of Judgment. There was not at that time a strong Zionist movement in the US. The Zionists only became a force in the early 1940s when the various American Zionist organizations gathered together at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. In fact, the 'Biltmore Declaration' of 1942 marks in a sense the beginning of the organizationally powerful Zionist lobby in the US, designed to push and to pressure the US Government toward support of a Palestinian state for the Jews after World War II.

The Jewish population of the US back in 1922 was much smaller than it is today. Most American Jews had come from Germany and were attempting to forget their own identities and become ordinary American citizens. Certainly there was some Zionist pressure on the Congress, but there was also pressure from Christians who thought that the idea of a Jewish homeland made sense. By 1942, however, there was a growing Zionist movement within it. As the Jewish community became larger and much more influential - and particularly after the establishment of Israel in 1948 - it focused all its energies on lobbying the US Government to support for Israel. At the time of the Balfour Declaration American Jews had been calling only for a 'homeland'. The Balfour Declaration did not call for a Jewish state in Palestine, but simply for a homeland for the Jews - one which was not to infringe on the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish indigenous population. That is what the American Congress supported in 1922. But two decades later revisionist Zionists and then mainstream Zionists were demanding a Jewish state that (in more extreme versions) would include the East Bank of the Jordan River and Southern Lebanon up to and including the Litani River.

My final point about this early period has to do with oil. The first oil discoveries in the Near East were made in the early 1900s in Masjid Sulaiman in southwestern Iran, followed by finds in southern Iraq. The concessions were essentially dominated by British and French businessmen. But the biggest producers of oil in the world at the time were the Americans, who had a huge oil industry in Pennsylvania, Texas and Oklahoma. But they (and the US Government) also had international ambitions. An agreement made by oil concessionaires in 1928 called 'The Red Line Agreement' admitted for the first time a consortium of American oil companies into the concession area surrounded by this red line, which surrounded most of the Mashreq, and so American oil companies began to have a certain interest in the new discoveries that were made in Iraq. The really big entry of the Americans into the Middle East oil

arena came in the 1930s when American oil companies that later became ARAMCO discovered massive oil wells in Eastern Saudi Arabia.

Now, in the early 20th Century, the development of the gasoline engine was revolutionizing the economies of the industrialized countries and also changing the technology of warfare as battleships moved from steam-driven to oil-driven power. Oil was becoming a vital economic commodity and also a vital strategic and military commodity, so by the beginning of World War II the US had begun to perceive that it had a strong strategic and economic interest in the Middle East. We find, therefore, that this combination of idealism, trading and missionary activity, the beginnings of interest in the Zionist projects in Palestine, and the discovery of oil form the components of American preoccupation in the Middle East after World War II, when the Middle East became vital to American interests.

With regard to the post World War II period, we can say that the US was driven by three key national security interests in the Middle East: the containment of Communism, support for the new Jewish state, and the protection of America's oil interests. World War II was a watershed in many ways. First of all, the old great powers of Europe - Britain, France, Germany, and Italy - were replaced by the US and Russia. By 1945, the US had developed and exploded the first atomic bomb and by 1950, the Soviet Union had also developed a nuclear capacity - so the one point above oil that defined the two super-powers as being 'super' was that each had a substantial nuclear capacity. Although other countries worked to develop their own nuclear capacity and military capacity in the 1950s and 1960s, none of them developed that capacity to the same degree as the US and the Soviet Union.

In terms of those three principles, in the Middle East context containment of the Soviet Union was probably the most important. From the American perspective, the Soviets presented not only a military security threat because of their nuclear weapons and their huge conventional armed forces on the European and Asian landmass, but also a very serious ideological threat. American policy-makers and American public opinion became convinced that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power in terms of including and extending a sphere of interest in key parts of the world at the expense of the US and its allies in what we called the Free World.

From its understanding of the Communist threat, the US felt that the only answer was the policy of containment, which is why it organized the NATO alliance in 1949. The US was petrified that the Soviets would push down into the Middle East and gain access to the oil, especially in light of the fact that the Soviets had actually attempted to take a little piece of Iranian territory in Azerbaijan in 1946, and had also threatened Eastern Turkey. So, the US decided to try to extend the doctrine of containment that was involved in the NATO treaty and to include Turkey in order to try and protect the Middle East from Soviet expansion. As a result, in 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953, the US, in cooperation with Britain, proposed several schemes for a Middle East defense organization. None of these fully succeeded because the people of the Middle East did not believe the Soviets to be dangerous and were extremely unhappy with the US because of its support for the creation of Israel in 1948. For example, when the US came calling on Egypt, the most important Arab country, the Egyptians were busy overturning the monarchy and establishing the nationalist government. They were in no mood to become a sort of an extension of NATO. In fact, by 1954 and 1955, the Egyptians and a number of other Arab governments, some of which had nationalist ideologies and nationalist sentiments, began to think that the Soviets might actually be a useful ally against the US and against Israel. One of the relatively viable Anglo-American security projects was the 'Baghdad Pact' of 1954-1955, which came finally to involve Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, although it was unable to contain Soviet influence.

With regard to the Egyptian Revolution, it seems likely that the CIA had a certain role in Nasser's ascent to power because it thought that the Egyptian monarchy needed to be replaced by something more stable. The Americans were of the opinion that Nasser and his colleagues might actually work with them mainly because they were probably anti-Communists. If we look beneath the surface, we find an interesting effort to have a dialogue with what American officials thought might be a progressive anti-Communist force in the Middle East, and the Americans had some interesting exchanges with Nasser in his early years, thinking maybe that they could work out a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. Later, President John Kennedy expressed certain sympathy for 'progressive' revolutionary movements in the Arab World. Unfortunately none of these bridge-building efforts came to anything. Kennedy was advised that Nasser was really a dangerous enemy to the US and could not be trusted. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson was a dedicated Zionist and during his term of office, there was a massive increase in American uncritical support for Israel.

In spite of the American attempts to contain the Soviet Union, Moscow eventually made arms deals with Egypt and Syria and began to exert its influence in a number of other Arab countries. The Americans became worried because they thought that if the Soviet Union had all these important friends in the neighboring Arab countries, the security of Israel would be threatened. They also worried about the fact that the Soviets were beginning to surround the places where oil existed and where the American companies had huge interests - i.e., Saudi Arabia; so Arabian Peninsula and Gulf security became a major US foreign policy priority.

Dr. Malcolm Kerr (a respected political scientist who was the President of the American University in Beirut when he was assassinated in 1984) wrote a fine little book called *The Arab Cold War*, which describes the alliance power in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. Basically it is about how the Cold War between the US and Russia was replicated on a smaller scale in the Middle East in an 'Arab Cold War', in which some Arab states that had good relationships with the Soviet Union were opposed to other Arab states that had special relationships with the US. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, one could say (roughly speaking) that in the American camp were Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and to some extent small Gulf states, while the Arab 'revolutionary republics' like Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya and South Yemen could be found in the Soviet camp.

The Americans faced a major problem when it came to Soviet containment inasmuch as they were trying to contain the USSR by nurturing friendships with the countries of the Arab World whilst, at the same time, delivering increasing amounts of support to Israel. The US had enough power and influence that in spite of being unable to stop the Soviets from having influence in places like Egypt, Iraq and Syria, it was able to minimize that influence and in some cases eliminate it. This is what happened in the famous case of Egypt after Sadat came to power, threw out the Soviet advisors and threw himself into the arms of the US. Subsequently, Washington had some notable success in weakening the anti-American stance of some of the other 'revolutionary republics'.

Israel, meanwhile, not only continued to exist, but also to prosper and indeed expand. In spite of the fact that the American Government was not over-enthusiastic about Israel becoming a regional superpower, it managed to do so, thanks in part to the very successful efforts of the Zionists themselves and to the support they received, their skills and discipline, and also in part to the weakness of the Arab states and governments. Although the Arabs had many advantages, they did not have the ability to organize themselves in a sustained manner to confront Israel, which by then was receiving the unconditional support of one of the world's two superpowers. I think that one has to conclude that the Arab states have failed to promote their own national and security interests, while, at the same time, the US has been able to successfully pursue the three goals that have driven American policy ever since World War II. First, Israel was not only established, but became an expansive, aggressive superpower in the region. Secondly, oil was always available, and the governments that controlled the oil were amenable to American influence. The one exception concerns the events of 1973-74 when Saudi Arabia used the 'oil weapon' - the oil embargo- to considerable advantage against the US and against the Netherlands. Third, Soviet influence was gradually reduced from its apogee in the 1960s to a far less threatening position by the mid-1970s. Whether one likes it or not, American officials believe that their aims in the Middle East - at least up until now - have been essentially fulfilled.

Comments from the Discussion Session

On the American Protection of Israel

■ As to how far the US is ready to defend Israel if it is seriously challenged, the actual debate in the US Government over whether we should support the establishment of a Jewish state at all took place in 1947-1948. The State Department and the Defense Department were against the idea of US support for Israel, but the White house and the Congress were all for and Truman had the last word. The main reason the State Department and the Defense Department were against the idea of a Jewish state back in 1947 was that they were afraid that we could not defend it and that it would become a sickly child that would have to be constantly protected against the threat of an Arab attack. By 1973, the story was very different: the Defense and State Departments could no longer argue that Israel is a sickly child depending on American major resources; on the contrary, American officials were very impressed by the Israeli record of military might and had actually come to consider Israel a strategic asset and a very useful ally.

When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973, would the US have waited before coming to Israel's aid? Absolutely not. In the first days of the October War the Egyptian army pushed the Israelis back across the Suez Canal and surprised everyone by using their anti-tank missiles to wipe out hundreds and hundreds of Israeli tanks; had the US not mounted an emergency airlift of ammunition and supplies, the Egyptians could have gone much further forward than they did. There was a very tough fight in the Golan and Jabel Ash-Sheikh, and even though the Syrians had no intention of going very far, it is certain that the Americans almost certainly would have done whatever was necessary to protect Israel even to the point of having a confrontation with the Soviet Union. As for the oil embargo, it hurt but it did not hurt a lot, and given a choice between oil and Israel, I am sure we would have chosen Israel. The fact is that we never thought for a moment that we would have to make the choice because it was not Saudi Arabia that was a threat to Israel and the Saudis were playing a complicated game, balancing off their American connection with their Arab connection. Certainly, if there is any perceived threat to Israel, the US will do whatever needs to be done, and the American Congress sometimes allocates more aid to Israel than the White House wants to give.

On the Term 'Middle East'

■ As to the origins of the term 'Middle East', it is a global strategic term that was probably invented by an American geo-strategist named Halford Mackinder. Also influenced by British views of the world, Mackinder basically felt that the Middle East was in the 'middle' between Britain and Europe and the Far East; it was that place in the middle between Britain and India or between Britain and its former colonies all the way to Australia. The term Middle East basically has a western geopolitical orientation to it. At an earlier stage, a further distinction had been made between the Near East and the Middle East. The Near East referred to the European remains of the Ottoman Empire, that is to say Anatolia itself although that is not strictly in Europe - Constantinople and Istanbul are part of Asia - and the Balkans, which of course were for a long time under Turkish control, which is part of the reason for the Bosnian problem today. In early maps or books on diplomatic history, there are references to the Near East, which according to some referred to the Balkans, to the Anatolian Peninsula and to the Levant and perhaps even Egypt. The Middle East referred more broadly to the territories beyond that, but still not as far as the Indian subcontinent.

As oil became more important in the geopolitics of the region, the term Middle East became more important as well because Americans and British strategists, particularly during World War II, were not just worried about making sure the Germans did not take over Syria or Egypt, which they almost did; we were also concerned about the Arabian Peninsula, about Iraq and Iran. During World War II, the allies set up an organization based in Cairo called 'The Middle East Support Center' and basically tried to organize the economy of the region. The organization was worried about the German efforts to shoot across North Africa and capture Egypt from the West, about German infiltration of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran and, above all, about the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. Because of the aid that was given, we were able to maintain an oil lifeline up through Iran to the Soviet Union, which was our ally against Germany, throughout World War II. Being so important, it was only fitting that the Middle East had a name.

As for Arab North Africa, until the Americans began to learn about Arab nationalism, it was seen as something separate and sort of dominated by France through Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. It was not Black Africa, but it did not seem to be the Middle East either. Today, however, when Arab nationalism is much weaker, we find people generally use this sort of hyphenated term, 'Middle East-North Africa', to deal with the region that seems to have a certain coherence, but not a lot of coherence.

On US Domestic Support for Israel

■ As for Israel, it is true that Israel has enormous influence over American policy in the Middle East, and it is also true that the US Government of today exerts very little influence over the present Israeli Government. Nevertheless, we continue to support Israel even though its behavior obviously jeopardizes US interests elsewhere in the Middle East: there is a lot of pressure to support Israel simply because it is a Jewish state, a more or less democratic state, an 'outpost' of western civilization, etc. Anybody who becomes a serious candidate to be nominated as President of the US, whether he is a Democrat or Republican, will support Israel, at least in principle, because all presidential candidates need the support of the American Jewish community and the pro-Israel lobby so as to win the election.

The thing that makes the pro-Israel lobby powerful - and incidentally, it is not just the Jewish lobby, there is a very powerful non-Jewish element in the Israel lobby - is that it is well-organized, it raises a lot of money and it will reward or punish any local official who is running for election in terms of whether

and how much that person supports Israel. Although all American presidents are going to support Israel, there are some differences. President Eisenhower, for example, drove Israel back from its invasion of Egypt, which means that although he supported the existence of Israel, he did not support the aggression of Israel. And similarly, George Bush supported Israel, but when he was trying to start a peace process with his Secretary of State, James Baker, he got very mad at Shamir and told him, "I will not recommend that the American Government provide loan guarantees for the Israeli Government because you are not taking our interests into account. We do not want Israel to be so nasty to its neighbors that those neighbors will be nasty to us." In fact, it is possible that the pressure that Bush put on Israel contributed to the defeat of Shamir in the 1992 elections. Clinton has been much more accommodating to Israel than Bush was and has not put any pressure on Netanyahu, even though everybody knows in Washington that Clinton thinks Netanyahu is the most awful person that he has ever had to deal with.

If there is a price for supporting Israel, it is not a high price because the Arabs basically are too weak. The Arab leaders complain, saying that the US has double standards; of course there are double standards! Is Mubarak going to refuse the American aid mission to Egypt? Is Mubarak going to mobilize the Egyptian army in the Sinai? It is not very likely, unless he feels that there is so much pressure from public opinion in Egypt that he might risk losing office if he does not take such steps. In short, the Arabs do not seem to have any clout. There are, of course, the odd occasions when an Arab leader will cause us some trouble. With regard to Iraq, for example, the underlying consideration in bombing Iraq, whether in 1991 or tomorrow, is the idea that any Arab state that has real military strength is a threat to Israel and in this case a threat to oil, and I think that it is oil that led us into the war against Iraq in 1991. The point that has been debated in Washington is basically that the US as a government much prefers to deal with individual Arab countries on a bilateral basis and it does not encourage any kind of integration, let alone unity, among Arab states because it fears that if Arab states were stable and well-organized, they would be a threat to Israel and a threat to the oil.

As to the interest of the US in the security of Israel, the main interest is not a national security interest nor a foreign policy interest, but a domestic interest; it is simply a preference. A large and influential well-organized lobby inside the US thinks that Israel is a good thing in itself and it deserves our support and protection and that is why we give both. Now, it is true that pro-Israeli foreign policy experts have tried to make an additional argument. They say that Israel is a strategic asset to the US, and pro-Israeli specialists spent a great deal of time arguing this point in the 1970s and 1980s when the Soviet threat still existed. They used to say that Israel is strong, it has a good army and it will help the US in two ways, namely, by helping keep the Soviets out and Arab nationalism suppressed, and if some Arab country should develop weapons of mass destruction, the Israelis will bomb their nuclear reactor (which is what the Israelis did in Iraq in 1981). Now, in fact, this is not a strong argument in my opinion and the reasons are obvious. To begin with, the existence of Israel actually allowed the Soviets to gain influence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and with the Arab masses because the Soviets took a pro-Arab and anti-Israel position. Moreover, now that the Soviet Union has disappeared, we do not need the Israeli military to put down a Russian invasion or something - it never happened and it never will happen and if it did happen, it is unlikely that we would want the Israelis helping us. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration had to actually pressure the Israelis not to participate because it was concerned that Israeli participation would lead to the coalition falling apart and the Arab governments going against the US. What kind of a strategic asset is that? American support to Israel, from my point of view, is certainly not based on rational national security strategic considerations.

On the US and the Palestinians

■ I think it was essentially the *Intifada* that led to the US Government opening a dialogue with the PLO. The *Intifada* began in December 1987; in 1988, the US opened its first very limited and short-lived dialogue with the PLO in Tunis. And then in 1991 - of course this was after the Gulf War when the Palestinians and the Arabs in general were weakened - the US organized the Madrid Conference and the peace process really got underway. I think that the *Intifada* allowed the American public, for the first time ever, to get a good look at the way the Israelis oppress the Palestinians under occupation, and I believe there is now considerable sympathy for the Palestinians. At the same time, many people who supported Israel said that if the violence continued, you would see anger throughout the region toward Israel, which would lead to anger toward the US. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons, as far as I am concerned, why the US Government has suggested that US nonessential diplomatic personnel and US residents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip leave now; it is not because it is afraid that they are going to be hit by a Scud missile from Iraq, but because they are going to be caught up in some very anti-American protests.

As to the current situation here, some people think that a new *Intifada* will erupt sooner or later - I have heard this from Israelis, I have heard it from American experts, and I have heard it from Arabs. Other people insist that the situation has become so bad that the Palestinians are completely depressed, suppressed by their own authority, abandoned by their Arab friends and therefore unable to do anything except accept what any friendly Israeli Government has to offer. From the point of view of the US, I think the Americans feel that the present situation is bad but bearable and it is very difficult for President Clinton, who has so many other problems to deal with apart from the Middle East, to take an unpopular step and pressure Netanyahu into returning to the peace process, even though people realize that the latter has abandoned Oslo. They realize that Netanyahu's 'new' model is basically to repartition the West Bank and not allow a Palestinian state or anything more than controlled local autonomy in the different Palestinian enclaves. If the situation explodes again here, then the repercussions of that will seriously weaken other Arab governments that are important to the US like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; were this to happen, the Americans would probably decide that something had to be done, but if the situation remains as it is, with one side looking like it has surrendered to the other, the attitude in the States will remain, okay, so that is history. What can we do now? We are far better off doing nothing for as long as there is no visible threat to American interests.



The US and the Middle East: The Policy-Making Process

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In order to understand the position that America adopts with regard to various Middle Eastern issues, it is important to determine what it is, exactly, that makes up the American agenda. First of all, we might mention the fashionable terms that emerged at the end of the Cold War - a 'New World Order' and, a bit later for this part of the world, the 'New Middle East'. Both assumed that America ('the only remaining superpower') would - and perhaps should - dominate the world, and certainly the Middle East as well. President George Bush talked about the New World Order after the Gulf War and Israel's Shimon Peres wrote an interesting book entitled *The New Middle East* - a region in which Israel would not only be a 'normal' actor but also a central one. But will this new Middle East survive? Does it even exist? The second item on the US policy agenda is the so-called Arab-Israeli 'peace process'. The third issue is what we call 'Gulf security', and which addresses the problems (from Washington's point of view) raised by Iraq and Iran with respect to friendly, oil-rich Arab governments. The fourth item on the agenda is 'political Islam' or 'Islamic fundamentalism', as it is often called. The fifth, and to Washington perhaps the least important, agenda item is democratization in the Middle East. This last item derives from the general Clinton administration policy to promote 'the expansion of democracy' everywhere in the world. Let us consider these points and at the same time - for the sake of argument - raise the following question: What kind of a grade does the Clinton administration deserve in dealing with this agenda?

My own view, unhappily, is that the performance of the Clinton administration has been a major disappointment in the Middle East, and that Clinton's second term in office (for which some of us had high hopes) is perhaps even less promising than his first term. Although the previous (Bush) administration had its drawbacks, I believe that it made some positive headway in the Middle East, especially by initiating the 'Madrid' phase of the Arab-Israeli peace process; but the Clinton administration in my view has squandered this inheritance. While I believe that Clinton and Albright have a good intellectual grasp of Middle Eastern realities, I have to say that neither have handled the Middle East very well, mainly because of the unfortunate intrusion of domestic political pressures. As a result, it is not too harsh to suggest that they have mismanaged the peace process; they have mismanaged the Gulf with the policy of dual containment; they have misunderstood the question of political Islam and have in fact encouraged Islamic extremism to some extent in this region by implementing certain US policies; they have not been sincere about democratization in the Middle East and have launched a 'war on terrorism', which misunderstands terrorism and violence in the Middle East by removing it from its political context. Along the way they have seriously strained their relations with traditional friendly governments in the area.

Certainly, if we look at the Middle East from an American perspective today, we see more failures than successes and we see more question marks than answers. This is very strange considering the fact that in the 'New Middle East', indeed in the 'New World Order', the US, as they never tire of saying in Washington, is the only remaining superpower. Technically, that is quite true: the US is the only country in the world that can project massive military force anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, there are still many trouble spots, and to me, it appears that among the most troubling is the Middle East.

In trying to explain why American Middle East policy seems to be inadequate it is important to look at what we call the policy-making process. To be sure, the President is the most important element in that process, but his behavior is affected by a variety of structures and other influential actors. Under the American Constitution, the Congress plays a significant role in foreign policy, especially through its power to authorize (or deny) funds for various presidential initiatives. The President is also to some extent answerable to his political party - Republican or Democratic. The parties, whose fundamental goal is to win elections to Congress and the White House, are dependent on the interest groups that help support and finance their campaigns. They are also affected by public opinion, which is usually measured through public opinion polls. The public's opinions are in turn significantly shaped by the news media - the press and electronic media, especially television. When it comes to Middle East policy - if I may generalize broadly - the entire process (including all the above-mentioned institutions) is heavily influ-

enced by supporters of Israel. They have a strong voice in Congress, in the political parties, in public opinion and the news media. Conversely, 'pro-Arab' sentiments carry relatively little weight.

Let us consider a few current aspects of US Middle East policy in terms of the policy-making process.

Is it better for the peace process to have a Republican administration? I think that the answer is yes, because generally speaking, Republican presidents have been more evenhanded than the Democrats have. There are, however, some important exceptions: Ronald Reagan, a Republican, did poorly, while Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, had at least one major success.

You will recall from our previous session that President Eisenhower, a Republican, exemplified evenhandedness in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He actually opposed Israel (along with Britain and France) in its aggression in the Sinai-Suez War of 1956. Nixon and Ford, two other Republicans, were less evenhanded; they were Presidents in the early 1970s, during the October War, the 1973 War and the oil embargo. Neither was prepared to abandon Israel, though neither was thought to be emotionally Zionist. Influenced, however, by a powerful pro-Israel National Security Advisor and Secretary of State (Henry Kissinger), they sought to manipulate the balance of power to bring about a political solution.

President Reagan, another Republican, was unabashedly enthusiastic about Israel, which helps account for his paltry record of accomplishment. In addition, he was shockingly ignorant of this region. Served - or should we say guided - by secretaries of state who shared his pro-Israel bias, Reagan was unable to move forward on Middle East peace and, indeed, gave tacit encouragement for Israel's disastrous invasion of Lebanon in 1982. His tenure was also marked by contradictory (and illegal) policy behavior with respect to Gulf security and the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s.

Like Eisenhower, President Bush was also a Republican - and more evenhanded than most Democratic presidents. He felt that Israel was obstructing the road to peace and at one point threatened to withhold American loan guarantees in order to pressure the Israeli Government. He also presided over the opening of a US-PLO dialogue. Bush's decision to organize an international coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1990-91 has been hailed by many and criticized by some in this part of the world, but the outcome created a moment of opportunity to reinvigorate the moribund diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Notwithstanding all the subsequent criticism of the 'peace process' I believe that Bush and Baker achieved something significant by inventing a formula that would bring all the parties together in a negotiating structure. Baker was able to convene the Madrid Conference by persuading Syria to participate - which nobody had been able to do before - and the team launched a very interesting and complex negotiating process. To be sure, the Washington talks that followed the Madrid Conference eventually became deadlocked, partly because of the passivity of the Democratic Clinton administration (which replaced the Republicans in 1992); yet a certain barrier had been broken. In 1993, the secret Oslo talks between Palestinians and Israelis (without American involvement) revived the peace process and led to certain gains and numerous disappointments. Nevertheless, the Bush administration deserves credit for launching the most complex and potentially successful American initiative since Camp David.

The record of Democrat presidents is not so balanced as that of the Republicans. When we look at President Truman and American policy at the time of the establishment of Israel in 1948 we can readily understand why Truman is regarded as a hero and savior among Israelis and Zionists, and reviled by Palestinians and Arabs. Against the advice of nearly all of his foreign policy and military advisors, Truman threw American support unequivocally behind the project of a Jewish state. Then, two decades later, the Democrats produced and the American people elected Lyndon Johnson, the most enthusiastic Zionist president since Truman. Johnson was president during the 1967 Six-Day War and moved the US into an unprecedentedly generous support relationship with Israel. Unlike Eisenhower a decade earlier, Johnson was opposed to pressuring Israel to withdraw from its newly occupied territories.

Of all the presidents who dealt with the Middle East and were Democrats, President Kennedy - had he lived - showed the greatest potential when it came to developing a more positive policy. Kennedy conducted positive correspondence with Nasser. He had supported the Algerian national struggle against French colonialism. He welcomed the republican revolution in Yemen. He sent a special emissary to try and solve the Palestine refugee problem. However, one also has to remember that it was under Kennedy that we began our first major military assistance program to Israel.

Another Democrat president who deserves some credit is Jimmy Carter. During the Camp David negotiations, he and his national security team worked hard to deal with the Middle East, which was at the top of his foreign policy agenda. It is interesting that while we think of Carter at Camp David, we also think of Carter at the very beginning of his administration in 1977 when he spoke for the first time about

the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and proposed the launching of a US-Soviet peace process to solve the problem. Carter was personally very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Unfortunately, the Camp David process had a major flaw, inasmuch as it led to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, the initiative of President Sadat. The Camp David negotiations deadlocked over the question of the Palestinians and it was not possible for political reasons for the Palestinians to be directly represented. The Egyptians, meanwhile, were unable to serve as effective proxy-representatives for the Palestinians and Menachem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister at that time, was adamantly against even a temporary cessation of settlement building, in spite of his promises to Carter. Carter in a sense failed, but I think one has to give him some credit for not being driven by the Zionist lobby and for giving it a good try. Of the two dozen or so diplomatic initiatives made by the US or by other countries to try to solve this problem since 1948, only Camp David was anywhere near successful. The Oslo process, despite having originally shown promise, appears to have collapsed and I am very pessimistic about a resumption of the process given the current state of Israeli and American domestic politics.

Many Americans today believe that the US is widely hated in the Arab and Islamic World. Washington's 'war on terrorism' is an understandable and popular response to these feelings. Unfortunately, neither the political elite nor the public in general often asks why the US engenders such hostility. People are especially unwilling to entertain the thought that the US support for Israel and its policies might be one of the causes. Beyond that, one sometimes senses that there is certain racism in parts of American society towards the Arab World and a tendency to practice 'guilt by association' for recent terrorist actions against Americans. In the debate in the US over striking at Iraq in February 1998, I was shocked by the opinions of some of the elites, especially those who favor the idea of a bombing campaign, occupying Iraq and changing the regime. At the elite level, there is clearly an unwillingness to consider the human dimension of all this. There are hundreds of thousands of deaths of children in Iraq that have been documented by international organizations, and yet some prominent commentators continue to talk as if the people there were scarcely human beings. Having said that, I believe that the majority of ordinary Americans are not racist and are ready to listen to reasonable arguments.

When you look at how policy concerning the Middle East is formulated in the US, it is sometimes difficult to justify it in rational terms. For example, there were no Congressional debates on the question of dealing with Iraq in February 1998, and to my knowledge there has been no sustained investigation into the collapse of the peace process. In general, the level of knowledge on the Middle East in Congress is remarkably low, and members tend to take the expedient path of following the Israel lobby rather than thinking things through for themselves. The knowledge of Americans in general pertaining to the Middle East, excluding Israel, is very limited. There is instead the popular mythology that Israel wants to bring civilization to this uncivilized part of the world and that the Israeli people share our values, are our friends and deserve our support. Moreover, to many Americans who feel guilty that the US did not do more to prevent the Holocaust Israel therefore possesses special legitimacy. Paradoxically, there is a great deal of objective information on the Middle East available both to the Congress and the general public; yet policy seems to be rooted in ignorance and myths.

Comments from the Discussion Period

■ As to the Iraqi crisis, the Europeans, with the qualified but important exception of the French and Russians, tend to follow the leadership of the US. They feel they do not have military power, and they place greater priority on their economic interests and capabilities. With respect to Iran and Iraq, for example, the French, Russians and Germans prefer to pursue their commercial interests in the region - and so they leave what we call 'the heavy lifting' - the often unpopular political-military work - to the US. On the Arab-Israeli problem, the Europeans and Japan remain deferential to the US on the political side, while playing an important economic development role on the Arab-Palestinian side.

It should be noted, for example, that the European Union was more generous in providing help to Palestinians than the Americans were. It remains to be seen how vigorously the Europeans might use their trade and economic leverage with Israel to pursue political ends. The problem with the Europeans is that they do not seem to have a high degree of commitment and unity on Middle East (and several other) issues. The Americans have been blunt and rebuffed European efforts because they feel that the Europeans are always likely to be pro-Arab and more critical of Israel. The Americans certainly do not like the way the French are supposedly 'imposing' themselves in the Middle East, and they are not all that pleased about the fact that the French and Germans are free to do business with Iran while they are unable to because of the sanctions.

■ As to the US having a 'hostile' policy towards the Arab states, perhaps some qualification is in order. Do the rulers of Egypt or Saudi Arabia say that America is hostile? No, they say that the US is very friendly with most Arab countries. Do the members of the Palestinian Authority think that the US is hostile? No, they will say that although the US is friendly to Israel, it is helping the Palestinians build their state. How many governments in the Arab World will say that the US is hostile? Not the government in Morocco, nor the government in Algeria.

■ With regard to the question of political Islam, groups like Hamas, Hizballah, Al-Jihad, etc., and important thinkers like Dr. Hassan At-Turabi of Sudan are all considered a part of this movement. When we use the term political Islam, we use it to refer to groups trying to activate governments on the basis of Islamic principles. In Islamist circles there is deep anger towards the US because of its support for Israel, but there is also another kind of anger being directed toward certain Arab leaders and regimes that are accused of mocking Islam and violating Islamic rules. Most of these Arab regimes, not coincidentally, are on friendly terms with the US.

The debate in the US on the Islamic movement began after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. It has taken on new prominence today as Islamist-inspired terrorist acts against Americans continue. On one side, we have certain conservatives and Zionists who make the exaggerated claim that all these organizations are part of one single Islamic movement that is hostile to the US. They go on to demand that the US make war on this 'terrorist movement' by direct military means and by financially supporting Middle East governments threatened by it. Some commentators even say that political Islam has replaced Communism as our mortal, global foe. Other commentators take a more sophisticated view, saying that Islamic groups are different and not necessarily or irretrievably hostile to the US. They note that the US Government has sometimes supported Islamist movements, including (in the past) the Moslem brothers in Egypt and Sudan and the Taliban in Afghanistan (more recently), hoping they would become a counterweight to movements that were friendly with the Soviet Union.

■ As to the question of fundamentalism, I know that the American Government as well as academic specialists recognize that there are Jewish (and Christian) as well as Islamic fundamentalists. They are very concerned about certain Jewish fundamentalists and the terrorism that they sometimes engage in - most importantly the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. Moreover, I am sure that when American officials define terrorism, they try not to equate it with Islam. Americans feel that anybody who studies the politics of this region could find religious fanaticism among Jews as well as Moslems and as well as Christians (as in Lebanon during its civil war).

■ With respect to the current US-Iraq crisis (February 1998), I suspect the Clinton administration will accept Kofi Anan's deal with Baghdad and that there will not be a military strike against Iraq, but it is hard to be 100 percent sure without knowing the exact terms of the deal. The administration has made such a big thing out of this that there will be a lot of Americans, especially from the opposition, who will be extremely angry if Clinton does not strike. Whatever happens, it is obvious that the US is going to think that it won; in fact, everybody involved, including Saddam, the Russians and the French are likely to think that they have won in one way or another. Perhaps, the Americans will say that we would not have gotten Saddam Hussein to back down if we had not gathered our military forces, and maybe that is true. But Saddam Hussein might say: "Well, I have done very well indeed; I have gained a lot of time to hide my weapons, and I have gained a great deal of sympathy in the Arab World. I probably consolidated my support in Iraq, I am being visited by delegation after delegation and getting terrific coverage by CNN and I am moving forward slowly toward the end of sanctions." I think it is true that the Iraqis can make a reasonable claim that they have gotten something out of this.

If the US were to attack Iraq after the agreement, it would represent a setback and humiliation for the UN. It would, however, be very difficult for the US to go against such an agreement because no matter how many conditions we put, world opinion and even American opinion will say: "Look, you know, you sent Kofi Anan off and if you go ignore the agreement, it will reflect very badly on the administration." When one thinks about the situation, it becomes clear that the Iraqis have played a very clever game here, in such a way that if the US ignores the agreement, it will have all kinds of problems. Saddam Hussein has even succeeded in making the Clinton administration's higher-ranking officials look rather foolish. I hope that the members of the Clinton administration will accept the plan although it will be difficult for them to do so due to the fact that they have built up so much support for a strike that if they turn around and say that a strike is no longer an option, it is going to be very hard for them to persuade people to accept that their decision is a good idea.

National Security Concerns for the US in the Middle East and The US: Origins and Implications of The Special Relationship With Israel

Dr. Joseph Alpher, American Jewish Committee, Jerusalem

I am going to talk about the US-Israeli relationship and America in the Middle East, both as an Israeli and as someone who represents a major American Jewish organization. What are the factors that have created this relationship and made Israel and the US in effect strategic allies?

If you ask Americans today why they have a special attitude towards Israel or a special relationship with Israel, they will talk primarily about shared values. What does that mean? There are things called Judeo-Christian traditions and values and I think that most American Jews and non-Jews, in explaining what these are, would refer to the fact that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East and add that democracy is seen as a Judeo-Christian value. But there is also something deeper, which goes into the religious or ideological roots of Zionism, not only among Jews but among American Christians as well. There is a large growing segment of the American Christian population that can be described as fundamentalist, and it is very vocal in its support for Israel. American-Christian Zionism goes back to the 19th Century, and one has to remember that the founders of Zionism who obtained the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate at the end of World War I were also supported by British Christians/Christian Zionists. So, a large portion of the American educated public has a very positive attitude toward Zionism, which was obviously very helpful in obtaining American support for the creation of Israel.

It is interesting to note that although the socialist views of the kind we saw here were not popular in the US in the 1940s and 1950s - by the time they became a little more popular, we had stopped believing in them; look at the fate of the kibbutz as an example - and even though the Americans were bothered by them, they did not have a negative effect on American support for Israel. There was in the initial stages some concern in America over whether Israel would take a pro-Soviet or a pro-Western orientation, but once that was cleared up, the existence of the kibbutzim and the Histadrut and all the other parts of the socialist package whose ideological origins are in the Eastern Europe that produced Eastern European communism were not a major obstacle.

A second factor is the Holocaust. While a broad public awareness of the Holocaust in America began with the Eichmann trial, I have no doubt that the feelings of guilt over the Holocaust and a desire to rescue those who survived the Holocaust and to give them a home were major factors in the decision of America's Jews and non-Jews to support the creation of the State of Israel and have remained factors ever since; certainly once World War II was over, it became very clear that the US could have done a lot more to reduce the scope of the Holocaust. The same applies to Europe, but Churchill's main priority was to win World War II. Nevertheless, once the war was over and the dimensions of the Holocaust became clear, there was most definitely a guilt factor involved.

It is interesting to note that today in the US among American Jews, the Holocaust is increasingly becoming the principle organizing framework for a Jewish existence and is actually competing with Israel in that respect. Every Jewish community in the US is building its own mini-Holocaust museum and Jewish educational programs now have a much larger element of the Holocaust, albeit sometimes at the expense of educating about Israel. It is a very interesting phenomenon.

Now we come to the influence of the American Jewish community, which really began to affect American politics at the time of the creation of the State of Israel. In the 1930s, Roosevelt brought a lot of Jews to Washington who shared his adaptation of socialist ideas and ideals. At the same time, a number of Jews became increasingly prominent, particularly in judicial circles, and as 1947 approached several Jewish judges formed the first effective Jewish lobby in Washington to lobby in favor of the creation of the State of Israel. Not all American Jews or Jewish organizations approved the creation of the state; some of them thought that Jews, if not assimilating, should at least be finding their place in

One has to always remember that the feeling in Washington is that Saddam Hussein can sign anything he wants, but he will never keep the promises. There would be people saying Saddam Hussein has tricked Kofi Anan and he has tricked us and we should not allow that to happen now that we have made all this effort to put this thing in place, especially when we know that it will be even harder to hit him next time. Besides, according to the scenario, it is very possible that in a few months something else will come up and there will be some other obstacle, which will put the US in a very difficult position. To leave forces there for several months would be very costly; it is neither easy nor cheap to keep a very large military force 8,000 miles away from home for an indefinite period. First of all, it costs a great deal of money to ship large amounts of equipment and supplies to the area. Moreover, you do not just sit there: you have to keep training, you have to keep practicing, you have to keep supplying, you have to keep maintaining and repairing the equipment, and you have to face the political price as well. There is also the problem of the local population: American airmen sent to Kuwait report that the Kuwaitis do not like to see American military personnel walking around their cities.

You have to pay a price whatever happens. If there is a strike, there will be a military price and a political price. The military price is that you might actually lose some soldiers and airplanes and so forth; losing too many would be a disaster because when Americans know that many of their own airmen are dying or being captured, they are going to wonder if the issue at stake is worth that amount of sacrifice. The political price is huge. If you carried out this strike, there would be protests everywhere in the Moslem World and the Arab World; that is why the American embassies are calling for a withdrawal of personnel and so forth. But, say that there is no strike, there is still a political price. The political price that Clinton will have to pay at home is that Saddam Hussein is still there, possibly continuing to defy the UN inspectors. If this happens Clinton and his foreign policy team will have some difficult explaining to do to Congress and the media. And the military price, as I indicated, is that it is not simple to maintain a large military force there indefinitely. It will be quite awkward - not to say costly - if in a few months the US military is actually called upon to carry out a major military campaign against Iraq.



Western society and they were not interested in encouraging the creation of a Jewish state, but the majority were interested and they were able to influence American policy for the very first time.

During the 1950s and 1960s, when Israel's pro-Western orientations were becoming very clear at the same time as the Soviet influence in the Middle East was growing, Israel was seeing and presenting itself as part of the efforts of the Free World to block the expansion of Soviet power in the Middle East. There was actually fighting between the Israeli airforce and Soviet planes piloted by Soviet pilots over the Suez Canal, and from a strategic viewpoint, this was certainly the clearest 'drawing of the lines', placing Israel very firmly at the forefront of the Western camp opposing Soviet expansion, which undoubtedly earned it further US support.

With regard to the Arab American lobby in the US, that which exists discounts its influence compared to that of various American Jewish organizations and lobbies. Certainly 30 to 40 years ago, there was no Arab American lobby to speak of while there was an extremely active Jewish American lobby. Nevertheless, the Arab American lobby is getting stronger and articulating itself and it could be a factor in the future, as could a Moslem American lobby. The number of Moslems in the US is growing and probably already exceeds the number of Jews, although most Moslems in the US are not of Arab origin, but are black Americans converted to Islam or immigrants from the Indian subcontinent. Whatever their origin, the fact remains that their existence is significant.

As I would define it, Israel has had two strategic allies over the recent decades: one is the US and the other is the American Jewish community, and the two are clearly linked. The fact that the US is seen as a strategic ally is in part attributed to the influence of the Jewish lobby, but I think it is important to differentiate between the US and its American Jewish community.

Why is the American Jewish community a strategic ally of Israel? To find an answer we have to delve a little into the demography and the power of politics of the Jewish World. There are today approximately 12-13 million Jews in the world, of whom 80 percent live in Israel and the US; the others are scattered and are not major factors of influence. In Israel, there are today close to five million Jews and close to one million non-Jews. In the US, meanwhile, there are about 5.5 million Jews and the trend is that the American Jewish community is getting smaller while the number of Jews in Israel is rising.

What we are seeing is a very interesting phenomenon. If we go back 50 years to the eve of Israel's independence, we see about 600,000 Jews here and about 6.5 million Jews in the US. Jewish power in the world was concentrated in the US and the relationship between the Israeli Jewish community and the American Jewish community was completely lopsided. The Israelis were fighting The War of Independence in 1948, and, being outnumbered and with their backs to the wall, they were completely dependent on aid from the outside – there were times when the Israeli Finance Ministry was down to something like \$30,000 dollars to pay its wartime bills - and the American Jewish community mounted a massive aid program involving funding, the smuggling of weapons and political influence in order to create Israel and to enable the Jews here to win the war.

Today, however, the two communities are about the same size because while the Israeli Jewish community is growing, the American Jewish community is shrinking, mainly because of assimilation through intermarriage. One has to remember that there is so little anti-Semitism in America today that there is nothing preventing American Jews from assimilating into the overall fabric of the US at a very rapid rate. Twenty to 30 years from now, we will be looking at a situation where Israel will for the first time in about 2,500 years be the largest Jewish community in the world unless something really drastic happens in the meantime; remember that I am going back to before the fall of the Second Temple and to before the time of Christ because by the time of Christ, there were already more Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere on the Mediterranean than there were here. You have to go back a long time to reach a time when the largest Jewish community was here.

The American Jewish community is very interesting in terms of its structure. Here in Israel our political system has enabled a religious minority to exercise very far-reaching influence on political and personal status issues. In America, on the other hand, the Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox communities make up about 10 percent of the Jewish population, but they do not in any way dominate any of the Jewish institutions or the making of American Jewish policy toward Israel. They are, however, the most 'Zionist' and the most closely linked to Israel. If you ask American Jews simple factual questions about Israel, you will see that American Orthodox Jews are much more engaged and aware of what happens here than the rest of the American Jewish community. Nevertheless, the rest of the American Jewish community, whether Reform, Conservative or unaffiliated with any stream of Judaism, make up the majority and have the major organizations that lobby, make declarations with regard to Israel, and follow very closely the way their Congressmen or Congresswomen vote on issues involving Israel.

Compared to 50 years ago, today we have a situation where the balance of power is changing. The number of American Jews is gradually decreasing because of the high rate of assimilation, and there are predictions that 50 years from now there will not be 5.5 million, but three million American Jews because the others will have intermarried and ceased to think of themselves as Jews. As a result, the leaders of the American Jewish community are looking for ways to improve Jewish identification in the education of young Jews in America, and they look to both the Holocaust and Israel as organizing principles. When it comes to Israel as an organizing principle they look to us here for us to tell them what being Jewish means, and this is rather a problem because being Jewish in Israel, assuming you are not Orthodox, merely means bearing Israeli nationality, whereas being Jewish in the Diaspora has more to do with belonging to Judaism, the religion of a Diaspora community that is a small minority, which wants very much to be Jewish, even in the absence of any real anti-Semitism. The problem so many Jews face today, whether they belong to the non-Orthodox majority in Israel or the non-Orthodox majority in America, is how to find the common denominator of their Judaism. If we do not want to see the number of Jews in the world cut in half in 50 years, even though Israel will then be stronger and will have more Jews living within its borders, we have to find a way to find a common denominator in our Judaism.

In contrast to the non-Orthodox, the Orthodox do not have a problem because they maintain an orthodox religious way of life that is identical in Israel and in America. Admittedly, the Orthodox in Israel are also Israelis while those in America are Americans, but they have much closer contact and they share a common language. Talking as a Zionist, if I thought that the five million American Jews would come to Israel and that would be the reason why there would be no more American Jews, I would not be concerned, but the reality is that they are not going to come here and are liable to disappear. In the long run, this could clearly have some effect on the ability of the American Jewish community to influence American policy with regard to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. One has to take into account that the Jewish community in America is already down from 6.5 to 5.5 million, and even though about 700,000 Russian Jews have emigrated to America in recent years, the Jewish community is still getting smaller at the same time as the American population and the Arab and Moslem lobbies are growing.

Nevertheless, the American Jewish community remains very skillful at organizing itself politically in order to exercise influence within the framework of the legitimate game of American democracy. How do interest groups influence policy? They do it through lobbying and through contributing to campaigns, including those of politicians, which is very much part of the American way of doing things and points to the fact that American Jews will continue to have a very strong influence for at least the next couple of decades, regardless of what happens demographically. But if we look further afield demographically, there is clearly the possibility of very big changes occurring.

Today, the two issues that have led to a controversial argument going on between the American Jewish mainstream and the Government of Israel are the peace process and the conversion or the 'Who is a Jew?' issue. On the peace process, American Jews who define themselves as liberals and who are devout Democrats adopted an attitude that was in favor of the idea of land for peace following Oslo, and the majority supported the notion of Israeli negotiations with the PLO. While there is no unanimity of opinion among American Jews and there have always been those who are very dovish and those who are very hawkish when it comes to Israeli issues, I would say that over the past few years, the majority has been consistently dovish in a very generalized way with regard to support for the peace process. Certainly since Netanyahu came to power some 19 to 20 months ago, the disparity between the way American Jews see the process and the way Netanyahu sees the process has become increasingly evident.

In spite of the dovish tendencies of the majority of America's Jews, Clinton and Albright still take their potentially negative reaction into consideration when considering the feasibility of putting pressure on Netanyahu and in deciding how much pressure to inflict. Clinton knows that if he pressures Netanyahu and the American Jewish community reacts negatively, this will affect not only his own standing but also that of Vice President Gore, who is Clinton's candidate for the 2000 elections. Clinton knows that a lot of his own funding came from Jewish sources or sources that are influenced by the American Jewish community and if Gore loses this funding as a result of pressure being put on Israel, he will be in serious trouble. He also realizes that if Gore loses popularity as a result of American Jews turning their back on him the American administration could be in trouble, and he knows that if American Jews choose to side with the Republican dominated Congress, which tends to be more hawkish on the Israeli-Arab issue, then this could make problems for Clinton, not only with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but with regard to other issues as well. And so, given that American Jews tend to be more dovish and tend - at least according to most of the polls - to support the notion of pressure being put not only on Arafat, but on Netanyahu as well, Clinton must constantly ask himself: How far can I go in exerting pressure?

Today, as a result of one recent poll done by the organization that represents all the Jewish federations – the American Jewish communities are organized on a city by city basis and in each city there is a federation of Jewish organizations - we know that 70 percent support the idea of putting pressure on both Netanyahu and Arafat, while only 52 percent say American Jews should support the policies of the newly elected Government of Israel. Meanwhile, 47 percent say that they have the right to criticize what the Government of Israel says and 60 percent say that Netanyahu unnecessarily provokes the Palestinians, etc.

There is also another survey, and I think that the differences between the two tell us quite a lot about the whole culture of surveys in America and also in Israel. A left-wing dovish American Jewish organization, the Israel Policy Forum, carried out a poll late last year and its members were very clever because they used Clinton's own polling company to ensure that he would be convinced that the findings were reliable. They discovered that 84 percent of American Jews believed the administration should pressure both Netanyahu and Arafat. When the results came out, *The Middle East Quarterly*, which was founded by American Jews of the more hawkish persuasion, did its own poll and found that only 24 percent of American Jews said Clinton should pressure Netanyahu to move faster on trading land for peace. Of course, a lot depends on the phrasing of the question, but the polling was used very freely in order to try to influence the American administration's views, particularly with regard to the peace process. It is clear to me that the Clinton administration is monitoring very closely the way the American Jewish community reacts to Netanyahu's policies, the way it reacts to Arafat, and the way it sees issues before it takes any new step to deal with them.

I will give you one very graphic example that concerns a conversation I had with a senior US diplomat last August when Albright was contemplating making her statement about the Middle East and coming to the area. The diplomat was talking to the representatives of several American Jewish organizations in Israel and he said: "Well, how do you think the American Jewish community will react if Albright starts banging heads together?" It was instantly clear to me that this is the main question that the US administration is now asking the American Jewish community in order to try to gauge how far it can go in terms of 'banging heads together' and putting pressure on both Arafat and Netanyahu at exactly the same time.

The second issue of great controversy is the conversion issue. With the rise of the political influence of the Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel, they have begun to push to legislate what I have to call 'fundamentalist' legislation, which is not very different from what Islamist parties want in those countries where they are able to express themselves at the parliamentary level. So we have in our Knesset what I call a Jewish fundamentalist agenda. I would note at this point that my Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox friends do not like the use of the word fundamentalist, and I do not mean to imply that all Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox Israelis are fundamentalist, but in the religious parties there are certain elements that are basically quite fundamentalist in their approach. These elements want Jewish Law to be the law of the land and they are trying to legislate on issues that affect not only Jews in Israel, but Jews everywhere and particularly those in the US, where the non-Orthodox movements are well developed. There appears to be a growing tendency for American Jews to look to Israel for their points of identity as Jews; add to this the fact that in Israel we have a growing extreme secularist movement while, for the past ten years, the whole concept of constitutional law and rule of law has gradually become well-enunciated, particularly by the High Court of Justice, and add to this the peace process with all its difficulties, and it becomes very clear that we need to prepare ourselves to answer the question we have managed to postpone for many years, namely, the question of the Jewish nature of Israel.

What is the Jewish nature of Israel? If you look at the Declaration of Independence, you will see that Israel is described as the state of the Jewish people and also as a Jewish national home; there is clearly a big difference between the two descriptions. A Jewish national home is a secular definition, while a Jewish state is a religious definition. The murder of Prime Minister Rabin by a fundamentalist Jew really brought the issue to the front of the agenda in a very big way and today, a growing number of Israeli thinkers and politicians are saying that the question of the Jewish nature of Israel is even more important than the peace process, while others are saying that it is an issue that should be left until the peace process has reached its conclusion. Naturally, there is an overflow of all of this political and intellectual activity in Israel that spills on to the American Jewish community, and if anything is capable of causing a major split between Israel and the American Jewish community, it is the conversion and the 'Who is a Jew?' issues. If the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox have their way, we could soon be seeing a serious weakening of American Jewish support for Israel leading to untold damage to our strategic alliance with the US.

Let me turn now to talk about how I see the American national security concerns in the Middle East. I would say that the two issues that tend to stick out again and again and be repeated in one form either implicitly or explicitly are Israel's wellbeing, survival, and security on the one hand and securing Ameri-

can interests in the Middle East, which really means oil and the means to secure it in addition to freedom of the seas, on the other. The peace process is seen as a means not only of ensuring Israel's well-being, but also of making it easier for the US to deal with its strategic interests in the Middle East and the strategic interests of the industrialized world in general, meaning oil.

But additional issues fall under this as well. One is anti-proliferation, that is, there is a growing awareness in America that the Middle East in the post-Cold War era, along with places like North Korea, is the major focus of the possible dangerous proliferation of non-conventional weapons and the means to deliver them. The peace process is seen as one means of reinforcing American policy with regard to preventing this proliferation – the Madrid Process, at least originally, contained the multilateral talks on arms control and regional security - but it is also seen as a way of cementing American influence in the region and achieving other American goals. Now, certainly when the current peace process began, it was seen then, and I think it is still seen today as one of several instruments that the US would like to use in order to maintain its unique superpower role in the Middle East, or to put it differently, in preventing Russia from reestablishing itself as a major source of influence in the Middle East. To the extent that the peace process is weakened, I think the US perceives that its proliferation problems are more difficult and that Russia has more opportunities to return to the region and to exercise influence, whether by selling arms or by offering its own diplomatic efforts.

There are three additional US strategic goals in the Middle East. One is blunting terrorism or dealing with terrorism. Again, terrorism is seen as one of the increasingly dangerous threats that emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Middle East context, it is particularly state-sponsored terrorism and to a large extent Islamic-oriented terrorism whether Hamas, Hizbollah or problems in Egypt or Algeria or the perception that Iran is a state-sponsor of terrorism that could be carried out by its own agents and sometimes by proxies. The second goal - although I think this is perhaps now less of a goal than it was, let us say, in the time of Jimmy Carter – is the spread and encouragement of democratization and human rights worldwide with particular emphasis on the Middle East. My sense is that US policy-makers adopted a more sober approach to this issue when confronted with the emergence of strong radical Islamic movements in the Arab countries, and particularly in Arab countries that can argue that these movements have emerged because they have engaged in democratization. Some of the ongoing tensions between American and Egyptian policy-makers are certainly related to America's constant pressure on Mubarak to liberalize, to which Mubarak has responded by saying, "Look what happened when I liberalized; I have to be very careful liberalizing because I have radical Islamic elements that will try to take advantage of it." But I think that the promotion of democratization and respect for human rights does remain broadly speaking an American strategic goal, and not only in the Middle East.

The third and final goal is European security *vis-à-vis* the Mediterranean southern rim and *vis-à-vis* resurgent Islam. When the US looks at this issue in its entirety it is aware, as are the Europeans, that there is a very important Middle Eastern element. You see this today, for example, in some of the argumentation over the question of expanding NATO. The US has decided to expand NATO and it is now trying to obtain Senate approval to revise the NATO treaty in order to get the first three Eastern European former communist countries, which are now democratic countries, into NATO. Some people are pointing out that one of the consequences of bringing in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary into NATO, is that you are increasing the Russians' sense that they have lost on this front and that they are under considerable security pressure on their European front, which has resulted amongst other things in Russia improving its relationship with Iran on another front.

Replies to Questions

With regard to where the US stands today on the two key Middle East issues, the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iraq, one can say that its overall standing in the Middle East has most certainly been damaged in recent months by the Arab perception that it is not prepared to pressure Israel on the stalled peace process issues, in addition to the fact that what it wants to do with Iraq is not popular with the Arab masses. Even when the peace process was successful, it was difficult for the US to recreate the alliances of 1990-91 with Egypt, Syria and the Gulf countries; it is even harder today, given the current state of the peace process. The US is aware that it is the subject of very heavy criticism and the cause of a sense of disappointment among some of the Arab leaders. On the other hand, assuming that the most recent agreement will restore the UN monitors to Iraq in the way that the US wants, it will also be seen, perhaps begrudgingly, that the US has done what no other power in the world could do in terms of compelling Iraq to obey the UN resolutions by using force very effectively; that is to say, by using the threat of force to achieve a strategic aim. It might be a very short-term achievement, because one could say that whatever Saddam Hussein agrees to today he is going to try to wiggle out of in the coming

months. Nevertheless, I think the ultimate conclusion of Arab leaders has to be that there is no alternative to America in terms of getting any outside power to help them achieve their strategic aims with regard to the peace process, or for that matter any other major issue in the Middle East.

One popular misconception concerning America is that the fact that many of America's most prominent political figures are Jewish is clearly reflected in US foreign policy here in the Middle East. One should bear in mind that Dennis Ross, Sandy Berger, and Martin Indyk, for example, despite being Jews, are doves on the Arab-Israel issues. I really believe that in the Arab World today there is an increasing readiness to differentiate between this American Jew and that American Jew. The new US Ambassador in Egypt, for example, is a Jew, yet the Egyptians welcome him because they know his views. The American Jews in Congress take very different positions, with some way out on the right and others way out on the left, and one of the main reasons why you do not hear American non-Jews complaining about the Jewish influence and the Jewish lobby is because increasingly, those American Jews who fill these positions are very well integrated into American society.

Even were the Americans to elect a Jewish president, this would not necessarily be a victory for Israel, nor would it have any real significance. One has to remember that American Jews do not have the power to dictate the results of the elections; they have influence, but the same applies to the oil lobby and the American Christian fundamentalist lobby, whose support for Israel varies according to the issue under discussion. In short, we are talking about a much bigger mosaic, and the power of the Jewish lobby has to be seen in perspective.

With regard to the possibility of Israel's present stand having a negative effect on America's interests, Madeleine Albright said in December that because there was no progress in the Israeli-Palestinian talks, it was more difficult for the US to get Arab support for dealing with Iraq. That was probably the closest the US has come in recent times to saying our interests are being hurt because of Israel's position in the peace process.

What is particularly interesting to note in this context is that Clinton's refusal a few months to meet Netanyahu was seen by the mainstream American Jewish community as nothing more than a kind of snub, a message to the Israeli public that their prime minister is *persona non grata* in America and that they should think about why, and although American Jews did not applaud Clinton's decision, they did not object. On the other hand, when Albright said the absence of progress between Israel and the Palestinians makes it more difficult for us to deal with Iraq, the organized American Jewish community did object. In objecting to this linkage, it pointed out to the President and the Secretary of State, that back in 1990-91, Saddam and Arabs who supported Saddam justified Saddam's position, and even in some cases the invasion of Kuwait, by referring to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and that Albright's attempt to create this linkage was dangerous and unjustified. In other words, the majority of American Jews were saying, you want to snub Netanyahu, fine, but do not do it by blaming him for Iraq. At the same time, although US policy-makers are hearing from Arab leaders, that if they do not get Israel to move on the peace process, it will be bad for their image in the Arab World, I do not believe that anything has happened to translate that message into a threat. There is no longer the threat of an oil boycott or of running off to Moscow to sign treaties of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union; all the old threats are gone.

At this point it is worth noting a very fundamental principle of American Jewish-Israeli relations, namely, that for the American-Jewish community, with all its support for Israel and its vital role in the creation of Israel, it has always been very important to maintain the distinction between Israel and itself. American Jews regard Israel as a sovereign, democratic state, whereas they see themselves as Americans. Moreover, they have seen as a principle the need to avoid taking sides in Israeli politics or on Israeli political issues, which would entail criticizing the elected Government of Israel. The big exception in the past year or two has been on the conversion issue, because here, American Jews said wait a minute, this is not an issue of Middle East peace, this is an issue of the Knesset of Israel legislating about whether our conversions are Kosher; we have a right to protest this. But on the other hand, when the Israeli Government decides upon the percentage of West Bank land it is going to offer or not offer to the Palestinians, we may think it is a good idea, we may think it is a bad idea, we quite often do not know much about it - knowledge of the intricacies of Israeli issues is very superficial - and exactly because we do not know much about it, we should avoid taking sides. One reason they want to avoid taking sides is that they feel that if the American Jewish community is seen to be split on this major issue, then it will lose some of its influence upon Congress, the White House, the media and other institutions.

In fact, one of the things the peace process has done is to free American Jews of the sense that they have to devote a large part of their energies to supporting Israel because Israel's survival is in danger. Of course, Saddam in 1991 firing missiles at Israel reinforced that sense once again, but by and large in

the last ten years Americans have become less preoccupied with Israel and its survival. But they see that in one way or another the peace process can have some effect on them, because they understand that there are links between the Israeli political discussion over the peace process and the Israeli political discussion over the conversion issue and other issues, which is why there has been a greater readiness to take a position. Whether we are going to see any major breakthrough here or not, I do not know; I think it is possible, assuming that Netanyahu maintains his hard-line stand, which might lead to more American Jewish opposition expressed toward him. I really think that key Arab leaders with whom American organizations have developed good relations in recent years against the backdrop of the peace process do tend to welcome contacts today with the American Jewish community because they would like to influence it and get it to take a stronger stand on these issues, whether publicly or privately.

At this point I should emphasize that my organization, The American Jewish Committee, like any mainstream Jewish organization, does not take specific policy positions on specific issues. It will say, for example, we support the peace process, we support the idea of territory for peace, talks with the PLO, etc., but it does not go behind that, although it did actually several years ago take a position against building settlements. Nevertheless, I feel it necessary to address the claim that American Jews living in Israeli settlements are perhaps the greatest source of the troubles in the region.

I would say that about 15 percent of the settlers are American immigrants, who make up approximately 25 percent of the hard-line, ideological Gush Emunim. The American Orthodox community is the most closely interested in Israel, and in recent years, of the 2,000 or so Americans who have immigrated to Israel every year, about half of them have been from that small seven percent or so minority of American Jews who are Orthodox, many of whom have gone straight to yeshivas or the settlements with a very strong religious Zionist, hawkish orientation. I would not say, however, that American Jewish immigrants are the dominant element in Gush Emunim or in the settlement movement, although they are certainly very vocal. If you ask the elected leaders of the Council for Settlers about the Americans they will sort of smile and say, well, they have not really been absorbed yet, they are kind of naive; let them yell and scream, they do not make policy. Having said that, if and when the day comes - and I think and hope it will come - when new lines are drawn on the map and some settlements at least find themselves inside Palestine, you will see a small, violent minority, including a lot of Americans, who somehow brought with them some attitudes towards violence that are more extreme than those of most Israelis.

One has to remember in this context that America is in its own way a very violent country, so some of the settlers in fact represent a combination of American traditions of violence - the Wild West and so on and so forth - mixed with some extreme orthodox or ultra-orthodox attitudes. When you put the two together, you can get a very violent combination, like Kahane or Goldstein. You have Israelis who are just as Orthodox or Ultra-Orthodox and just as extreme in their beliefs but not violent, but then again you also have violent secular Israelis. It is not clear cut, but undoubtedly there is an unusual proportion of Americans who I would include in the violent, religious fringe, capable of using violence to stop the peace process. I am also saying, however, that one has to be very careful when it comes to stereotyping.

Another aspect of American Jewish-Israeli relations materialized in the demonstrations against Rabin in 1994 and 1995 when we had a situation whereby a recent American Jewish immigrant to Israel speaking broken Hebrew would be arrested by the police for demonstrating illegally, and as he was being dragged away he would pull out his mobile phone and call his father in New York, begging him to go tell their congressman in New York that he had become a victim of Israeli police brutality. In this kind of an incident, you have a very interesting dynamic of American Jewish-Israeli relations; American Jews who are prepared to organize pressure in America to achieve their very particular political ideological goals in Israel. You saw it again with the conversion issue, whereby the American Reform and Conservative movements went to their congressmen and said, "Do not support Israel unless Israel drops this conversion law," also very blatantly using these brutal political tools. One of the interesting aspects of American Jewish-Israeli relations has been that while broadly speaking the two communities are growing apart, the one becoming either more ultra-orthodox or secular, and the other becoming more assimilated, when they do interact they interact today in a much more dynamic manner, involving one another very closely, pressuring one another, and using money, politics, dirty tricks and everything in order to affect the policies of each other in a way that we did not see in the past.

With regard to the Jewish lobby in the States, I think that the present preoccupation with the American Jewish influence on American policies, whether domestic or external, is very legitimate. The Jewish influence, however, does not encourage anti-Jewish feelings or anti-Semitism; it might have 40 or 50 years ago but it does not today. Today, American Jews are very much in the mainstream, and their organizations are seen as legitimate. I am not saying that non-Jews do not resent their influence, but there is far less resentment than there was in the past, just as there is much less anti-Semitism today.

American Jews are seen to have a legitimate interest in Israel in the same way as American Armenians are seen to have a legitimate interest in Armenia. American Greeks lobby against Turkey, and although the Turks object, there are not enough American Turks to oppose them so American Greeks are a very effective lobby. Still, the fact that the Jews may be more successful than others is not something that encourages anti-Jewish feeling.

Moving on to the way in which the Palestinians can influence the American Jews and get them to agree with them, it is clear that there are some American Jews on the left wing of the spectrum who do agree with some Palestinian views, while there are others who do not and others are simply ignorant or have no opinion. I must say, one of the things I am surprised by is the fact that the PLO office in Washington does not have people who are effective in explaining Palestinian issues to Americans in general and to American Jews in particular, the majority of whom are prepared to listen.

One has to always take into account that as far as the majority of American Jews are concerned, the broad strategic agenda with regard to Israel is the welfare and strength of Israel. American Jews have traditionally backed the democratically elected Government of Israel and its policies, albeit often very blindly and without understanding its policies, but theirs is a very specific, long-term position. In other words, as far as they are concerned it is a case of even if we are not going to get involved in specific policy issues, we are going to give the Israeli Government our broad support.

But again, American Jews do look upon themselves first as Americans; you can see that in the inter-marriage rate. Seventy percent of young American Jews intermarry, and most of them do not raise their children as Jews, which says something about the future size of the American Jewish community. The level of knowledge of American Jews about the Middle East, Islam etc., is higher than that of most Americans, but it is still very poor, although American policy on issues like Islam is much more sophisticated than it was ten years ago, when they were making pronouncements that put the Islamic movements in Algeria, Iran, Sudan and Egypt into the same bucket. It would appear that they have learned a lesson from the consequences of generalizing.

As I have already indicated, the American Jewish community is decreasing in size while the overall American population is increasing and I believe that when American Jews number not five and a half million but three and a half million, it will make a difference to America's support of Israel. But it will be a very slow and gradual process, and it will depend on many things. I would like to hope that the peace process will have progressed enough 20 years from now to render all the figures insignificant inasmuch as Israel's relations with its neighbors will have improved while their relations with the US will be such that there will be a broad American interest to support all concerned.

Personally, I think it is a big mistake for Arabs or Israelis to say that everything depends on the US. Today, for example, the US is a mediator, but it is still not producing results. The only successful breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli peace process, even going back as far as Camp David, took place without the knowledge of the US, or in some cases despite the opposition of the US. Sadat announced on 9 November 1977 that he was coming to Jerusalem and Carter refused to give the trip his blessing for an entire fortnight because it destroyed his notion of an American-Soviet brokered Geneva conference of peace; he did not understand that what Sadat was saying was that I want to get the Russians out, and I want an American orientation, and I am going through Jerusalem to get it.

Oslo is another good example. The US leadership was against our talking to the PLO, and Rabin went behind its back. Even the treaty with Jordan was signed without the knowledge of the US. This is why I do not believe in American mediation as something that is going to produce anything of real significance. I think the US policy-makers know the chances that they can facilitate any real progress are very small, because the distance between the two parties is too great and there is no trust or credibility between them. They are simply hoping to do enough to keep the process alive until something happens that enables the parties to do this themselves, and in this respect one has to remember that it is impossible to impose peace. I think America is very cautious about the notion of producing its own solution to the second further re-deployment and saying to the parties, take it or leave it, because it will look like an American dictate, and if it is accepted it might not work, because it is accepted under pressure, while if it is not accepted, the US will look ridiculous. In short, if something is wrong with the way the Israeli Government is dealing with the peace process, ultimately it is the Israelis, not American Jews and not Americans, who have to deal with this internally in Israel in order to make something work.



Instruments of American Policy in the Middle East: From Diplomacy to Intervention

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What exactly do we mean by intervention in the field of foreign policy and international relations? Whilst looking for an answer, we soon realize that there is more than one kind of intervention and more than one degree of intervention, so before looking at the record of American interventions in the Middle East we should distinguish between different degrees and different kinds of involvement. In doing this, we should take an inventory of what international relations students call the 'instruments' of foreign policy; in other words, we should determine how big powers project their influence and how they try to make the things happen that they want to happen.

To begin with, one must ask the question: Is it proper and right to characterize the American involvement in this region as being heavily oriented toward 'intrusive' or 'interventionist' applications of influence as opposed to 'normal diplomacy'? And related to that question is another: Assuming one were assigned the task of advising the top US foreign policy leadership regarding its future Middle East policy, what kind of advice might one give, and in particular, what 'instruments' of foreign policy - from normal diplomacy to military intervention - might one recommend be applied to the various issues that concern America with respect to the Middle East?

In Washington, ever since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the US has come to be considered the only remaining superpower in the world. If this is correct, we should ask ourselves how the US exercises its hegemony in a region such as this one, which, at least from the American perspective, has been extremely troublesome. How has it used its power and its leverage to achieve the results that it wants to achieve?

Degrees of Involvement

When we turn to the task of defining intervention in international affairs, I would propose that there are degrees of involvement on a spectrum ranging from normal and ordinary diplomacy to the most intrusive instrument, which is the actual application of military force. One might imagine that we usually begin with what we call normal diplomacy: the proposing of initiatives, the organizing of projects, or the starting of peace processes to deal with particular problems.

In the case of the US, we know that one important instrument has been the application of economic assistance in the pursuit of foreign policy interests. A wealthy country such as the US, if so inclined, can offer grants, loans, technical assistance and so forth so that a friendly government can remain stable or a particular leader will feel a new sense of obligation toward the US and its interests. Over the years, the US has offered economic as well as diplomatic assistance to a number of the key actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By far the most has gone to the Israelis, who have received increasing amounts of economic assistance from consecutive governments, whose aim has been to project influence in general and to manage the Arab-Israeli situation in particular. We can become a little more intrusive with the provision of military assistance: for the same reasons that the US gives financial aid, it also finds it useful to use the instrument of military aid, the giving of tanks and planes - or the selling of them if the client government can afford to buy them - to achieve certain kinds of influence. In the case of Israel, the American logic has held that a militarily secure - even superior - Israel will then be both able and inclined to negotiate a durable peace with relatively weaker Arab neighbors.

We can expand the notion of intrusive intervention further by moving along our spectrum toward the instrument of subversion. Subversion can provide the means of getting your way in a particular troubled region. The US Government, especially since World War II, has developed a large intelligence community, which includes the CIA and a number of other agencies. In addition to gathering intelligence, these agencies have also on occasion actively intervened beneath the surface in order to alter the political equation in a particular country. This is the 'dirty tricks' instrument, and it is pertinent to ask to what extent and with what results has the US used the technique of subversion - attempts to undermine governments, arrange coups, and assassinate leaders - over the years in the Middle East?

Finally, we come to the conventional notion of what intervention is all about, namely, the use of military force. This is the ultimate form of intervention and the instrument of last resort, not to be used very often. Military intervention is an instrument that may have benefits, but it also has risks, and it most definitely has costs. In speaking of it we should differentiate between the indirect use of military force, such as through unmanned missiles, the air force or navy, and the actual placement of troops on the ground in an attempt to occupy territory.

The US Middle East Policy Agenda

Now that we have distinguished various degrees of intervention, we may consider how the US has used these instruments in the Middle East over the years, especially since the end of World War II. What are some of the big, foreign policy or security issues pertaining to the Middle East that have concerned American foreign policy-makers since the 1940s?

Number one, of course, is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the centerpiece of regional tensions and American concern going back to the middle-1940s. Another big issue area for the US was the containment of the Soviet Union: how to keep communism and the Russians out of this area in order to prevent them from competing with American influence in the Arab World or in the Middle East in general.

Yet another issue is the need to maintain access to the oil resources of the Middle East and to maintain reasonable prices. Speaking from the point of view of US policy-makers, this is what they, like the British before them, were perhaps most worried about. The oil reserves in the Middle East are important strategically, economically, and commercially, and Americans are unable to ignore the possibility that unfriendly external competitors might somehow get their hands on them or at least find a way to impede our access.

There is a fourth area that has occupied a lot of time on the part of American decision-makers, and that is the question of dealing with nationalism and inter-Arab politics. From the point of view of American foreign policy-makers, as well as all the analysts within the intelligence community in the State Department and the Defense Department, the rise of radical nationalist sentiments was a matter of real concern, as it was in the past to the British Government. Why was it a problem? Because more often than not the nationalist movement in question - and I am thinking particularly of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s - was targeted at regimes with whom the US Government had good relations and upon whom it often depended for local assistance in the pursuit of its various interests. So if, for example, the Governments of Lebanon or Jordan were under attack or threatened by 'Pan-Arabism' - as they were in the 1950s and 1960s - instability loomed and US policy-makers fretted about preserving the friendly regimes in both countries. US intelligence operatives were active in both countries, and finally American forces intervened in Lebanon (and British forces, in coordination, intervened in Jordan) in 1958. Later, when the Palestinian *muqawama* (resistance) movement posed a challenge to the regime, this situation rang all kinds of alarm bells in Washington. The question policy-makers had to consider in facing these 'alarming' situations was how a very powerful country 6,000 miles away from the scene of the trouble should deploy its resources and intervene to try and assist the beleaguered regime challenged by a nationalist movement.

Case Study: US Policy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Let us now look at the instruments of foreign policy that the US has employed in the Arab-Israeli conflict. How has the US dealt with the transformation of Palestine from an Arab land to a Jewish state from 1947 to the present day? What kinds of instruments did the US foreign policy team apply to deal with the consequences of the creation of the State of Israel and the *Naqba* - the displacement of the Palestinians - and the disruption that occurred in the Arab World in general?

In general, the US since the mid-1940s has been very active in taking diplomatic initiatives for a peaceful settlement of the problem. The US had of course supported the Partition Resolution of 1947 that was adopted by the United Nations, which was yet another diplomatic effort to try and resolve the Palestinian tragedy. Of course it was unsuccessful, being immediately followed by war, expulsion and instability. Once the conflict was over, the State of Israel was established, essentially through military success. It was then up to the US to try to find a way to move from a very unstable and tense standoff between Israel and its Arab neighbors - armistice agreements having been signed on the island of Rhodes in 1949 - to an arrangement according to which the new State of Israel would be accepted by the Arabs. The US supported and accepted the UN resolution after the War of 1948 that called for the repatriation of displaced Palestinians as long as they were prepared to live in peace with their neighbors in the State of Israel, but like so many other diplomatic efforts that the US either initiated or supported, it was not successful, mainly because it was categorically rejected by Israel and not vigorously enforced by either the UN or the powers behind it.

Depending on how you count them, over the years there have been up to 20 or 25 distinct efforts by various American administrations to bring about a diplomatic solution. Among them one thinks of the Eric Johnston Plan of 1954/55, which was not only a diplomatic intervention in itself, but also an attempt to deploy economic assistance in order to persuade the parties to reach a permanent political settlement. This was an effort to encourage joint work on developing the water resources of the Jordan Valley to the benefit of all parties. On another occasion in 1955, the Eisenhower administration, which believed that economic assistance would be able to serve a political purpose, sent out a special envoy to quietly broker a diplomatic process between Nasser and the Israelis, but although the plan showed some promise for a while, it also did not work.

During the period of the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, Kennedy sent out Mr. Joseph Johnson to work on the refugee question, but although he spoke to the Israelis, the Jordanians, and to practically everybody who would listen, there was still no progress. In this case, as in so many others, it was the stubbornness of the Israeli Government that ensured that those involved were unable to achieve any success. It should be noted that this period witnessed ever-increasing US financial assistance to Israel, although the other countries of the region such as Jordan and Egypt also benefited from US aid.

After 1967, diplomacy was once again on the agenda, and there were serious efforts by the US to engage the help of the Russians, the British and the French, but none were successful. Finally, after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the US sent in its 'super diplomat', Kissinger, who engaged in an exercise known as 'shuttle diplomacy' whilst trying to arrange a cease-fire between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria. Although Kissinger succeeded in his immediate purpose, he was unable to move the whole problem very far forward. One of the reasons why Mr. Kissinger's diplomacy basically failed is that it ignored the question of the Palestinians.

We move forward to the era of President Carter, who initially wanted to organize a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli question through a conference in Geneva, in which all the major parties would participate, including the Soviets. This effort was quickly sabotaged, first of all by the anti-Soviet forces within the American political system, and secondly, by Anwar Sadat. Fearing that Carter's approach gave too much prominence to the Soviet Union, Sadat decided to override the American initiative and go to Jerusalem to try and break what he saw as the psychological barrier between Arabs and Israelis. In the process he bypassed the US as a kind of godfather of the Arab-Israeli settlement plans. The Carter administration quickly adjusted its policies and built on Sadat's initiative. Carter's Camp David negotiations were a crucial diplomatic initiative, and led to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Normal diplomacy, with presidential involvement, scored a victory fully as complete as any US military intervention before or since.

We now come to the Reagan administration, which I imagine is not remembered with great affection here in the Middle East. President Reagan's plan of 1982 put a strong emphasis on Jordan as a kind of custodian of Palestinian interests in the West Bank, and even today the Jordanian option keeps coming up in the American diplomatic arsenal. In any case, such normal diplomacy was entirely overshadowed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, for which Israel was apparently given the 'amber light' by the Reagan administration. But Israel's war went badly and led to an unanticipated military involvement by the US as part of a four-nation multinational 'peacekeeping' force. Actually, it was America's second military intervention in Lebanon, the first having taken place in 1958.

After Israel had occupied about half of Lebanon and besieged Beirut, the US, along with Britain, France and Italy organized a multinational force (MNF), which was to enter Beirut. The Americans were eager to find a way to end the siege that was leading to the deaths of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians, and they wanted to do this by finding a way to get the Palestinian fighters out of Beirut. So President Reagan assigned the task to Philip Habib, an Arab American diplomat from Washington. Habib's job was to quickly find a way to evacuate the Palestinian fighters and avoid a bloody showdown with the Israeli forces encircling Beirut. But at the same time the great powers decided - I believe with justice and wisdom - that it was important to interpose an international military force in Beirut to secure the safety of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians left behind and now unprotected by the Palestinian military forces that were being evacuated. Having secured the evacuation of the Palestinian armed forces, the multinational force quickly withdrew, but as soon as it withdrew, the Lebanese Christian militias moved forward and massacred several hundred Palestinian refugees living in the camps of Sabra and Shatilla. I remember going there a few weeks later and observing the consequences; it was a very grim and bloody business, especially when one takes into account the fact that throughout the massacre, the Israeli troops who were on the perimeters of the camps abetted the Phalangists by providing search lights so they could find their Palestinian victims and kill them.

The MNF hastily returned but the damage was done, and its commanders must have felt greatly ashamed for having left before its mission was completed and allowing this massacre to occur. Moreover, the MNF soon found itself unwillingly sucked into the ongoing civil war in Lebanon. The American stay in Lebanon ended in a tragic and humiliating manner early in 1984 when a Hizbollah truck bomber broke through the perimeter fence housing the US marines who were part of the multinational force at Beirut International Airport and blew up the truck, himself, and the building in which 240 or so marines were sleeping, killing them all. Meanwhile, another Hizbollah fighter did the same kind of thing to the nearby French multinational forces, killing 60 or so of their number. Following the catastrophe at the barracks, President Reagan, who had originally declared Lebanon a vital national interest, quickly changed his mind, and the rapid evacuation that followed put an end to this particular military intervention. One is left to one's own conclusions about what this specific example tells us about the utility of military intervention in complicated and unstable situations.

Meanwhile 'normal diplomacy' resumed, but to little effect until President George Bush came to power. Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker, was rather more inventive than his predecessors. In 1989, Baker began to take a very active but interventionist role in the Arab-Israeli problem by proposing a plan for bringing the parties together, and it was thanks to his efforts that we witnessed the convening of the Madrid Conference in 1991, which was the result of an unusually well-structured and multi-faceted example of diplomatic intervention. What Baker and his colleagues attempted to do at Madrid was, as it were, to 'square the circle' to get around the extremely big gaps between Israel and the various Arab antagonists. Baker succeeded in doing this by proposing a comprehensive setting that brought the Syrians, who have always rejected diplomatic initiatives not of a comprehensive nature, into the game. At the same time he satisfied Israeli demands for bilateral face-to-face negotiations with each of the separate Arab parties. Built into the Madrid process was a set of bilateral negotiations. In addition, Baker and Bush sought to generate momentum by constructing a parallel set of multilateral negotiations that would include influential regional powers not directly involved in the Arab Israeli dispute. Various working groups were proposed to deal with several major region-wide issues, including arms control, refugees, water, and economic development. Despite all subsequent setbacks to the peace process, this multilateral structure is still more or less in place and could possibly contribute to the rejuvenation of the now-comatose peace process.

Other Cases: From Lebanon to the Gulf

The US has often used diplomatic initiatives to try and build alliances across the northern part of the Middle East in order to prevent the Soviets from infiltrating what we used to call the northern tier. In 1957, for example, Eisenhower promised modest economic assistance and US protection against the threat of international communism to certain countries such as Jordan and Lebanon and others countries that cared to be included. This was also perceived as an effort to protect friendly regimes, such as those in Jordan and Lebanon, from an indigenous regional threat, which was indeed a kind of nationalist challenge to established regimes. There was at least one case - there may be more - of the use by the CIA of subversion or dirty tricks, whereby the CIA attempted in 1957 to overthrow a Syrian Government in order to promote a regime in Damascus that would be more immune to the influence of communism or nationalism, but the attempt was a failure.

□ Lebanon 1958

In the 1950s, in another friendly but fragile country – Lebanon - the US entered a phase of close and continuing coordination through the CIA station in Beirut with the government of Camille Shamoun when Shamoun was under attack by local forces and forces that were sympathetic to Gamal Abdul Nasser; the forces were enthusiastic about the recent union between Egypt and Syria and so forth. Later, during the Lebanese War of 1958, the government of Shamoun found itself increasingly besieged and Shamoun called for US military intervention in Lebanon to save him from the communists and the Nasserists who, according to Shamoun, were basically hand in glove with the communists. His pleas finally received a sympathetic hearing in Washington, although it was initially skeptical about his claims, and in the summer of 1958 US troops landed on the beaches of Beirut. Two months or so later, the conditions they set made it possible to bring the Lebanese war to a peaceful conclusion.

Note that the initial trigger for US intervention in Lebanon was not merely or even mainly something that had happened in Lebanon, but the overthrow of the royalist government in Iraq, a pro-British, pro-US government - after all, it was the seat of the Baghdad Pact - by military nationalist forces led by Abdul Karim Qassim. The coup rang alarm bells in Washington more than any number of pleas from a Lebanese president could do because under the circumstances, the Americans and the British felt that they

were about to lose control of the Middle East. Pan-Arabism had succeeded in Egypt and spread to Syria, Syria and Egypt had united, and now the third major country in the Mashreq, Iraq, had suffered a bloody coup. American troops landed in Lebanon perhaps because it was easier to land on the beaches of Beirut than in downtown Baghdad. Simultaneously, British paratroopers landed in Jordan to protect young King Hussein who felt he was on the verge of being swept aside by the Jordanian masses, who at that stage were very enthusiastic about Arab nationalism.

The instrument of last resort, namely the military intervention, was used in this particular case because from the American viewpoint, it looked like the whole region was slipping out from under American influence, offering an opportunity for the Russians to push their way in. Such developments would have led to a real shift in the whole balance of power in the Middle East. The situation was unacceptable to Washington, so the US Government decided it had no choice but to use its ultimate interventionist weapon.

□ The Gulf

Oil, quite obviously, is one of America's most important interests in the Middle East. Worries about the security of Gulf oil supplies to the economies of the US and the other industrialized countries led to what is surely the most dramatic case of American military intervention in the region in recent years - the Gulf War of 1991. The war involved not only the bombardment of Iraq from the air and from the sea but also the application of a massive ground military force, an army presence to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait and bring a tangible defeat to the trespassing Iraqi Government. The American Government decided that what Saddam Hussein has done was unacceptable and should be opposed with every available resource because oil was - and remains - such a vital national interest. It was not so much a question of protecting Kuwait, which as a state is not a vital national interest of the US, but rather the geopolitical position of a victorious Iraq that concerned Washington. It was feared that if Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait then it would be in a position to dictate oil production and pricing policies for the other Arab Gulf oil exporters and also pose a strategic military-security threat to Israel. Even though Iraq might not have then invaded Saudi Arabia, the Saudis and the other Gulf countries would have been so intimidated by the Iraqi presence on their borders that there would have been a major shift in the *status quo* of the balance of forces. A victorious Iraq would also be in a position not only to threaten Israel directly but also to mobilize other Arab governments toward a more hard-line anti-Israeli policy.

Having the power to do something about it and having the diplomatic influence in the world to mobilize an international coalition in support of this exercise, the US organized what was one of this century's major wars in the Middle East. The intervention far exceeded the level of intrusiveness and severity of previous US involvement in the region; moreover, it went well beyond the use of the more normal diplomatic, economic or technical assistance or even subversive interventionist techniques that are available to a big power. Seven years after the war, I think we are in a position to conclude that the US intervention succeeded in accomplishing its stated aim - the liberation of Kuwait. It also succeeded in significantly weakening Iraq's power and influence in the region. This success was due in great part to the multilateral nature of the military intervention - President Bush had prudently built up a broad-based coalition that included key Arab as well as European states.

We also know, however, that the post-war continuation of seemingly interminable and weighty sanctions on the Iraqi population in order to accomplish the eradication of Baghdad's capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction has been politically very costly to the US. How costly? An anecdote may provide a clue. Speaking with a Western journalist in Jerusalem in February 1998 - just as it appeared that the US might mount a major military strike against Iraq for its continued defiance of the UN inspection regime - the journalist turned to me and remarked, "Well, I guess that means the end of the Pax-Americana in the Middle East." My journalist friend felt that the US has been out-maneuvered and it had generated so much hostility with its repeated resorts to force and threats of force that it was losing international and even regional support.

A Theoretical Note

At this point it might be worthwhile to note a fundamental principle of international relations - the theory of realism, or (in German) *Realpolitik*. The theory holds that states do what they have to do in the anarchic world of international relations. Sometimes that behavior is not very pretty, because it involves the use of armed force. Another key element is the notion of the balance of power. American strategists had decided by the time of the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, that the best way to have a stable balance of power in the Middle East and one that is favorable to American interests, is not to have an even balance, in which each side has more or less equal military power, because that might not be stable. The reason it might not be stable is that neither side would be sure that it was secure so both might

test their strength and get into a fight. So they came up with the idea that if you want a stable region, it is better by far to have an uneven balance of power. This, in theory, is why the US supplied and continues to supply Israel with sufficient superiority in military power and technology, thereby making it irrational for any Arab state or army or any combination of Arab armies to challenge it.

Realpolitik practiced arrogantly can lead to unhappy situations. Perhaps the ultimate test of the success of American or external intervention in this region would be the following: if the people in the area are convinced that they have no choice, that they are unable to build weapons or regulate the price or supply of oil, that they are essentially helpless, then they would lack the will to resist foreign hegemony. Such perceptions could engender or exacerbate fatalism: people would feel that nothing really matters because whatever happens is just a matter of fate, and thus they are powerless to do anything about it. If that attitude were widespread in the Arab World, then those from the outside that would like to in fact manipulate and control people in this area would feel vindicated in their *Realpolitik*.

Obviously, this situation does not sound fair, but realists would respond bluntly, "So what?" The American policy to supply Israel with far more military capabilities than it needs, is (from the *Realpolitik* standpoint) precisely to create inequality in order to achieve that fundamental stability in which one side is clearly very strong and the other side is very weak.

Has US Middle East Policy Been Successful?

In terms of the basic interests that the American Government has set for itself in this region, we seem to have succeeded. Why then, as we contemplate the future, are many of us sharing a real sense of concern over the American position in the Middle East down the road? Is it not a contradiction or a paradox for me to say that when I give a grade to the Clinton administration in the Middle East, I only award it a 'C'? And why is it that so many people express the view that the US might be succeeding at present but it seems to be breeding hatred and contempt on the part of the people in the region in a very widespread manner? One answer to that might be that it is too bad but maybe it does not matter because the people do not really have much control over their governments, and the American Government and most other governments conduct their foreign policies with respect not to the people, but to governments, to the states, the regimes. I see a real problem here: success on one level, but the prospect of failure in the future on another and ultimately more important level.

My personal view is that it would be sensible for the US to change the style and the methodology of its involvement both in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in the Gulf. It also needs to rethink its methodology with respect to Islamism, although political Islam is a very complicated matter without any easy solutions. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue, it seems to me that the US record is not very encouraging. The conduct of American policy since the Madrid process has been mediocre, in my opinion, and is one of the reasons that we have been led into the present impasse. I would make one observation about the Palestinian role: in dealing with the US, remember how important the influence of domestic lobbies is in formulating or shaping or tilting the execution of American policy. The US committed itself as far back as 1947 to certain principles, and through a UN resolution - although no one in Washington remembers this now - to an independent Palestinian state, as part of the UN Partition Plan. In 1967 the US committed itself to UN 242 which by any interpretation means that the Israelis are supposed to get out of territories occupied in the Six-Day War. (I have it from the late Lord Caradon, who was one of the authors of 242, that the wording, while ambiguous, never contemplated anything but minor territorial adjustments in the shaping of a permanent peace.) Why is it then that the US, although it has committed to the resolution, has subsequently weakened and softened its position under strong American domestic pro-Israel pressure and under the pressure of the Israeli Government to the extent that it no longer talks about Jerusalem in clear language? And why has the Palestinian side been so feeble and ineffective in trying to generate counter pressure inside the US to make the American Government stand up to the positions it has already taken? One obvious answer is that there is a strong pro-Israel lobby. But I do not understand why the Palestinian side and the Arab side have been unable to articulate a respectable counter argument that people will listen to. I do not think the blame lies entirely with the Americans. States are not generous by nature, and they are not going to do things that they do not want to do; they have to be pushed.





Seminar Participants with Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at Chatham House, London, and PASSIA Staff.



PASSIA Seminar The US and Canada: Participants and Lecturers.



HE Robert Kealy, British Consul General in Jerusalem, HE Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO Delegation to the UK and to the Holy See, and HE John Herbst, US Consul General in Jerusalem.

The US and Canadian Relations/Roles in the Contemporary Middle East: Weapons Proliferation, 'Terrorism', and the 'Rogue State' Phenomenon

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The Cold War, in a way, defined the American national interest, namely, to contain communism and the Soviet Union, and when that particular interest disappeared, people were unable to agree upon the new American interests in the international community. Many ideas arose, such as the need to contain the clash of civilizations, there no longer being a superpower struggle but a contest between different civilizations around the world, such as the one between the Islamic civilization and the West. Usually, the winning idea is the one that succeeds in linking the constraints of the 'establishment' with the domestic political arena. What emerged here is that at the end of the Gulf War, Americans who care a lot about Israel were worried not only about Iraq, but also about Iran, which had emerged from the war quite powerful and was already considered an enemy of America. US policy had been for a long time to create a balance in the Gulf by helping the party that most needed help in equaling the other in terms of military and political power at any given time. The Americans helped the Shah, for example, to balance Iraq, and after the establishment of the Khomeini government, they started to help Iraq balance Iran, mainly by supplying the Iraqis with weapons. Nevertheless, at the end of the war both Iran and Iraq were seen as the enemy, and Martin Indyk came up with the concept of dual containment. By dual containment, what is meant is that instead of maintaining a balance of power, both countries are contained and disarmed, as opposed to armed, to exactly the same extent. In fact, the original idea was to maintain a comparable sanctions regime on Iran in order to create that balance. As to the term 'backlash states' it refers to the states that are reacting against the new international order, i.e., the law.

Indyk's idea was reinforced in the establishment by a very important article by the National Security Advisor to President Clinton, published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine and called, 'Confronting the Backlash States'. The article dealt with a new kind of thinking in American politics as it took the dual containment theses and then said that the American policy now is to look at countries such as Iran and Iraq and contain them as much as possible because of the threat that they pose. He selected of course the countries that are not helpful to America in the international community, such as Libya, Cuba, Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Syria, of course, is now a friend of the US, thanks to Assad's move in 1991 and his decision to join the winning side; had he not done so, there is no way of knowing what would have happened between Israel and Syria at that time.

At the heart of this issue, there was a fear in the US that was not entirely connected to the Middle East although it certainly had a lot to do with the region when it came to weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. It is interesting to note that no matter how one defines terrorism, American State Department figures reveal that the Arab countries are well down the list of countries involved in terrorism, regardless of whether or not the terrorism is aimed at American interests. Latin America has more terrorism, Africa has more terrorism, and Israel has more terrorism. The perception of Arabs as terrorists has a lot to do with the World Trade Building bombing, which really scared Americans because the building was a symbol of American power in New York. Actually, American soil has seen practically minimal Middle Eastern terrorism against civilians, and the World Trade Building bombing was a huge exception because what was meant to happen was that the two buildings were supposed to collapse on each other killing thousands of people in the process and destroying a major symbol of American power. The press cleverly exploited the fact that it tied in to what was happening here because Israel is important in the American debate, and it became a very serious issue.

The countries mentioned in the article are in no way real threats to the US nor real powers in terms of global politics. If they want to make a threat, it must necessarily be unconventional because none of them can pose a conventional threat. Iran cannot invade its neighbors, nor can Cuba, and the only argument one can use is that there is going to be destabilization in the region if they use state-sponsored terrorism or possess weapons of mass destruction. During the Gulf War, there was tremendous cover-

age of Iraqi usage of chemical weapons against the Kurds and that had captured the imagination of the public, but there was also concern that the fears in Washington about the proliferation of Russian weapons would prove to be well-founded; with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was an assumption that Russia did not have full control over the stocks of nuclear weapons and that both the weapons and the technology were now up for sale, and this idea certainly captured the American imagination. In fact, it was not long before preventing any actual sales from taking place became a policy and a national interest.

With regard to the term 'rogue states', it refers to the states that are reacting against the new international order, i.e., the law.

I think I should make it clear that even as far back as 1985/1986, the US considered intervening in the Gulf due to the fact that the assessment in Washington was that Iran might actually win the war, which is why the US suddenly started supplying Iraq with weapons. Although the US hoped to see a stalemate, if there had to be a winner, it did not want it to be Iran, which was considered an enemy. By the mid-1980s, Iraq had succeeded in persuading the US that it was a secular, pragmatic state that was prepared to cooperate with America, thanks in part to the efforts of Nizar Hamdoun, the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington, who was extraordinarily successful in developing the Iraqi-US relationship. (Iran understood this, and it did not want the US to intervene because it knew that other Western countries would soon follow America's example.)

One of the ways in which the US expressed its 'support' for Iraq was by moving to re-flag the Kuwaiti ships in order to prevent attacks against oil tankers by Iran. Iraq at that time was actually attempting to draw Iran into attacking oil tankers as a way of extracting American intervention, knowing perfectly well that it would not be able to win the war alone. Iraq had a well-designed contingency plan to invade Kuwait in 1986 that was almost exactly the same as the one that was implemented in 1990. It was not the result of a desire to expand, but the result of a strategic assessment by the Iraqis that if they got desperate, they would have to draw foreign intervention to stop the war. Frankly, after Iraq appeared to have won the war, there was some kind of self-congratulation in Washington, but only until the emergence of the threatening Iraqi rhetoric; from then on, Iraq came to be regarded as a threat to Israel and members of Congress wasted no time in targeting Iraq.

When Iraq eventually invaded Kuwait, the invasion took most experts by surprise. Some of them had believed that Iraq might possibly attack Israel and that if it did, the US would not have many options when it came to a response because the Arabs would not allow it to intervene. What happened, however, was that once Iraq invaded, it was almost impossible for the Bush administration not to react, the reason being that for good or bad, the US had decided that the Persian Gulf is of strategic importance to the US.

The Bush administration had been friendly to Iraq, even to the point of turning a blind eye to accusations that Iraq had used chemical weapons against the Kurds, and Congress was constantly criticizing this friendliness. Even when Iraq gathered its troops at the border, the US did nothing to deploy forces or otherwise threaten Iraq, and Congress saw that as an appeasement.

When Iraq finally invaded, Bush, who felt personally betrayed by Saddam Hussein, was under attack for not having predicted the invasion and so he went to the American intelligence community and asked if Iraq was likely to go to Saudi Arabia. The intelligence community, which was also under attack for having failed to predict the invasion of Kuwait, responded in the affirmative – in spite of the lack of proof - there being no way that it was going to risk being made to look foolish again. And then Bush went to the military and asked if the US would be able to stop Saddam if he went to Saudi Arabia, and this time the answer was 'no', the US did not have the troops to deploy, Saddam would be able to march right through and take over almost all the oil fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia, and it would be almost impossible to dislodge him because there would be nowhere for the US to land its troops. Armed with this information, Bush's first priority became to stop Saddam from going to Saudi Arabia by deploying US troops there. There was still no decision as to what to actually do with them once they were there; after all, you cannot leave a quarter of a million troops anywhere indefinitely. There was in fact an assumption in American thinking that time was on the side of the US and against Saddam due to the sanctions and military pressure, but the problem was that events were clearly working in Saddam's favor and so, with the coalition weakening, it soon became clear that there had to be a decision to settle the issue much more quickly. As a consequence, the number of US troops was doubled according to an operational doctrine that the Americans had learned from Vietnam, namely, that if an area is a vital interest to the US, you deploy forces on a very large scale in order to win quickly. Once the troops were in position, Bush knew that he had to go all the way; in other words, Saddam would have to withdraw or the US would have to go to war.

The American decision that took place at that time took place automatically, not according to preplanning or due to a conspiracy. One has to remember that George Bush was not especially fond of Israel, but he was still the first to make the decision to go to war because of the belief that not doing anything would lead to major problems. Now, having said that there is no question that the American political system supported the decision more intensely because of this threat to Israel, and Bush actually used the supporters of Israel to get his decision through Congress. But, the fact remains that the decision was made by the administration, not by the supporters of Israel, and it was made very early on.

As to US interest in keeping the Arabs disunited, I think the bottom line is that each government serves its own personal interests and is not going to give up those interests; the Pan-Arab movement has been mostly rhetorical and Arab governments, despite what the public feels, are the ones who make policies and they all serve their own interests. There are certainly a lot of people in the outside world who like to see the Arabs divided, but the simple truth is that the Arabs remain divided mainly because of the logic of the system.

If one looks at the invasion of Kuwait from an American perspective, one finds that here you have an Arab state that is trying to force unity on another sovereign state; in other words, a case of aggression. People argue that all this division of the Arab World is artificial – and in some ways it is – and that this division, which arose out of the two world wars, serves the interests of the west and other outside powers. The fact remains that we have an international system of sovereign states for good or for bad, and once it becomes acceptable for big states to swallow small states in the name of unity, the entire order is jeopardized. It is for this reason that the United Nations backed the buildup against Iraq.

In the late 1970s and following Camp David, Sadat and some others within the Egyptian establishment suggested that Egypt take over Libya, a small country with huge oil resources and an unpopular leader, but Carter rejected the idea, even though Israel would have not objected to Egypt taking over Libya. The point is that it is in the Western powers' interest to see the Arab World the way it is, but that is completely different from saying that the US makes it a high priority to keep the Arabs the way they are or to go to war. The Arab World is like it is because of the colonial powers and their ambitions in the region; it is unfair, and all we can do is to accept it or take risks, knowing very well that the benefits often do not warrant the costs.

As to what the Iraqi leadership thought the US would do following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there are two interpretations: one possibility is that the Iraqi leadership at one point thought that no matter what they did, a military attack against them was inevitable. The other possibility is that they thought this whole thing was a bluff. In fact, Iraq for a long time believed that the US was bluffing and was too scared to go to war. I think that once the military was deployed, there was most certainly a segment of both the American military and the administration that believed not only that Saddam should be taught a lesson and forced to withdraw from Kuwait, but also that the size of his military should be drastically reduced.

Saddam Hussein did not miscalculate American behavior, and he expected the US to mount a military attack against him. If you look at all his speeches beginning with those he made in the Autumn of 1989, it becomes clear that he believed that with the Soviet Union gone, the hopelessly pro-Israel US was going to intervene directly to establish American hegemony in the Middle East, with or without Israel. Saddam may have made his decision to invade Kuwait back in the autumn of 1989. What he was trying to do was to win the support of Arab public opinion at a time when Arab public opinion was very anti-American even without Saddam Hussein because of the issues of Soviet Jewish immigration, Jerusalem, and the *Intifada*. Saddam most certainly sought to exploit that atmosphere, which is why we saw Abu Ammar spend so much time in Baghdad.

Saddam's main miscalculation had to do with whether or not the Arabs would allow this American intervention. The bottom line is that the assessment in Baghdad was that in that environment of anti-Americanism and very shaky Arab governments, no Arab government would dare accept the idea of American troops landing on its soil in order to fight against an Arab country. To make sure, or so he thought, he became the champion of the Palestinian cause and entered into the Arab Cooperation Council Agreement with Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, and then went to Saudi Arabia and assured the Saudis further by signing the pact of non-aggression with them. In other words, even though he calculated that the US was going to try to attack, he thought that at a minimum, the Arabs would not cooperate, which would guarantee that he emerged as the victor.

As for King Fahd, he found himself in a real dilemma when Dick Cheney came to him and showed him these incredible electronic maps, which showed that the Iraqi forces were deployed in such a way that

they could invade Saudi Arabia. It is no wonder that he was scared, especially when he heard Dick Cheney say, "We do not believe that Saddam is going to invade Kuwait, but we do believe that he is going to invade you and I can tell you from now, we will not be able to stop him. The only way we can prevent this from happening is by landing our forces on your soil."

Did the US exaggerate in selling the decision? Absolutely. Did the US oversell the possibility that Saddam would invade Saudi Arabia? Of course it did. The President made a decision not because he was absolutely sure that Saddam was going to invade Saudi Arabia, but because he had received a warning, and that was enough; he could not afford to ignore it because he knew that he would lose the presidency if people ever found out that he had been warned but had chosen to ignore the warning. Once he had made the decision, everything else was a sales job and it did not matter what the States had to do; if it had to lie, it lied, if it had to exaggerate, it exaggerated, and if it had to twist arms, it twisted arms. That, unfortunately, is the way the American political system operates.

Were a new war with Iraq to take place, there would be a terrible worsening of Arab-American relations and possibly attacks by different groups, including on our forces in the Gulf; this, of course, would do untold damage to the peace process and would be giving Netanyahu exactly what he wants. Having said that, in the aftermath of a confrontation with Iraq, the American Government would probably feel obligated to restore some Arab backing for a revival of the peace process in order to compensate for what had happened and try to put an end to the tension. Nevertheless, I do not think that we are going to see any dramatic changes.

As to why the US did not destroy Iraq despite having the power to do so, there were three basic calculations. Calculation number one was that the coalition was established with a single UN mandate, namely, to liberate Kuwait. To destroy Iraq was not a part of the mandate, and the Bush administration understood very clearly that it must maintain an international coalition of legitimacy. Number two, the Arab countries opposed it, saying, "Do not go to Baghdad, because if you do, we are all going to be in trouble. There is a big difference between liberating Kuwait and going to Baghdad." Certainly other poles in the international coalition partners including France, but excluding Britain, would not have gone. Number three: the US had the capability to march over to Baghdad, but the American assessment was that we would lose a lot of American troops while others would end up remaining in the Gulf for an indefinite period and we would have another Vietnam. In other words, the assessment was that it would be totally disastrous.

There were probably several attempts by the Americans to assassinate Saddam Hussein during the war. On several occasions CNN showed pictures of Saddam meeting with his advisors in one of the huge vans that had been converted into a mobile headquarters, and American airplanes hunted for these vans all over Iraq. Most of the time, of course, they ended up firing at perfectly innocent trucks. There is no doubt whatsoever that America was out to get Saddam.

One has to take into account the fact that there existed in the State Department a school of thought according to which the disintegration of Iraq was undesirable; even today, there is a widely held belief that if Iraq falls apart, it will have a totally destabilizing effect on the Gulf states and other countries about which the US cares. Turkey, despite everything and more than any other country did not want to see the disintegration of Iraq because of the Kurdish problem. Syria did not want to see the disintegration of Iraq. The most that people wanted, especially in the US, was that Saddam personally would be overthrown.

Today, one thing is certain: If Kofi Annan comes with a result but the US goes ahead anyway and launches a military attack, it is going to be the end of Pax-Americana in the Middle East and probably the end of American influence globally as well. I think that were America to attack in spite of the apparent consensus with the UN Security Council that the diplomatic deal is acceptable, the Iraqi regime would most likely survive and undoubtedly wave goodbye to the UN inspectors, no one in the international community would support the US move or come to its side, and most likely there would be tremendous pressure on other countries, particularly Russia, to disregard the sanctions. Incidentally, Russia did not vote in favor of the recent resolution - even if it had, its leadership would not have considered the decision binding because it is Yeltsin who makes those kinds of decisions - and if the US attacks Iraq with Russian opposition, Russia is simply going to adopt the stand that it no longer considers itself bound by the UN sanctions. It will be extremely difficult for Clinton to go against an apparent diplomatic solution that has the support of the majority of members of the UN Security Council.

If Russia, China and France accept the diplomatic solution, the only leverage the US will have pertains to the fact that the UN resolution is clear about one thing, namely, the fact that Iraq must comply and

cannot negotiate on the UN resolutions. It is of course possible to negotiate when there is unfairness in the implementation of resolutions to the extent that the resolution is not being implemented as designed; that, of course, is a different story. I think that what happened in the recent meeting in the Security Council before the General Secretary visited Iraq is that parameters were defined concerning where there is agreement; that is Russia and France, or at least France, fully agreed with the US position that there has to be unconditional compliance, which means allowing the inspectors to go anywhere they want in Baghdad. That fixed parameter is probably the only one that can be derived directly from the UN resolutions, and the Secretary-General was given the leverage to negotiate terms around that. Having said that, it will be hard domestically for the US to back down now and Clinton might even be willing to pay the international price because he cannot afford the domestic price of not doing something.

I think the most devastating criticism of the US position, which I have been making myself on the pages of American newspapers is that the US is not explicitly saying that full Iraqi compliance will lead to a lifting of the economic sanctions. The truth of the matter is that the US just simply cannot get itself used to the idea that the sanctions would be lifted and Saddam Hussein would still be there and probably get stronger, and the Americans are desperate to figure out how to resolve that problem. On the one hand, they cannot allow Saddam to get stronger, and on the other, they want him to comply. The Americans recognize the problem, but they simply do not know how to deal with it.

I think that what the Iraqis are looking for is some kind of parameter regarding the number of sites that the inspection team needs to visit before the sanctions will be lifted. Where does it end, they ask? How many sites do you need to visit? I think that the Iraqis this time around will probably succeed in getting parameters like that, but the bottom line is that even if they are found to be in compliance, the US has not yet said that it is going to remove the economic sanctions and is still insisting that Iraq should obey human rights principles in the north and south of the country. Does that mean that the sanctions are indefinite? Once Saddam is found to be in compliance by the UN, I do not believe that the US would be able to use the excuse of human rights violations to prevent the sanctions from being lifted.

As to the UN resolutions being heavily influenced by the US, it does seem unfair that the US is able to have such an influence, but part of the reason is that the US is willing to provide the resources that other states or countries are not. I mean the US said take, you want inspectors, you want technology, and you want airplanes, etc., here they are, but even that is becoming an issue in Washington. The inspection regime certainly serves the interests of member states as well as the UN because the information that comes out from the UN inspection is readily available to the member states, particularly the member states that are very active. One has to remember that there is no such thing as the UN in a way; I mean, the UN does not have its own resources, all the resources are those of the member states and all the experts, particularly on intelligence and weapons of mass destruction are also members of the security apparatus of those states, so that is a part of the problem of the structure of the UN. It is not a world government; it is an organization made up of member states, which dominate operationally as well as in the decision-making process and by nature, tend to be selfish when it comes to their interests. It is a myth that the UN is an unbiased organization, although it is certainly less biased than any individual state.

The fact that some experts were wrong in their assumption that the Arabs would not allow US forces to land on Arab soil during the Gulf War has led to very heavy criticism of their opinions. In fact, there has been a kind of crusade against the Arabists in the American political system or the Middle East experts who were seen to be sympathetic to the Arabs and who emphasized Arab public opinion, saying the masses would create uprisings and prevent every single Arab government from accepting US forces on Arab soil and that if the US should attack Iraq, there would be total chaos in the Middle East, which would not be in America's interest. When the war took place, Arab governments accepted American forces, the US attacked Iraq and the Arab street was contained by the regimes and it seems to have given the US more - as opposed to less - influence than before and even enabled it to take the lead in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, many people now believe that the experts did not know what they were talking about and that all of them should go. "Sure," they say, "you have Arab public opinion, but it is irrelevant because Arab governments will make the same calculations that they did before, namely that there are far more rewards to be gained by supporting the US, especially if the US wins the confrontation. Arab governments will always find a way to deal with the voice of the streets."

With regard to a possible Israeli intervention in the current crisis, I think that it would be absolutely crazy for Israel to intervene, even as the result of an Iraqi attack with conventional weapons; were Israel to be attacked with non-conventional weapons, that would be somewhat different. I personally do not think that Iraq is going to attack Israel; it would make no sense for it to do so, because even if Iraq still has a few scud missiles, it would be stupid to waste them on Israel and on conventional weapons. Even in

1991 when it fired 60 or so Scud missiles, there was not that much damage, except, perhaps, for that inflicted on the Israeli psyche. Saddam could have launched chemical weapons in 1991 but he did not, because he knew what the consequences would be; the man, after all, is neither totally crazy nor suicidal.

As for the Arab reaction, one has to remember that a balloon has limits, and even though the Arab balloon did not explode last time, that does not mean that it will not do so this time; it can only take so much. I want to make something very clear: the Arab governments have often made tremendous mistakes in preserving their own interests. You cannot blame them, but this selfishness has made them pathetically ineffective. I believe that there is a need for difficult choices to be made and for a different political system to evolve. Speaking as an analyst, I look around and I imagine the changes that I myself would make if I were one of the leaders of Egypt, or Syria, or any Arab government. My foreign policy would be implemented very differently, within the acceptable limits, and I would design a policy that would accomplish things much more efficiently. One thing is clear: the Arab World is in need of democracy.

Moving on to the issue of US double standards, one important aspect of this is the media, but the truth of the matter is that the reporting media is not that important; what is important is the media that is found on the commentary pages. The most important public opinion-shaping publications in the US are the following:

- ❑ *The New York Times'* public opinion page with columnists plus the occasional contributor;
- ❑ *The Washington Post*, the second most important newspaper, also with columnists and contributors;
- ❑ *The Wall Street Journal*, which is important for the business and economic elite;
- ❑ *The Los Angeles Times*, the most prominent newspaper on the West Coast and widely read in Washington.

Although the reporting media is actually helpful – when reporters come here and see stones and blood, they report it because they have no choice, although obviously there is some control in editorial input – by and large, the page that really matters and shapes opinion is the editorial page. *The Washington Post* has several columnists who write on the Middle East including Charles Krauthammer, who is a very close friend of Benjamin Netanyahu and often defends him in the press. Richard Cohen is considered to be a relative moderate, and here is the kind of argument that he uses: "It is not that people do not hear the double standards argument, they hear it, but whereas last time I checked Israel had not used poison gas, the same cannot be said of Saddam." That is how it is answered - there is always some kind of fundamental difference between the two and of course, if he cannot find one, he will always turn around and say, well Saddam is a dictator and Israel is a democracy. They have to find excuses and so they do; that is how the system works.

In *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*, the key columnists on the Middle East are all Jews. Two are big supporters of the peace process, but there is one on the right, William Safire, who has never criticized Israel. In short, there is no unified position.

If I were asked today for the best advice that I could give to the Palestinians, I would tell them that they should no longer think of American foreign policy as only the official foreign policy; they need to engage with the American public, including the American Jewish community, which is clearly not unified. A diplomatic initiative must be one oriented toward that arena of politics because the US is not a centralized state and Clinton ultimately will respond to domestic politics. Arab governments for some reason have not been able to understand this.

Let me give you an example: If one agrees that public opinion matters and that Jewish public opinion in America matters, then one should not go out and make a statement and say: "If the peace process does not move forward next month, I am going to unleash the *Intifada* again." Why? Because those who need to know, know. I mean Israel knows that the *Intifada* could happen again, the Americans know it, and people who need to think strategically know it. So, why are you saying it? Who are you trying to reach? Remember that the right wing in Israel will be able to use that and say to the American Jewish community, "See, we told you, they are not serious about peace." You need leverage, but leverage should be used in a very subtle way; to use it in an outward manner brings no benefits and can actually cost a lot. I regret to say this, but the Palestinian diplomats must come to terms with the fact that there is a huge lack of understanding concerning the complexity of the domestic politics in America.



Mediation: Camp David and Madrid


Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem

The political backgrounds of both the Camp David and Madrid conferences were very similar. Certain political analysts would even describe the two events as an example of history repeating itself, the only differences being in the names of the locations and parties involved.

The Camp David Accord was one of the major consequences of the October 1977 War, the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement and the psychological breakthrough represented by Sadat's visit to Israel. The Sadat initiative, which came in the wake of the failure to hold an international conference in Geneva, struck at the logic that had governed Arab-Jewish relations for many decades. Nevertheless, the visit – although certainly a turning point in Egyptian-Israeli relations – failed to bring about a political breakthrough or mutual understanding leading to a political settlement between Egypt and Israel, and it was the efforts of American mediator, President Carter that were ultimately responsible for direct talks taking place between the two countries under American auspices and the conclusion of a political solution.

The Madrid Conference, on the other hand, was a consequence of the Gulf War, which came against the background of the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank, as well as the Palestinian *Intifada*, which represented another psychological breakthrough in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These events occurred in the shadow of the failure of the London talks between King Hussein, Peres, and Shamir and the option of the international conference. This time around it was American President George Bush who initiated the conference, inviting all concerned parties to enter direct talks under American auspices.

The roles of the parties involved in the Camp David and Madrid conferences may be better understood by comparing the following two triangles:



Concerning the first party, namely Israel, one could say that the stance adopted by Begin immediately prior to Camp David was very similar to that adopted by Shamir immediately prior to Madrid. Israel's conditions for receiving Sadat in Jerusalem, according to Begin, were exactly the same, although worded differently, as its conditions for attending the Madrid Conference:

In the case of Camp David, the conditions were as follows:

- Israel will not withdraw to the 1967 borders;
- Israel will not deal with the PLO;
- Israel will not accept the creation of a Palestinian state;

and in the case of Madrid:

- there will be no change in the status of 'Judea, Samaria' [West Bank] and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the government;
- Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO;
- Israel opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza district, and in the area between Israel and Jordan.

Moreover, prior to both Camp David and Madrid, Israel imposed a major obstacle in the form of its stipulations regarding Palestinian representation. During the preparations for Camp David, Israel refused to accept Palestinian participation, even in a joint Arab delegation, and consequently, no Palestinian party - including PLO members and representatives from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) - was allowed to participate in the conference.

The Israeli conditions for Palestinian participation at the Madrid Conference were along the same lines as those laid down at the time of Camp David:

- there should be a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and not an independent Palestinian delegation;
- there should be no PLO participation;
- there should be no Palestinian Jerusalemite representation;
- there should be no Palestinian flag and no Palestinian state.

The Israeli-proposed solutions presented at Camp David and Madrid were also practically identical. On 28 December 1977, Begin proposed his famous autonomy plan, which entailed self-rule for the Palestinian residents of 'Judea and Samaria' and the Gaza district, to be instituted upon the establishment of peace. Fourteen years later, on 31 October 1991, Shamir addressed the Madrid Peace Conference, saying: "Today's gathering is a result of a sustained American effort based on our own peace plan of May 1998, which in turn was founded on the Camp David Accords. According to the American initiative, the purpose of this meeting is to launch direct peace negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors, and multilateral negotiations on regional issues among all the countries of the region."

As for the second party in the Camp David-Madrid equation, it was Egypt and Sadat at Camp David and the Palestinians and Arafat at Madrid. Sadat had come to power after the 18-year rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, during which Sadat had committed himself to the goals and relations of a strong Egyptian leadership, but whilst planning and eventually carrying out a white *coup d'état* – one of several - that would enable him to practice new policies and become a genuine leader, rather than merely one of Nasser's comrades or deputies.

In Sadat's first *coup d'état* he laid down policies for an Egyptian economic '*Perestroika*' and in his second, he enforced a patriarchal democracy, as described in Haykal's famous book *The Autumn of Wrath*. The third *coup d'état* occurred when he put an end to the Soviet strategic alliance with Egypt, and the fourth, the culmination of the previous three, when he sought a political settlement with Israel. One may still remember his famous phrases "The October War is the last war," "Peace is a strategic strategy" and "We seek the peace of the brave."

Prior to Madrid, Yasser Arafat was a leader who had remained unchallenged since 1969, working in coordination with the Arab leadership, i.e., Nasser and Sadat, with whom he shared the same goals. However, as a consequence of the 1990 Gulf War, he suddenly found himself isolated and relegated to a far away place, namely Tunisia. Arafat's public support for Saddam Hussein had resulted in a situation whereby no one was prepared to deal with him at a political level or continue to support him financially, especially the Gulf countries and the Saudis.

Eventually, by the time the Madrid Conference took place, Arafat found himself facing a three-headed threat to his legitimate leadership. The first threat was on the international level, when James Baker met in Damascus with the Arab foreign ministers and discussed the formation of a delegation from the Palestinian opposition, seated in Damascus; the second, on the regional level, when King Hussein of Jordan appointed Taher Al-Masri Prime Minister, and the politicians in Amman displayed a willingness to form a Palestinian team to represent the Palestinian position - Arafat used to say, "Taher Al-Masri is supposedly the Palestinians' foreign minister, yet unexpectedly, there appears to have been a coup and here he is, becoming the Jordanian Prime Minister, standing at the doors of Madrid and leading a government that is made up of mainly Palestinian members," - and the third, on the domestic level, with the emergence of the local Palestinian leadership in the OPT, which, although loyal to Arafat, had adopted a major political role and acquired tremendous media attention throughout the *Intifada*.

At both Camp David and Madrid, the third party was the same, namely the US. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker replaced President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who were the American mediators in the Camp David episode, at Madrid. In both episodes, the US was the strong, active, creative and influential party, having made it abundantly clear that Washington considered Israel an important strategic ally whose security came first and at whose disposal the US was prepared to place enormous amounts of economic and financial support whilst protecting its interests in the Middle East, namely, the flow of oil, an end to terrorism, and economic and political stability for the ruling elite in the Arab states.

Although the US was the main mediator whose substantial influence led to significant results in both scenarios, several other parties also played an important mediating role. They included King Hassan of Morocco, President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, and the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, in addition to the American-Jewish establishment in the US.

King Hassan, prior to Camp David, had hosted the very first encounter between official representatives from Egypt (Hassan At-Tuhami) and Israel (Moshe Dayan). He was also responsible, prior to Madrid, for opening the door for the Israelis to enter the official Arab house by receiving Shimon Peres in Morocco.

In the 1970s, Romanian leader President Ceausescu had facilitated communication and served as a bridge leading to the first direct dialogue between Sadat and World Zionist Organization leader, Nahum Goldman. Later, in the eighties and nineties, he played a similar role when he hosted various dialogue programs for Israelis and Palestinians. As for Austrian Chancellor Kreisky, he also contributed to the creation of awareness and to bridging the gap and promoting understanding between Arafat and his colleagues and Israeli members of the Knesset.

The majority of serious constraints that were to have a significant influence on Sadat at Camp David and Arafat at Madrid came from the local region. After the October War of 1973, which had 'bonded' Egypt and Syria, Sadat was aware that he could not act alone on the political front without first consulting or coordinating with Syria. In this respect, his decision to meet with Israeli leaders in Jerusalem and recognize the State of Israel, in addition to his negotiations with the Israelis at Camp David, were serious blows to Egypt's strong and brotherly relations with Syria. So serious were these blows that they were to eventually result in a freezing of both the historical Egyptian-Syrian alliance as well as Egypt's leading role in the Arab World.

At the time of the Madrid Conference, Arafat knew that he could neither ignore the Jordanians nor claim that the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank meant that he no longer needed their support, which is why he agreed on 28 August 1990 to Palestinian participation in the conference under the Jordanian umbrella. He stipulated, however, that continued Palestinian participation was conditional upon recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, the right of the PLO to decide upon the Palestinian delegation to Madrid, which should include Palestinians from East Jerusalem, no attempts being made to delete the Question of Jerusalem from the conference agenda, an end to Israeli settlement activity in the OPT, and international protection being granted to the Palestinians.

On 16 September 1990, the Palestinians were given a letter from US Secretary of State George Baker, stating that the US would agree to list the Question of Jerusalem on the peace conference agenda. Then, as throughout the conference, the US mediation efforts were an essential component of the attempts to reach an agreement. Washington was more than a facilitator or partner; it was the dominant factor.

According to William Quandt in his book *Camp David* of 1988 (p. 29):

Mediation: Camp David and Madrid

Mamdouh Nofal, Member of the Palestinian Central Council
and of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)

Over the past few years, the various issues being discussed by negotiating teams and the political framework of the peace process have remained a constant source of discussion. At the moment, however, we are more concerned with the current deadlock, which has created some new reactions in the region that have the potential to do one of two things: to turn the peace process into a great success, or else to transform what we have already realized into a burden. One thing is clear: had it not been for the Gulf War and the defeat that followed, we would not have accepted the conditions imposed on us at Madrid.

Following the Gulf War, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was in an extremely weak position; the Arab World and the international community considered it an outcast, and it was judged and banished accordingly. The fact that the conditions under which the PLO went to Madrid were unfair was clear from the very beginning. Abu Ammar and the Palestinian leadership were prevented from going, those Palestinians who were allowed to go were obliged to do so under a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with a Jordanian leadership, and Israel was granted the right to contest the participation of any member of the delegation. Nevertheless, the PLO accepted these conditions and gave unilateral guarantees to the Americans because it was in a state of weakness, the power that resulted from the *Intifada* having been frozen by the Gulf War.

There is no doubt that without the *Intifada*, the peace process would not have evolved. The *Intifada* created international interest and a movement inside Israel that insisted on moving towards a political solution, and if it had not taken place, I doubt that the Israelis would have agreed to come and negotiate. I am also fairly sure, that if the *Intifada* had not recurred after the 40-day curfew during the Gulf War, other unfair conditions would have been imposed on us.

There was clearly an Arab position that pressured us to accept the American conditions. I remember that a Palestinian delegation visited Syria and asked the Syrians not to reject the idea of the peace process and to put Jerusalem on the agenda, but they refused. Moreover, both Jordan and Syria declared that they would participate in Madrid even before we did, in spite of our request that they refrain from doing so. At the meeting with Hafez Al-Assad, he said to us, "Why are you dividing your country? Go to the negotiations and speak about Palestine. Do not make a difference between Jerusalem and other areas." We told him that it was others who were differentiating, not us. And then, when we complained that the PLO had been ousted from the process, he replied, "Why do you divide your people into insiders and outsiders?" It could be, of course, that Syria did not want the PLO to participate because it did not want Jordan to get the credit for the process. When James Baker arrived he told us that we could take it or leave it, and that we were free to go to Tunis and inform the leadership that they could refuse, but that the cost would be very high and could mean an end to the PLO. It was clear to everyone that our only option was to go to Madrid, despite the unfair conditions.

With the onset of the negotiations, a Palestinian committee was formed to follow up the talks and Nabil Sha'ath, Akram Hanieh, Tayseer Arouri and I were sent by the PLO to Madrid to supervise the Palestinian delegation. We entered secretly with the help of the French and the knowledge of the Americans, and we started to help the delegation as godfathers. We were not in the negotiating room, but we met with the delegation in our hotel in Madrid. I once went in secret to the Victoria Hotel and was forced to leave after somebody saw me and the whole thing ended up as a really big story. Anyway, we helped the delegation to go to Tunis via Algeria in the plane of King Hassan II by saying that we were going to Morocco; this was our way of showing people that the PLO still had a very important role. The Americans realized this, and they used to say, "You will have a role, but behind the curtain."

The aim of the negotiations that continued for 20 months was from the point of view of the leadership in Tunis to hinder the process as much as possible, in order to highlight the fact that the PLO had this very important role. Right at the beginning, we had succeeded in eliminating the Jordanian umbrella and the Jordanian tutelage, which put an end to Yasser Arafat's nightmare about Jordanian control over the

Palestinian Territories. This is one of the ways in which we did it: When we left Amman on our way to Madrid, we, the PLO group, were requested to keep a low profile, but our delegation had already agreed that they would be a little late boarding the plane, meaning that the Jordanian delegation would board the plane alone and it would be clear that there was actually more than one delegation. The same thing happened in Madrid when we arrived. We refused to enter the same reception hall as the Jordanian delegation, and ended up in another hall all by ourselves. Some people say that these things are just formalities, but I say that they helped us to formulate a framework for achieving our objective, which was to separate the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation into two separate delegations and bring out our independent role.

Another implicit position concerned the composition of the Palestinian delegation. Although the PLO had approved the names of the Palestinian delegation, it was not at all happy; it was afraid from the insiders, which is something that controlled the direction of the negotiations. Abu Ammar was constantly pressuring the delegation to show a firmer approach and he actually threatened anyone who showed leniency *vis-à-vis* the Americans and the Israelis. The idea, of course, was to arrive at the point of direct negotiations with the PLO, i.e., the secret negotiations that took place in Oslo without the knowledge of the Palestinian delegation; the Israeli leadership, by then, was convinced that it was impossible to advance in the negotiations with the delegation from the inside, which appeared weak and hesitant.

Would it have been better if the delegation from the inside had reached an agreement with the Israelis? Faisal was convinced that he and the others would come to some personal harm if they continued. I told him that he was wrong; if an agreement were reached, he would be remembered not only for the role he had played in the *Intifada*, but also for the one he was playing then. It could be that going with the insiders option would have been better than the blockade we are currently up against, but the outside leadership was very protective concerning its role.

I would like to underline the fact that the insiders refused to take any step forward unless there was a clear agreement and a clear provision concerning the settlements. After the Israelis refused to discuss the issue of settlement in the presence of Faisal Hussein and Haidar Abdul Shafi, amongst others, they started negotiating with the PLO. They discovered, even during the very first session, that the PLO was prepared to put aside the issue of settlements, and it was then that they realized that Peres's very positive feelings about the negotiations were justified. Rabin was against negotiating with the PLO while Peres was very enthusiastic, and Peres told Rabin: "You will not reach an agreement with Faisal Hussein concerning these issues, but you might reach an agreement with the PLO."

The fact that the PLO yielded on fundamental issues is due, in part, to its over-confidence in its own power and abilities. I remember that when the PLO signed the agreement, I asked Abu Ammar, "What about the settlements?" He replied, "I have them both – I have Gaza and Jericho! The settlements are only details. When we are there, things will change." He was referring, of course, to the former situation in Lebanon, where we created from a mere three or four military locations an entire Palestinian state on nearly 70 percent of the Lebanese territory. The members of the PLO negotiating team - Abu Ala', Abu Mazen, Hassan Asfour and Yasser Abed Rabbo - had been saying that the Israelis would not agree to us taking Gaza and Jericho, and they were preparing to accept Gaza without Jericho, but Abu Ammar had insisted that because of the struggle with Jordan, there was no way we could consider taking Gaza and leaving the West Bank. For Israel, the agreement meant having a settlement concerning the borders. For the Palestinians, it meant renouncing their claim to the historical land of Palestine.

Will our people eventually be granted their rights? If we succeed in preserving what we have or maybe making it a little better, and if we do not create more bad realities, it may be possible. A lot depends not only on us, but also on the balance of powers and the situation of the Arabs. The Soviet Union represented for us a kind of a wall to lean on and when the Soviet Union was dissolved, we lost a very valuable source of support. Without Arab support in the future, it will be difficult for us to solve our problem, which requires a lot of work and a lot of peripheral cooperation. The priority now is to organize the Palestinian internal situation. Since Oslo, everything has been put aside to the benefit of the negotiations. Now, it is clear that from now until the year 2000, and perhaps until 2004, we cannot do a thing because of Netanyahu, who is not a man who looks for peace.

Our choice, therefore, is to put aside everything including our external relations to the benefit of organizing our internal situation. This means organizing and cleaning the Palestinian house. We have many problems, including the absence of a real opposition; the only opposition that we have now is to be found amongst the religious trends, and this is something that worries me a great deal.

When Saddat visited Jerusalem, he changed the Israeli society. We, despite all the things that we suffered from, have also succeeded in changing the Israeli society. Now, nearly 49 percent of Israelis are with the peace process: 40 percent are Jews, while nine percent are Israeli Arabs. Making peace in the region requires raising this percentage to a minimum of 51 percent, which will take a lot of hard work. The figure of 49 percent was not reached easily nor only as a result of purely internal Israeli factors; it was also a result of certain external factors and effects including the Palestinians themselves.

What we need now is a democratic national movement - not a religious one - that stands between the religious movement and the PNA and participates in pushing the PNA towards democratic development.



American Foreign Policy – A Case Study: The Question of Palestine

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When analyzing American foreign policy, there are a number of different theoretical perspectives one can employ: bureaucratic politics, rational actor or realism, corporate interest, world systems, national interest, and so on. The perspective one selects, in addition to reflecting personal values and preference, will, to a considerable extent, influence the substantive conclusions of the analysis.

Having said that, I have found it useful over my years of studying US foreign policy to focus on the continuities and consistencies of US policy from a global and historical perspective. Such an analysis diverts our attention from the specificity of any one given event, and places particular circumstances in a continuum that illuminates the patterns, principles, and objectives that underlie policy.

With regard to the Question of Palestine, the most salient aspects of US policy have been its constancy and its absolute negation of fundamental Palestinian rights. I am referring here to the basic right of the Palestinians to self-determination and sovereignty in some part of historic Palestine: either that portion designated in the 1947 UN resolution partitioning Palestine, or the more commonly agreed upon area that has been accepted by the PLO itself since 1974 - the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.

I will argue in this presentation, that despite the appearance of policy shifts, new peace proposals, and initiatives from Washington over the years, the US has been consistent in its rejection of this Palestinian right. The analysis will suggest that there are three basic factors explaining such consistency:

1. Structural and ideological factors in the US system that give rise to opposition to all Third World nationalist movements.
2. A concern with Western freedom of access to Middle Eastern oil supplies, which has translated into the promotion of a particularly reactionary *status quo* in the region.
3. The idea that Israel's strategic importance warrants a favorable reaction, or at best non-interference by Washington in Israel's objectives and policies.

Between 1948 and 1967, Palestinian nationalist aspirations were expressed through Pan-Arab nationalism rather than independently. Thus, during that period, Palestinian interests were never considered except as a problem of refugee resettlement - jobs, homes, and so forth for individual Palestinians. Not until the re-emergence of Palestinian nationalism as an autonomous phenomenon in the aftermath of the June 1967 War was there any consideration of a collective Palestinian issue in American policy. Beginning with that period it is possible to investigate American policy toward Palestine and the Palestinians, although it is worth noting that not even in 1948, nor at any time thereafter, did the US ever attempt to see that the UN Partition Plan, which it had backed so strongly, was fully implemented.

But again, American consideration of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict did not really take shape until after 1967 when, on the one hand, Israel so mightily defeated its Arab neighbors and demonstrated its mammoth military strength, and on the other, the Palestinian nationalist movement re-emerged out of the defeat of the Arab states and began making itself visible on the international scene. The response of the US was immediate opposition and disregard, while the problem for Israel was de-legitimizing and suppressing every manifestation of Palestinian nationalism, be it cultural, political, or military, and that was a campaign in which Washington wholly concurred and fully participated.

Finally, while I am going to be making some comments about American policy toward revolutionary nationalist movements in general, it is worth noting that while the PLO portrayed itself and was portrayed by others as a revolutionary movement, this was not the case in the strictest sense. PLO objectives

between 1964 and 1974 were first to regain all of historic Palestine, later to establish a democratic secular state, and after 1974 to accept a state in the newly occupied territories. While the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) raised slogans pertaining to structural changes in an independent Palestinian state, Fatah, the leader in the PLO, evidenced no concern about such issues. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that had an independent Palestinian state emerged in 1975, it would not have been a revolutionary state but would have become part of the *status quo* in the Arab state system. (Clearly, that is obvious today.) However, Washington's perceptions, or distortions, made the nature of the Palestinian national movement appear otherwise.

As to the original points of analysis, first, regarding opposition to Third World nationalist movements, the US has historically opposed all such revolutionary movements. Whether American policy is understood as being derived from economic determinants or the needs of national security, or even both, the consequences are the same. Since the markets and resources required for the economic supremacy and military superiority of the US are largely to be found in the Third World, US policy-makers have considered it crucial that these states remain stable, integrated into the US economy, and dependent on the US. The 'threat' of nationalist movements to American interests lies in their potential for indigenous leaders choosing to utilize their resources in the service of their own people rather than for the benefit of the US, and in developing autonomous economic and political structures responsive to local needs.

Second, regarding Western freedom of access; the American political economy is grounded in corporate economic interests, which, axiomatically, involve continuous external expansion together with a stable environment in which obstacles to limitless growth will be removed or minimized as much as possible. As a result, the US is a *status quo* power committed to maintaining a fixed Pax-Americana over the entire globe. Any 'disorders' within its area of control - nationalist movements, revolutions, elected leftist governments, etc. - are automatically confronted with opposition, containment and annulment.

Now, the importance of US economic and strategic interests in the Middle East has resulted in particularly hostile reactions to nationalist movements in that region. Recall, for example, the marine landing in Lebanon in 1958, or the intense opposition to Nasserism, especially after co-optation failed. US tacit support for Israel's initiation of war in June 1967 was related to American anticipation of Nasser's demise at Israel's hands. Ironically, as I said earlier, Palestinian nationalism re-emerged in the wake of the collapse of Nasserism, and for a period, the Palestinian movement had charismatic influence in the Middle East as well as throughout the Third World. Thus, in the eyes of US policy-makers, in addition to its potential destabilization threat in other Arab states, its plausible demonstration effect elsewhere in the Third World mandated its containment.

The indispensability or perceived indispensability of Middle Eastern oil to the Western economic system has led the US to forge *de facto* alliances with the most conservative regimes in the Middle East; Saudi Arabia is one example. Washington has undertaken to maintain in power the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, the most important state in the oil equation, in exchange for the monarchy's cooperation in supplying oil, defending the value of the dollar *vis-à-vis* other currencies, and recycling petrodollars back to the US through investments, savings, and the purchase of goods and services. Moreover, a convergence of Saudi and US perspectives on Palestinian nationalism has been highly detrimental to Palestinian interests.

Within Saudi Arabia, and in the Arab state system generally, the normative constraints of Arabism have made it necessary for the ruling elites to appear supportive of the Palestinian cause. In reality, however, the Saudi monarchy (in common with other governments) considered the Palestinian movement - especially in its youthful democratic, secularist phase - a direct threat to the rule of the royal family. This led Riyadh to pursue seemingly contradictory policies: on the one hand, publicly advocating the cause of Palestine, undertaking the brief oil embargo in 1973, and providing Fatah leaders with large sums of money, while on the other forbidding Palestinian political or military activities within Saudi Arabia, insisting that Fatah leaders reign in so-called 'radical elements' such as George Habash, and withholding the use of the oil weapon in a prolonged or meaningful manner as a means of support for the Palestinians. The actual Saudi opposition to Palestinian nationalism as opposed to its rhetorical support for the movement coincided with US antipathy to the Palestinian quest for self-determination. This convergence, together with the full integration of Riyadh into the US-dominated capitalist order by the mid-1970s, relieved the US of concern about a linkage between the realization of Palestinian objectives and favorable Saudi policies on petroleum, financial, and monetary matters. Moreover, after US policy-makers understood the actual objectives of Saudi Arabia, American opposition to Palestinian nationalism was reinforced and further intensified.

The third factor explaining US policy toward Palestine is related to the perception of Israel as a strategic asset: Washington's relationship with Israel is based on the institutionalization of beliefs about Israel's strategic utility to American interests in the Middle East. Israel is considered to be promoting American interests in the following ways:

- ❑ by acting as a counter to Pan-Arab nationalist movements;
- ❑ by fostering and exacerbating the divisions and weakness in the Arab World;
- ❑ by stabilizing the region through its absolute military superiority including its nuclear capability;
- ❑ in the past, by containing the spread of Soviet expansionism;
- ❑ later, by boldly fighting international terrorism;
- ❑ by ensuring the survival of pro-American Arab regimes.

In my judgment, there is considerable room for debate concerning how effectively Israel contributes to the realization of these objectives. But what matters are the perceptions and beliefs within private and public policy-making circles.

In this context, it is important to consider both the concrete and the symbolic factors that have contributed to the institutionalization of the beliefs about Israel's strategic role. The main concrete elements include the following:

1. Israel's stunning military performance in the June 1967 War when it defeated three major Arab states in six days.
2. The 1969 Nixon doctrine proclaimed in response to the Vietnam quagmire, which postulated reliance on certain states in crucial areas acting as substitutes for direct US intervention in the defense of American interests. This resulted in US efforts to construct a *de facto* tripartite alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, while Israel worked closely with Iran under the Shah, it opposed all attempts to increase Riyadh's military capability. In the end, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979, Israel was considered the sole significant surrogate.
3. Israel's mobilization (at the request of Henry Kissinger) for possible intervention on the side of Jordan in the September 1970 crisis between King Hussein and the Palestinians. Though Jordan, by itself, crushed the Palestinians and repulsed a Syrian tank force, the Israeli mobilization was enough to serve as a significant legitimization for the argument that Israel is protecting pro-American regimes.
4. Henry Kissinger, with his immense influence and power, and with his intense commitment to Israel and to Israel's utility as a strategic asset, contributed greatly to the legitimization of Israel's role both symbolically and concretely through the massive transfers of technology and the military and economic assistance to Israel that he oversaw.
5. Pro-Israeli forces in American society, which themselves became far stronger and more important in the post-1967 period, contributed time, money, passion, and organizational and other skills to the reinforcement of the strategic asset thesis.
6. Among the concrete elements contributing to the institutionalization of Israel's position in American political culture was a subtle transformation in the nature of policy-making on Middle Eastern issues, in which Congress and the bureaucracy came to play an increasingly important role, combined with the myriad ways in which Israel and her American supporters interfaced with Congress and the bureaucracy.
7. Beliefs about Israel's role in the Cold War anti-communist consensus, manifested in part by the campaign to free Soviet Jews, also played a critical part in the institutionalization of the strategic asset perception. Additionally, during the Reagan administration, Israel's contribution to the 'anti-terrorist' dimension of US policy (personified in the adulation heaped on Bibi Netanyahu in the wake of his brother's death after the raid on Entebbe) became an integral part of the American ideological superstructure.

The foregoing, then, constitute what are considered the concrete factors that contributed to the strengthening of the beliefs about Israel's strategic utility.

But, as important as any of these elements, independently or even collectively, are subjective symbolic elements. The fact that there were so many attempts to portray Israel as a strategic asset to US

interests and that so many elite sources attempted to legitimize this stand explains, in part, why the process of institutionalization was so rapid and irreversible.

'Knowledge' is - and I use this term in quotation marks - often mistaken for truth, but in reality, knowledge is highly subjective because it is a product of human construction. The major 'sources' for 'knowledge' about foreign affairs in American society are as follows: official Washington - primarily the President, but in this case Congress too; mainstream journalism and the media in general; and scholars and the intelligentsia - especially those associated with the most prestigious and influential institutions. However, typically, both journalists and the media, in addition to the intelligentsia, take their information from government sources and reflect the positions and beliefs of governing circles. Indeed, for a free society, we have one of the least independent media in the Western World. Scholars too usually maintain an uncritical posture on foreign policy reflecting and confining their 'debates' to tactics while upholding the official consensus on objectives and interests. In the end, much that passes for independent journalism and scholarship amounts to little more than the reiteration of official positions. Nevertheless, what is produced by these respected institutions is accepted as 'knowledge'.

In particular, the primary sources of 'knowledge' about Israel's strategic utility were government officials such as Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, Eugene Rostow and his brother Walter, Senators Henry Jackson, Jacob Javits, Abraham Ribicoff, Stuart Symington, Hugh Scott, and others.

Then, reflecting the opinions of these government officials and, in some cases reflecting personal sentiments (for example, Abe Rosenthal), a secondary source of 'knowledge' was the media, respected commentators, and scholars who espoused the new beliefs about Israel in every possible venue. For example, editorials in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and other highly regarded newspapers consistently advocated Israel's interests and promoted her strategic importance to the US.

Scholarly texts that became required reading at universities and graduate schools took the same track; books such as, Nadav Safran's *Israel: the Embattled Ally* and Bernard Reich's *The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* were considered bibles on the subject.

The pro-Israeli lobby was also a source of 'knowledge' about Israel, continuously producing documents and studies to bolster American support for Israel as well as generously rewarding those elected officials who adopted their line, and punishing others who did not.

Eventually, 'knowledge' about Israel's strategic value to the US, as well as about its intrinsic moral worth, became part of the paramount reality, which is to say the reality of everyday life for the majority of Americans. In other words, the nature or character of Israel, and of its significance to the US, came to be taken for granted as an objectively existing reality.

Other subjective factors that reinforced Israel's institutional position in American political culture include a host of what sociologists call linguistic 'typifications'.

Language, like knowledge, is a subjective form of human activity and a variety of linguistic constructions, many with extremely powerful symbolic content, have been used in the service of this institution-building process. Linguistic typifications such as America's 'moral commitment' to Israel's 'survival'; the 'only democracy' in the Middle East (indeed, not just a democratic state, but 'a light unto nations'); America's 'sole reliable ally' in the region; the 'restoration' of the 'chosen people' to the 'Promised Land'; courageous 'pioneers' who made 'the desert bloom'; the 'Judeo-Christian tradition' and Israel's 'Western' society in a sea of barbaric infidels - these and other linguistic clichés were so habitually repeated, externalized, objectified, and finally internalized in the collective American social psyche that what began as one opinion about one possible policy for maximizing American interests in the Middle East, was transformed into an objectively existing institution of the social order.

One subtle but significant example may be seen in the fact that the US never merely 'supported' Israel or engaged in 'relations' with it as it does with other states. Rather, the US undertook a 'moral commitment' to Israel's 'right to exist' and to its 'security and survival' (even though, in reality, the security and survival of Israel were never in danger, and never in the annals of real politics has one state undertaken such a commitment to another).

Certainly, the frequent use of the terms 'moral commitment' and the 'right to exist' would imply that America feels it has 'obligations' to the survivors of the Holocaust. Were this not the case, it is unlikely that the 'self-evident truth' of an embattled, mortally threatened state could have been sustained, especially in light of spectacular military performance in June 1967. Despite Israel's image as a beleaguered

underdog about to be driven into the sea, and the concept of it as a surrogate power for the US, both images were upheld. In fact, they both made a significant contribution to the institutionalization of the US-Israeli relationship and the belief that Israel indispensably serves US interests in the Middle East.

With all of these positive inducements and symbols, there still remained a few dissenting voices in the US, which necessitated the development of 'mechanisms of control', so to speak, to ensure that the institutional definition of Israel was maintained. Thus, those who questioned the strategic asset thesis, or worse, expressed concern for the Palestinians were immediately labeled 'anti-Semitic' and/or supporters of the 'terrorist PLO', and placed on a black list - all quite intimidating in American political culture. These efforts were highly effective, resulting in considerable 'spontaneous' self-censorship.

In any case, as a consequence of the institutionalization of the ideas about Israel's uniqueness and its importance as a strategic asset to US foreign policy, the US has not seriously objected to any of Israel's policies, which include: the 1982 war in Lebanon, its continuous practice of state terrorism, the brutality used against Palestinians during the *Intifada*, its annexation and settlement of Jerusalem, the occupation of Syrian and Lebanese territory, the relentless confiscation of Palestinian land and concomitant settlement expansion, and its unshakable commitment to deny the Palestinians an independent sovereign state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

To the extent that American officials accepted Israeli arguments that a Palestinian state was a threat to Israel's security, the US had no interest in pushing an option that differed from Israel's - in part because it did not wish to see Israel's security and its strategic function weakened. Moreover, since the US also opposed Palestinian self-determination, the convergence of perspectives solidly reinforced the existing American policy.

With regard to US-Palestinian relations, while I have alluded to the issue earlier, it now becomes very important to clearly distinguish tactics or policies from objectives and interests in American foreign policy. While a variety of new tactics or policies to deal with the Palestinians - peace conferences, peace talks, peace initiatives, and so on - have emerged over the years, and much has been made of so-called American efforts to broker a peace agreement, one fundamental US objective has remained constant: there is to be no sovereign, independent Palestinian state. And, that, after all, is the essential interest, and in my opinion right, of the Palestinians. Moreover, each time some new initiative pertaining to the Palestinians has emerged, it has come in response to other considerations - regional or international - rather than to Palestinian needs, rights, or interests.

In the aftermath of the June 1967 War, and in the context of Arab anger over American support for Israel, President Lyndon Johnson outlined a proposal for Middle East peace. Yet, his 'Five Principles for Peace' focused only on the political rights of existing states and referred to the Palestinians merely as refugees. American sponsorship of UN Resolution 242 was more of the same.

After the 1973 war, Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of US foreign policy, decided to convene an 'international conference' to obscure his real policy of divide and rule over the Arab states. Concerns about the oil embargo, Soviet support for Syria and Iraq, and several other factors made such a conference appear useful. Yasser Arafat wrote to Kissinger at the time, asking that the PLO be included in the conference, but for Kissinger that was unthinkable - both from his own personal and political perspective and because he had just accepted a written demand from Israel that the US never recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized Israel's right to exist.

President Jimmy Carter is remembered for being the first public official to articulate any Palestinian interest. He called for a Palestinian 'homeland', which, I would point out, is by definition quite different than a state. In the end, however, he reneged even on this position in the context of Israeli demands (and Egyptian disinterest) during the Camp David process, which eventually led to a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace that contained nothing for the Palestinians.

Ronald Reagan came to office with utter contempt for the Palestinians, a simplistic perspective of them as merely terrorists, and a declaration that the settlements were not illegal. However, after Israel's war in Lebanon and the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, Washington felt the need to at least give the appearance of 'evenhandedness'. Thus, the peace initiative of the Reagan Plan and its attendant diplomacy - all of which held nothing that could further the Palestinian objective of statehood.

When in December 1988 the US opened a low-level and short-lived dialogue with the PLO, this tactic was designed, as had been others, to deal with problems other than Palestinian interests. There were two fronts:

- ❑ First, at the international level, the US sought to improve its tarnished position after George Shultz's November refusal to grant Yasser Arafat a visa to come to the UN, which resulted in the UN going to Mr. Arafat. Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev had been working the international scene quite effectively and the US was concerned about maintaining its position as the dominant external power in the Middle East.
- ❑ Second, and equally, if not more important were regional concerns: the US wanted to bring about a termination of the *Intifada*. It was concerned that Israel's strategic utility was being weakened as its military became embroiled in suppressing the Palestinian uprising. The US was also concerned about the potential demonstration effect the *Intifada* could have in other Arab countries. And, once more, the US wanted to restore a sense of 'evenhandedness' in the region after its many years of overt support of Israeli interests and policies. Again, the PLO obtained nothing from the dialogue in terms of progress toward its strategic interest; indeed talking with the PLO was seen by Washington as a means of co-opting it, terminating the *Intifada*, and deflecting Palestinian demands for statehood. Nevertheless, as a prerequisite for its participation, the PLO had capitulated to all of Washington's long-standing demands.

The year 1991 brought the Gulf War and in its aftermath, the frantic diplomacy of James Baker culminating in the Madrid Conference. But, if we cut through the multitude of trees constructed during that period, it is possible to see the forest: as firm and unyielding as ever on the fundamental question of Palestinian sovereignty.

Next came the Oslo Accords and the supposedly historic handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the White House lawn - we have before our eyes this day the consequences of that affair.

In the US, we have a saying that diplomacy stops at the water's edge - meaning that Democrat or Republican, Liberal or Conservative we will be of one mind in our approach to foreign policy. Tactics or policies may be changed and will often be debated loudly, but objectives, interests, or ends remain constant. I cannot think of a clearer example of this maxim than US policy on Palestine. Here we might also note that the same holds true for Israel on so-called security issues - Labor and Likud have had and continue to have the same objectives with regard to the West Bank and East Jerusalem: it is the Land of Israel and it will be so eternally. Everything else is rhetoric, or if you prefer, pomp and circumstance.

In conclusion, I think that it is necessary to be very forthright - US policy on the Palestine Question has been clear and consistent: American policy-makers are unequivocally opposed to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Moreover, the Arab States have put no real pressure on the US to change that policy. And, given the strategic importance attached to Israel, indeed the institutionalization of that idea, it would be unrealistic to expect Washington to 'pressure' Israel in regard to Palestine. The evidence of this can be found in the fact that the US never put genuine pressure on Israel: the US\$3-6 billion given annually to Israel - without which it could not have settled the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza and attained the high living standard that it has - has never been used, nor even threatened, as a means of altering Israel's behavior. Note too that Israel's annual subsidy is far more certain than that promised to retired Americans as social security.

One final thought is the importance of reflecting carefully on the meaning of the word 'peace'. It tends to be assumed that 'peace process', 'peace conference', 'peace initiative', and 'peace talks' have a substantive meaning that includes a measure of justice for both sides. However, in American lexicology, peace is simply the absence of conflict, regardless of how unbalanced the fruits are for each side. Whether it manifests as a process, a negotiation, in a conference, or as a 'new' initiative - it is simply a tactic to divert Palestinian attention from its fundamental objective of statehood.



US Foreign Policy in the Middle East - A Palestinian View

HE Afif Safieh, Head of the PLO Delegation to the UK and to the Holy See

I would like to start by saying that I am speaking in an individual capacity. If you agree with the performance, you can thank Dr. Abdul Hadi for making a wise decision regarding his choice of invitees. If you disagree, you should blame me and not the National Authority.

There are three or four books on the topic of US foreign policy in the Middle East that I wish to recommend: the first is by William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, the second by Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, the third by Camille Mansour, *Beyond Alliance* and the last by J.J. Goldberg, *Jewish Power*. Had I written the last book, I would have been accused of anti-Semitism, but since it is Goldberg who wrote it, at worst, he will be called narcissistic.

Now, American society is fascinating to study, and there are a variety of schools of thought concerning this fascinating society. There are those, for example, who look at American society as a result of widespread anti-colonial feeling. The American society is the result of widespread immigration from European countries. Who are those immigrants? Mainly the Catholics from predominantly Protestant countries and the Protestants from predominantly Catholic countries, and the Republicans from monarchies and the monarchists from newly emerging republics; in other words, the doomed of the earth, all of whom sought more hospitable shores, struggled against the British Empire, obtained their independence, and in the 20th Century helped many a Third World country obtain its own. This is a very interesting approach that can be intellectually legitimized and substantiated.

You could also, however, see things in a totally reverse fashion: the US society as a colonial society that was built at the expense of the Red Indians - the Palestinians of America - who were exterminated and put into reservations preceding the emergence of the US at Mexico's expense. One should not forget Texas, California, etc., where Mexico was gradually eaten up and annexed.

Speaking as a political scientist, I can say that the study of politics - the study of the State, the international system, the interstate relationship and the allocation of power within the international system - is still not a science, although it is moving toward scientification. There was a period of what was called 'quantomania', when we attempted, by adhering to imitation scientific procedures, to quantify interactions, but it never worked. I believe that in this particular field one can present a hypothesis and its contrary with equal persuasiveness, which means that in most instances the approach one adopts depends to a great extent on one's perception, preferences, prejudices and biases.

Now returning to the different schools of thought surrounding the American-Israeli relationship, which is a decisive relationship that has fascinated two generations of scholars, one could say that in the past there were those in America whom we used to refer to as the globalists and the regionalists. The globalists saw the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of global competition, mainly with the Soviet Union and the Communist World, etc., and in this globalist approach Israel was seen as a strategic asset and America's regional ally. The Americans were in trouble in Vietnam; both China and Russia supported the Vietnamese, and we in the Middle East had the stronger horse and were putting them in difficulty. Opposing the globalist school of thought in Washington were the regionalists, who made up the minority and who were saying, no, please, extract the Middle East from this global picture and study it on its own merits, namely the merits of justice and injustice, and with regard to how this conflict affects us and our positions in the Middle East *vis-à-vis* Israel and our regional network of alliances, whilst asking ourselves if our being favorable to Israel means that we are sacrificing the network of our relationships in the Gulf, in North Africa and elsewhere.

Today, two schools of thought are engaged in a kind of intellectual battle - and by the way, intellectual battles are always necessary - in which one considers Israel a strategic asset, the other a liability *vis-à-vis* American national interests. I personally believe that Israel is becoming more of a liability, unlike in

the 1950s and 1960s when it was helpful to American foreign policy in the Middle East because it helped in confronting emerging Nasserism, militant Ba'athism, and the possibility of communist expansion. Today, whether one likes it or not, the entire regional state system is very pro-Western and conservative, and the Israeli Government, by its intransigence and non-flexibility is defying, destabilizing and deligitimizing the profoundly pro-Western regional system. We have all seen in recent contemporary history how the policy code of dual containment by the Americans was put in disarray. Why? The answer, according to the Arab perception, is that there was a missing link; it was never a triple containment policy because we, the Arabs and Palestinians, were more concerned with the containment of Israel. The recent failure of the Doha Conference and, a mere two weeks later, the success of the Islamic Conference in Tehran, which reinstated Iran as a major player in the region and beyond, should in my opinion cause American decision-makers to open their eyes.

In summarizing all the above-mentioned debates on the American-Israeli relationship in my own words - and I know any summary is simplistic - I would say that the first school of thought speaks of an American Israel and the other of an Israeli America. Today, the US is the only remaining superpower in the world, yet when it comes to the Middle East, it has abdicated that role to its regional client, *protégé* or junior partner, Israel. While the first school of thought says that the US, as the senior partner, imposes upon its regional ally and junior partner its regional policy, which conforms with its global approach and interests, the other school of thought says no, because of a special relationship the Americans adopt the Israelis' regional strategy and integrate it into their global framework. So the difference is does America impose on Israel its policy, or does America solely adopt American policy and integrate it into its approach. The reality is somewhere in the middle.

Speaking frankly, I am not insensitive to the second line of approach. There clearly exists an influential pro-Israel lobby, which is a major player in the formulation and elaboration of American foreign policy pertaining to this region. You might have seen on CNN a recent public relations exercise, which many referred to a disaster, involving the three major spokesmen on American foreign policy, namely Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger and Cohen. The three are Jewish, and they were voicing the three key positions in the formulation of American foreign policy. I was present at the London meeting with the three Americans most directly involved in dealing with Middle Eastern mechanisms and peace processes, and I recall that after approximately ten minutes, Madeleine Albright and Arafat departed to another room. It was then that I observed that from one end of the room to the other, all those who remained were brilliant American intellectuals who were now political operatives. I remember our joking with Arafat, Abu Mazen, Sa'eb Ereikat, and Nabil Sha'ath in the hotel afterwards and telling Mr. Arafat in the presence of all the others that we, the Christians in Palestine - and I consider myself a sociological Christian, not a theological Christian, because I have doubts and doubts about my doubts - make up two percent of society, yet in our team we were two out of eight, meaning 25 percent. The Jews in America, meanwhile, make up two percent of society, yet they were eight out of eight, meaning 100 percent, so we, the Christians of Palestine, were either underrepresented - which was not the case, because we were 25 percent - or they [the American Jews] were over-represented! I put it very bluntly because it is a case of perception but also content and desire.

I think that the peace process *is* in trouble. Let me give you my preferred formula of 25 years ago, when I was a big fan of General de Gaulle. The general, because he was both aware and a very courageous statesman, felt that the only way for conflicts to be resolved in the Middle East was through an imposed solution involving the major powers. This is why he called for a consultation between the major four; remember China was not yet in. I used to elaborate on that by saying, since both the Israelis and we believe that the entire country is ours, this enforced solution should be mutually unacceptable. Incidentally, in politics and diplomacy the concept of mutual unacceptability carries more potential than mutual acceptability: if I know that he also does not like it, it makes it less unattractive to me! So since both societies considered the entire area theirs, an imposed solution by the external major powers should have been based on a two-state solution that was mutually unacceptable but imposed. Unfortunately, since that time we have become unreasonably reasonable and accepted the two-state solution, which is why our realism is now sometimes confused with resignation. Our bet concerning American foreign policy was always to wait for a new Eisenhower; remember how, in 1956, Eisenhower said to the British, the French and the Israelis, okay, now you just withdraw, and in hours the withdrawal took place?

My personal feeling when it comes to the two schools of thought and who makes whom wag in American foreign policy is that much depends on how comfortable the American President is in the Congress and in the country and how comfortable America is in the world. I believe that today, America is extremely comfortable in the world; it is the one remaining superpower, and I think, given the popularity ratings of Bill Clinton, he is comfortable in the country, although one could say that in the Congress he

is not, etc. Now this is why we had the complicating factor of what happened while Arafat was in Washington. The weakening of Clinton was a devastating blow for Palestinian national interests.

At this point it is important to note that we, the Palestinians, have never put our house in order and we have a sort of dynamic approach to the American society. I believe that we should address not only American decision-making but also American public opinion, and we should have an institution, not necessarily within the Authority, with a pool of 15 or so speakers who spend their time moving between every single state in the US. We should have here in Palestine think tanks that decide upon the best Palestinian diplomatic doctrine and how we should package our message, because here again we were not always maestros in the communication of our ideas and aspirations. We should have a better Palestinian diplomatic team; we should have a foreign relations committee in our parliament to sort of cross-examine nominated diplomats, involving MPs from all the different political groups, meaning we should be able to formulate our foreign policy according to the national consensus. There is no doubt whatsoever: for as long as we do not do our homework, we are destined to remain failures.

I would point out here that Arafat was deeply moved by the fact that he was given the same treatment as Netanyahu during his most recent visit to Washington. In the interest of facilitating the success of the peace process and making it correspond to the Palestinian national interest to a greater degree, we should look further into de-Americanizing the peace process itself. De-Americanizing in what sense? By introducing additional players. Now in 1991, there were three sponsors, but we knew that the Soviet Union was busy managing its decline and in occupying Chechnya. We had hoped that the European Union would be a third co-sponsor because we believed that the EU is on the economic level of this multi-polar system a pillar of the international community, and we believed that because of the physical geographic proximity, there is an inter-dependence in our national interests, not only from the point of view of economic transactions and interactions but also with regard to security and demographic overflows, etc. However, the participation of the EU was torpedoed by the Israelis with American assistance, although a month ago there was a document issued from Brussels by Marin, the Commissioner for Mediterranean Affairs, who claimed that Europe should be allowed to play a more active role in the peace process. I believe that the Russians should also play a larger role and that while the Americans should be invited to continue their involvement, we should also resurrect the United Nations role as a whole; Kofi Anan was certainly the revelation of the last crisis and we - Arabs, Palestinians, Israelis and all the others - should use more of that man and the institution he represents in conflict resolution.

The fact remains that I am pessimistic, mainly because the Israelis tend to support the idea that the Arabs have no more options, thereby confusing our realism with resignation. I am proud to say that I am a realist - I object to the use of the word moderate in this context - and I do not think that realism means resignation. I also think that we as Palestinians should agree on what the desirable negotiated outcome should be. There is already, from my point of view, a consensus in Palestinian society, and one that I am sure we can succeed in having Hamas endorse. The consensus is based on the idea that we have a conceptual difference with the Israeli political class, left right and center, which prefers to speak in terms of territorial compromise, and that we should prefer to speak of historical compromise.

But what is historical compromise for us? We believe that mandatory Palestine is the disputed area and that any compromise should be based upon the 4 June 1967 boundaries. The Israelis believe that the West Bank is a disputed area, and they offer us a compromise halfway between Jerusalem and Jericho. We, on the other hand, offer them a compromise that is based on a meeting point in Jerusalem and nowhere else. These are two different conceptual approaches with different territorial implications: territorial compromise on the one side, historical compromise on the other. For us Palestinians, this is our mini-max approach, territorially at least; the maximum we are asking for, but also the minimum we are ready, willing or capable of accepting. There is no elasticity on that issue, and I think that even those who now oppose the peace process would be prepared to join this consensus under the proper conditions.

The Israelis ask themselves what options the Palestinians have at the present time. I tell them that we have for many years attempted to play with them the winner-winner game, in the sense that we are in favor of the two-state solution, but that we were unreasonably reasonable and accepted to play that game by phases and stages. Unfortunately, they still want to play with us the winner-loser game, and I tell them very frankly, no society on earth likes to be the eternal 'loser' of history; a minority always emerges - and remember that it is the minorities, not the majorities who make history - and says, if we are condemned to be the eternal losers of history, then to hell with the temple, down with the pillars, let us play loser-loser! On a more positive note, when a movement starts playing loser-loser, the rational tendency of the other side inevitably emerges and says, let us return to winner-winner; let us spare ourselves all those agonistic, agonizing scenarios and continue the game on the winner-winner level. I

am extremely happy that even in America with Henry Kissinger, and in Israel, with General Sharon, both have spoken of the inevitability of Palestinian statehood, and even though I recognize the fact that 'inevitability' is a very clinical term - you can say it is inevitable but undesirable - at least they have recognized the inevitability of Palestinian statehood.

A favorite Jewish author of mine, Nahum Goldman, once defined diplomacy when commenting on Henry Kissinger's approaches in the 1970s. Goldman said that diplomacy in the Middle East seems to be the art of delaying the inevitable as long as possible, in other words, that statehood is inevitable, and our task as political activists is to find historical shortcuts and to get it before the 20th Century rather than later. Now I personally would like to see the international community more involved, and I believe that we should reorganize the peace process by introducing other external players and rehabilitating the role of the UN. I think Kofi Anan was America's choice to begin with; remember, Butros Butros Ghali was destabilized so that Kofi Anan could come to power, and although he was not the Palestinians' or even my personal choice, he turned out to be a person with great dignity, a great statesman and someone with enormous independence and concern for the avoidance of war, and I am sure he is as deeply committed to the achievement of peace as he is to the avoidance of war.

With regard to the question of whether there is a need to rewrite Oslo, let us review the last six years, noting that I was in favor of us going to Madrid and Oslo. The format of negotiations was clearly tailor-made to suit Israeli negotiating preferences. A person for whom I have great admiration, James Baker, often used to repeat that we have to make an offer that Israel cannot reject, in other words, an offer that corresponds to its own negotiating preference. For five or ten years prior to Madrid, articles in magazines such as *Commentary* in the US confirmed the belief within the Jewish intellectual community, i.e., that the Palestinian question should no longer be given centrality in America's Middle Eastern approaches and that the Palestinian track should be disconnected from the Arab tracks.

And so, according to the tailor-made format of negotiations at Madrid, the Palestinians were invited to be half a delegation representing half the people seeking half a solution (the self-government for the interim period)! We had to go in the framework of a Palestinian-Jordanian team whose members were supposed to be recruited only from the West Bank and Gaza, and which should not include any East Jerusalem residents, nor PLO officials, nor Diaspora Palestinians. We accepted because we thought this would trigger a snowball process and improve things on the way. Oslo rectified two of those three conditions: we were no longer half a delegation, and we were now negotiating as a national movement representing the indivisible nature of our people, although we were still seeking half a solution on the way to permanent status.

Returning to the present, due to the fact that we got stuck along the road, we are now victims of an Israeli desire to optimize and take advantage of the imbalance of power. While we believe that UN resolutions and the principle of land for peace should be the guiding compass of negotiators, the Israelis would like to reflect territorially and geographically the imbalance of forces on the one side and the other. We, of course, are not comfortable with participating in the peace process whilst being at the mercy of the balance of power, and we thought that the international community would help us at the negotiating table and remedy this inferior status *vis-à-vis* the power equation. Their intervention up to now, however, has not been sufficiently decisive. Territorially the Israelis offer us a Sharon map or a Mordechai map; Sharon wants to give us back 35 percent, Mordechai is less ungenerous and willing to give us 50 percent, while Yossi Beilin might be even more flexible. That is the present situation. Usually, territorial rectification of a major nature is always justified under the guise of security needs and requirements. I personally believe in the intellectual battle; we should wage a serious media and information campaign, explaining to the public opinion and decision-makers in Israel, America and elsewhere, that in the Middle East, it is peace that will bring security and not security that will bring peace. Only peace with the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors will bring security for Israel, whereas territorial rectification will provoke the perpetuation of the conflict.

We, the Palestinians, are the key to regional acceptance of the Israelis. When it was perceived that negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians were moving smoothly, Israel could open doors from Morocco to Muscat, but when it was perceived that Israel was again maltreating us and not negotiating in good faith, those same doors closed in its face. So we are the key to regional acceptance, and it is this fact that is the prerequisite for security, not territorial appetite. Let me tell you very frankly, that in the 1970s an idea to which I subscribed was floated in the States, namely that there should be a formal alliance between the US and Israel that would enable Israel to feel more secure and prevent it from constantly referring to the security pretext and territorial claims.

The reason why a military imbalance exists today is that Israel enjoys three superiorities on the military level. It has conventional weaponry superiority: its aviation establishment is numerically bigger than that of the French and British combined, and I suspect that on the operational level it is even better because it has had much more experience, which means that on the conventional level, Israel is stronger than any possible coalition or combination of Arab forces: You can add up Egypt, Syria, Iraq, diminished or undiminished, etc., and Israel on the operational military conventional level is still superior. Israel also has the nuclear monopoly - it is the only actor in the regional state system that maintains nuclear weapons. And number three, Israel has an unwritten alliance with the only remaining superpower, and I personally believe that an unwritten alliance with the only remaining superpower is even better than a written one, because an unwritten alliance allows the junior partner to behave with irresponsibility, while a junior partner within the framework of a formal alliance has to respect a certain code of conduct because he might be an embarrassment to the senior partner. So I, Afif Safieh, part of the Palestinian and Arab national movement, am not against a formal alliance ratified and codified between the US and Israel according to which the US says that any threat to Israeli security and territorial integrity in the future is an attack and an offense against the American state. This means, however, that keeping this hill and that valley is not a necessity within a framework of cohabitation or within the framework of an alliance.

The Americans, in addition to the Europeans, often invoke Israeli democracy in such a way as to make Israel seem more *sympathique* to the international public opinion and, for example, to Saddam the 'dictator'; Israel is a democracy and there is no moral equivalent. By the way, I am not a fan of Saddam Hussein, nor was I a fan in 1990 and I think one of the reasons why this crisis [the recent Gulf Crisis] was better managed was because some of his assistants played a more prominent role. This argument of Israeli democracy is an interesting argument, and it is usually used as a kind of extenuating, attenuating actor. I personally believe that on the moral level, Israeli democracy is a disturbing phenomenon because there is nothing worse morally than a democratic oppression, meaning an oppression that enjoys the democratic support of the voter and the citizen. Ten years ago I was against Qaddafi's policy towards Chad, but the Libyan people could not be held responsible for Qaddafi's policies regarding his southern neighbor because they were never consulted. In Israel, on the other hand, because of the democracy enjoyed by the Jewish citizens of the state, what is inflicted on us - the injustice, the oppression, and the persecution - enjoys the support of public opinion, the voter, the citizen and the soldier. Democracy means responsibility of the citizen, and in this context I recall the words of a New York rabbi who said during the Vietnam War that in a democracy, if a few are guilty, all are responsible.

Now democracy also has problems making war and waging peace, and we are not unfamiliar with the coalition building policy in Israel and the impact this has had on flexibility and inflexibility at the negotiating table. This is why again, I believe there should be an external input. I was in favor of Oslo, although I admit to having had problems with the way we managed the negotiations, then the way we managed people and the economy. Oslo was a historical necessity, a lesser evil. I believe the Palestinian people and the Palestinian national movement would be in a worse condition had there not been Oslo; I think we would now be in round 62 in Washington, stagnating, with the PLO bankrupted financially and also politically, and with increasing tensions between the Palestinian legitimate, central historical leadership in Tunis and the negotiating team, which some would have perceived as an alternative leadership. But am I in favor of rewriting Oslo? No, if it is implemented the way it ought to be, it is okay.

What should have been implemented? On the territorial level, even though there was constructive ambiguity, we reluctantly accepted for Jerusalem and the settlements to be left to the final status negotiations. Territorially speaking this involves ten percent of the West Bank, meaning that in the three installments of the three redeployments, theoretically we should have gained control or be about to gain control of the other 90 percent. We did not get the 90 percent, and in fact, we did not get even the first redeployment, which is why we are speaking of one redeployment that will be two in one. Theoretically, the interim period should have been of five years' duration, starting on 4 May 1994 and ending on 4 May 1999. It will not, of course, be ending by then if we continue at the current pace. I often say that Rabin and Netanyahu when compared to a turtle make it look like Speedy Gonzalez!

Theoretically, then, Oslo is to be implemented by 4 May 1999, by which time we should have peace, statehood, etc. We will not, but we should have. This is why there is talk within the Palestinian political community of unilaterally proclaiming the state on 4 May 1999 in the areas we control, considering the other parts of the occupied territories as part of the state that are under occupation, etc. Who will recognize it then? We do not know what the attitude of the Europeans and Americans will be, and there are so many question marks. So, re-write Oslo? I do not know. But the message from us should be that we are in favor of mutual recognition, and by the way, in this Israeli-Palestinian/Jewish-Palestinian relationship, the victim hates the oppressor much less than the oppressor hates the victim. It is intriguing.

ing: the oppressors hate us the victims much more than we have ever hated them historically, but it is the historical truth. We have moved faster towards mutual recognition than the Israelis have; since 1973 and 1974 - the October War was the demarcation line - we have moved faster towards mutual recognition than the Israelis have. They should understand, therefore, that we are for mutual recognition. If we do not get our independent state based on the 1967 boundaries, the recognition we extended in 1988 or in 1991, in 1993 or in 1994 will be subject to revision, to rewriting, according to our very pragmatic, unemotional, unsentimental approach. We are in favor of mutual, but not unilateral, recognition.



The Palestinians and the US

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When it comes to major issues such as the issue of statehood or the issue of right of return, nothing has changed over the years as far as the official American position is concerned. The official position remains, "We will agree to whatever the two parties agree on," which means that the US, with no real position of its own, is merely hiding behind whatever the two parties agree to do. I must add, of course, that the US still does not recognize the Palestinians' legitimate right to self-determination, statehood, nor return, nor does it recognize the PLO, in spite of the fact that it accepted UN Resolution 194 and signed the Oslo Agreement in which the PLO is mentioned.

In short, the US is inspired more or less by what it sees on the Israeli side and tends to wait for Israel to define a policy, regardless of how it is received by the Palestinians. One must remember that the US agreed to open a dialogue with the PLO only after the PLO and President Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist, accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounced all forms of violence. From my point of view, had it not been for Israel's acquiescence the US would never have accepted Arafat and the PLO.

As to the US mediation, the US, a primary sponsor of the peace process, describes itself as an honest broker, but Palestinian officials have always complained that this is not the case and that the US position is not neutral but is more or less consistent with the Israeli position. Had it not been for this American bias towards Israel, we would not have asked for the inclusion of other parties, which, after all, only serves to complicate the negotiations. We would much rather negotiate with the Israelis alone, but unfortunately they are not willing to negotiate in good faith and respect the concluded agreements, which is why we are obliged to go to the Americans and ask for a European role.

Today, we find ourselves – for the very first time – with two Palestinian positions *vis-à-vis* the US: the Palestinian official position and the position of the Palestinian street. In the past, the PLO and the people were one and the same, and generally speaking our collective position was that America is our enemy. Now, we have a political system and we have a different official position, and while people in the street and the political factions issue statements condemning America for this or for that policy or position, President Arafat sends his greetings to President Clinton and thanks him for what the US is doing: this is the way governments function, but it does not mean that Arafat is not privately unhappy or even angry with the American leadership for the way it is behaving.

As to the US Congress and the prospects of improving the US-Palestinian relations, I do not see much hope of this happening in the near future. The American public, in general, does not care much about this issue. On the other hand, there is a strong pro-Israel lobby, and I believe that we should send people like Hanan Ashrawi to present our story to the public and to Congress, at least to the people who are misinformed. In Europe, for example, many people changed their perceptions of the Palestinians once they heard our story in full, and today there is considerable sympathy for our plight at both official and unofficial levels. I believe that if we argue our case convincingly and logically in front of Congress, we stand a good chance of winning some support, even though it might not lead to a major shift, bearing in mind the strength of the pro-Israel lobby and the fact that so many politicians depend on members of this lobby for support. There is certainly room to improve our relationship with the US Government and with the US Congress, but this will require great efforts from our side.

With regard to the Palestinian leadership, we still have one man who makes all the decisions and although he listens to those around him, nobody really knows what impact this has on the decision-making process. Whenever Arafat assembles the other leaders in the PLO Executive Committee or in the Palestinian Authority (PA), it is more or less to provide a cover for the kind of decisions he takes, and even the PLC members have only a very little impact on the decision-making process. We do not have a coherent decision-making process, and this is becoming a major problem, especially as the one man who does make decisions is overworked and is getting old, at the same time as his responsibilities have increased. Obviously, he cannot do everything himself, and even though he takes all the major decisions, he is incapable of following them up. As yet, we have still not a satisfactory decision-making system.

Take, for example, the negotiations and the way in which people are selected to participate, which is totally *ad hoc*. How can we expect to get anywhere without improving the current system? To my regret, we at the PLC do not have the mandate to change this, and although we have often voiced our opinion that something should be done and presented what we believe to be suitable guidelines, it has been to no avail.

With regard to the question of whether such a leadership can lead our people through such a critical period, it is a difficult question. This kind of leadership is unable to mobilize the capabilities of the Palestinians. I think that political participation is a very important principle; when people participate, they are mobilized and they share the responsibilities. From my experience during the *Intifada*, when we work together, the outcome is usually better. But again, Arafat is obsessed with a certain vision: he wants Jerusalem and a Palestinian state and he thinks other things should wait. This is not a personal issue; Arafat is a political leader *par excellence*, who is very legitimate, having received 87 percent of the votes in the elections. Why did he have such support? I think the answer has a lot to do with the fact that ours is still a very parochial and partially tribal society, and a majority of people still think - remember the political elite do not represent the masses of the people - that Arafat's leadership may not be adequate, but that without him we are going to be far worse off.

I also think that the Americans, the Israelis and the Palestinians all agree and realize that the endgame is a Palestinian state: I do not think that even a Likud government would object to a Palestinian state in Gaza. The problem is the West Bank, because we do not consider a Palestinian state in Gaza an objective. What is the position of the US administration with regard to this problem? What is it doing in order to prevent the swallowing up of the West Bank by Israel? The endgame could be a Palestinian state over ten square meters or it could be a Palestinian state covering the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

With regard to the Iraqi crisis and its effect on the Middle East peace process, I believe that the Americans are simply waiting for Saddam to make a mistake so that they can go and hit Iraq, and this time without making a phone call to anyone. But, let us assume that the Americans do strike Iraq; it is my belief that the administration would feel less compelled to play the same active role that it played after the war of 1991 when it was accused of double standards and felt it had to do something to balance the policy. Assuming America does not hit Iraq now, I believe that things will continue at more or less the same tempo with the same kind of intervention.

The trouble is that if one is serving as an honest broker and does not intervene, then, of course, the outcome is going to be in favor of the more powerful party, which is exactly what has been happening. This is why the Palestinians always end up being the party that has to make all the concessions in order to appease the other side; the balance of power prevails, with America simply stating that it will agree to whatever the two sides agree to. Unfortunately, until there is a major crisis it is unlikely that the Americans will react and then, of course, each time there is a crisis, it is the Palestinians who end up paying the higher price. We have witnessed some minor changes, but they have not been enough to force the American administration to be more creative or for us to wake up one day and hear the American leadership announce, "Okay, we will recognize a Palestinian state."

With regard to the way in which people use the external difficulties to avoid making changes internally, I think we have to ask the question: Do external difficulties really prevent us from fighting, for example, corruption within our society? As far as I am concerned, it is obvious that if we clean up our internal situation, we will be better prepared to face the external challenges. If we take care of all of these internal problems - inefficiency, corruption, the lack of transparency - or if we at least start taking care of these things, we will have a state of mobilization. The leadership can always hide behind the external difficulties, but I see no reason why we should not kick out all of the corrupt ministers, etc., and exercise transparency, accountability and the rule of law. On the other hand, of course, people in the street are not enthusiastic about going out to the streets to risk their lives or allowing their children to risk their lives for the sake of those individuals who are enjoying the fruits of their power, which is why we are not seeing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians going out there to protest the Israeli practices or even those of certain Palestinians. I think we could say that basically, people have eaten the bait and are now more concerned with trying to preserve what little they have gained, whether it is three percent of the West Bank or restricted authority. That is why we - the people and the leadership - after almost an entire century of fighting need to reevaluate our present situation and our current and future options.



Lectures and Discussions Part IV: CANADA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PALESTINIANS

The Historical Evolution of Canadian Involvement in the Middle East

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My name is Rex Brynen, and I teach in the Department of Political Science at McGill University in Montreal. Although my work concerns the Middle East in general, a large part of it has to do with a variety of aspects of Palestinian politics, especially the refugee issue, peace negotiations and foreign economic assistance to Palestine since Oslo. I also spent two years attached to the Canadian Foreign Ministry as an academic advisor, which was an interesting experience in terms of being able to combine my academic interests with some practical experience. Policy processes certainly look a lot different from the inside than they do from the outside.

After his visit to the region in November, the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy decided that Canada should adopt a more active policy with regard to the Palestinian issue. As a result, he formed a sort of inter-departmental taskforce to come up with recommendations on what a revised Canadian foreign policy with regard to the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict should look like. At this very moment, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is in the process of writing up the report.

Prior to World War II, there was very little Canadian involvement in this part of the world, mainly because there were no obvious Canadian interests in this region. Canadian foreign policy tended to focus on two things: one was Britain (a legacy of our colonial past) and the other was the US. Canada and the US share the longest undefended border and one of the largest bilateral trading relationships in the world; over 80 percent of Canada's current trade is with the US, and Canada is by far the US's largest trading partner, although virtually everyone in the US presumes that the largest US trading partner is Japan. Canada was in the words of one parliamentarian at the turn of the century "a fireproof house far from combustible materials," meaning that what went on in much of the rest of the world did not affect Canada in any substantial way.

A second reason why there was not a lot of Canadian involvement in this region, which relates to the first, is that it took a while for our foreign policy to be an entirely 'Made in Canada' foreign policy. Apart from our interests, our foreign policy-making was also tied up with Britain in important ways, and until the 1920s and 1930s we tended to reflexively support British positions.

A third and probably less important - but still significant reason - was that there were no significant domestic lobbies in Canada pressing for greater Canadian engagement in this part of the world. There was a Jewish community, but it was discriminated against and so politically ineffective that it was unable to get the Canadian Government to open Canada's borders to Jewish refugees in the 1930s. The Arab community, meanwhile, was very small. There had been immigration to Canada largely from what came to be known as Syria and Lebanon at the turn of the century and in the early 1900s, but most of these early immigrants ended up in the Atlantic provinces where the ships would dock, and their small community was certainly not vocal.

The situation began to change after World War II, which was something of a watershed in terms of Canadian global foreign policy. Canada, a founding member of the United Nations, emerged from the war as a more important country, having made significant contributions to the allied war effort. Although it was not in the top tier of powers, which after the war included the US, the Soviet Union and Britain, it was certainly part of a second level of global powers. The idea of being a middle power proved to be

quite influential in Canadian foreign policy inasmuch as Canada realized that it could do certain things that a superpower could not, such as serve as a helpful mediator and suggest constructive solutions and so forth.

It was in the UN that Canada made its first significant contribution to the affairs of the Middle East through its sympathetic support for Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel. Canada was a member of UNSCOP (the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine), which came up with a majority recommendation that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish and Arab state. Canada worked quite energetically for that position and recognized the State of Israel shortly after it was established, although it is not clear that its support reflected much else other than a kind of residual sympathy for Zionism that came from the sort of Judeo-Christian background of most of the key foreign policy-makers of the time, combined with sympathy toward the plight of the Jewish refugees from Europe. Canada most certainly felt guilty about the Holocaust, particularly in light of its behavior before World War II when it had refused to provide a safe haven for Jewish refugees. As for the Palestinians, I believe that their rights or overall situation did not appear to Canadian policy-makers as a significant consideration.

Canada's next substantial engagement in the affairs of the Middle East came in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. The tripartite invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain and France, posed some very serious problems for Canada, not because of anything that was happening in the Middle East but because it led to the emergence of tension between Britain and the US. The US administration was profoundly unhappy with Suez and strongly critical of France's and Britain's role in the region, and it put huge pressure on the British to pull out from Egypt. In fact, it was largely that pressure that resulted in the British and French withdrawal from the canal zone. For Canada, being in a situation where its two major allies were arguing with each other was a very uncomfortable position to be in, and in order to facilitate a British withdrawal from Egypt, Canada proposed the idea of deploying UN peacekeeping forces in Sinai. That was in fact the birth of the notion of UN peacekeeping, for which the then Canadian Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) Lester Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize. So even at Suez, the driving force in Canadian foreign policy tended to be European and North American issues, not Middle Eastern issues.

Moving forward to 1967 and the June War, immediately prior to the outbreak of war Egypt demanded that the UN peacekeepers be withdrawn from the Sinai. One has to remember that the peacekeepers were only on the Egyptian side of the border since the Israelis had refused to have a peacekeeping force on their side. Nasser was therefore well within his rights to demand their withdrawal. Canada, however, was one of the countries that argued that the UN should refuse to withdraw. Fortunately, the UN realized that it was unfeasible for it to maintain a peacekeeping presence against the will of the host country and the forces were withdrawn. The fact that Canada had recommended that the peacekeepers remain did little for its bilateral relations with Nasser in 1967, and it was thus prevented from playing a substantial diplomatic role the way it had played one in 1956. I think that Canada learned a very important lesson from all this, namely, that it had to pay a little more attention to the perspectives of both sides.

The October War of 1973 was also important to Canadian foreign policy in the region, not only because it demonstrated the continuing instability of the region, but because of the Arab oil embargo. Only two oil shipments for Canada were actually stopped, and the fact that Canada did not rely for the greater part of its oil on the Middle East led to a certain amount of confusion as to the extent to which Canada was affected or supposed to be affected by the embargo. Nevertheless, the embargo demonstrated to Canada and the European countries the potential of the conflict in the Middle East to have broader economic repercussions.

If one takes a look at the history of European diplomatic engagement in support of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it really only becomes constructive after 1973, by which time the Europeans - who were heavily dependent on Middle East oil - had learned that they had to try and promote a fair negotiated settlement in the region because of the security of European oil supplies. Canada is closer to Mexico and Venezuela and it produces a substantial amount of oil as well as other energy sources, which means it was never as affected as other Western countries were by the increases in the price of oil or embargoes.

In 1973, Canada probably had only three or four embassies in the entire Middle East; of those only one - in Iran - was in a Middle Eastern oil producer. Only after 1973 did Canada begin to substantially increase the level of diplomatic representation in this part of the world.

The 1970s also saw an attempt on the part of the Trudeau government to somewhat reorient Canadian foreign policy. Trudeau was of the view that Canada was excessively reliant on the US, especially when

it came to trade - even today, the degree to which Canadians have trade dependency on the US is about the same as the degree to which the Palestinians have dependence on Israel - and his government decided that Canada should try and diversify its trade policy and improve relations with Europe as a way of somehow counterbalancing trade with the US. The attempt was only moderately successful, because whereas the US is right next to Canada, the Europeans are on the other side of the Atlantic.

Even today, the level of Canadian interaction with the US is incredible at all levels. Although the US always focuses on the Mexican border, the number of people who daily cross the Canadian border is many times larger than the number who cross that of Mexico.

Certainly if one looks at Canadian voting behavior in the UN, one does not see a great deal of difference between Canadian voting behavior and US voting behavior. Canada almost always voted with the US on resolutions pertaining to the Middle East, and apart from the US and some very small irrelevant countries we had the most pro-Israeli voting record in the UN - partly because the Middle East was not terribly important to us whereas the US was.

The year 1979 was important in Canadian foreign policy because during the course of the election campaign, the person who became Prime Minister, Joe Clark from the Conservative Party, had rather rashly promised large Jewish populations in Toronto that he would move the Canadian Embassy to Jerusalem. After becoming Prime Minister and realizing that the issue was extremely complicated, he asked the former Conservative Prime Minister who was on a special mission to the region to investigate it further. The Stanfield Report, as it was known, stated very clearly that Canada should not move its embassy. Equally as important was the fact that the report made it clear that Canada had not paid enough attention to the Arab World or the situation of the Palestinians and that its level of diplomatic representation was still not adequate. In short, the Stanfield Report helped to propel much greater attention to the Middle East and to propel forward the development of a more independent Canadian view of the region with much less dependence on whatever the view was in Washington.

The early 1980s witnessed an incident that was very important to the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, namely, the hostage situation in Iran. Some of the American Embassy personnel hid in the Canadian Embassy and in the so-called 'Canadian Caper', we managed to smuggle them out of Iran with forged Canadian documents, which made us enormously popular south of the border for a certain period of time.

Later, in 1982, Canada was extremely critical of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and it was, I believe, the only Western country to maintain embassy staff in Beirut, including its ambassador, throughout the siege. The embassy got hit several times, which was important because the war brought to people's television screens an entirely new view of Israel; in other words, an Israel that was shelling large civilian areas in West Beirut. The Canadian Ambassador was there and he was constantly interviewed on Canadian television about the carnage in West Beirut, so the Canadian perceptions of the Middle East and Israel underwent a significant change.

Public perceptions changed even more as a consequence of the *Intifada*, which had a huge effect on public opinion, particularly among the younger generation of Canadians who grew up from the 1980s onwards with a totally new image of Israel as a country that had invaded Lebanon and broken the bones of Palestinian demonstrators and so forth. I happened to start teaching around that point, and the difference between students in 1987 and students now is dramatic; there is far more sympathy toward the Palestinians now than there was before the *Intifada*.

However, what one has to keep in mind about public opinion is that the majority of Canadians vote mainly because of national unity issues, taxation or economic issues, and those who vote on the basis of Middle Eastern policy are disproportionately in the Jewish community. When looking at public opinion, it is not enough to look at what views people hold: one must also consider who is likely to go out and do something about their views. People will say that they sympathize with the Palestinians, but the vast majority are unlikely to take any kind of positive action. It is the degree of mobilization that is important, not the degree of sympathy and non-sympathy.

After World War II and the establishment of the State of Israel, the pro-Israel lobby in Canada became increasingly effective. It was arguably the single most effective foreign policy lobby in Ottawa, and it promoted the idea that people would actually vote for a candidate based on their position on the Middle East. Was this because of money? No. Campaign financing was never really an issue because in Canada our parties are federally financed. Of course the Jewish community has several economic advan-

tages in Canada, but so does the Arab community, being well above the average in terms of professional skills, wealth and so forth. The main reason for the success of the Jewish lobby is that it has always been good at mobilizing its members and has good support in the Jewish community. There is an awful lot to be gained from looking at how it operates. It is extremely well organized, and it is very effective at getting information out. Moreover, up until very recently, it tended to speak with one voice. Due to the fact that the Jewish community dates from the initial arrival of European settlers in Canada, it is a community that is comfortable as any other in the Canadian political environment, and its members know who to talk to and how the system operates.

One significant change in the mid-1970s or early 1980s was that there was an increase in Arab immigration to Canada, particularly because of the Lebanese Civil War. There are roughly 250,000 Lebanese in Canada and another 40,000 or so Canadian Lebanese who are now in Lebanon, which means there are nearly 300,000 Canadians from Lebanese backgrounds.

In spite of its size, the Arab Canadian community is not able to mount a lobby that is anywhere near as effective as the pro-Israeli lobby. For one thing, its members come from different Arab countries and they are reluctant in some cases to engage in politics. More than half of them are Lebanese (especially Maronite and Shi'ite) and they do not like the Palestinians a great deal. Moreover, while second-generation Arab Canadians are fairly attuned with how the political system operates, the first generation are not so attuned and do not always judge well when it comes to deciding when to make loud public noises and when to have quiet lunchtime meetings. Nevertheless, in Ottawa, for example, where Arabs are the third largest community, Arabic is the most common language after English and French and there are MPs of Lebanese background, which has had its effects in terms of a somewhat greater sensibility to Arab viewpoints. In contrast to the US, I would say that we are now witnessing far more effective Arab Canadian participation and politics.

With regard to the question of Palestinian self-determination, although senior members of the Foreign Ministry and ambassadors could not speak with the PLO in the past, everyone else could, so Canada in fact had close contacts with the PLO. The restrictions on meeting with the PLO were eliminated during the *Intifada*, when Canada began to speak for the first time about Palestinian self-determination. Even today, Canada is often reluctant to talk about self-determination, and the reason is Quebec, where part of the population wants to form an independent, sovereign state through a process of self-determination. As a result, Canada's policy on Palestinian self-determination and Palestinian statehood, and even its policy with regard to how Canada is represented to the Palestinian Authority, reflects concerns over how Canadian policy could come back to haunt Canada with regard to Quebec.



Canadian National Interests/Security Concerns in the Middle East

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Before identifying Canada's national interests, one has to recognize the fact that interests are vague and ambiguous things; it is not as if politicians have a list in the safe somewhere and they just go and check it when an issue comes up for consideration. Different decision-makers are going to tend to have somewhat different perspectives on what the interests are, or perhaps more accurately, on the weight of the various interests.

Peace and Stability

Clearly, Canada is interested in peace and stability in this region. Of course, the two do not necessarily go together: it is possible to have a reasonable amount of stability without peace and it is certainly possible to have stability without justice. In the case of Canada, however, they are seen as linked.

Why is peace and stability of concern to Canada? Because the Middle East is an important part of the world for economic reasons: that is to say, what happens to the Middle East, because of the presence of oil, has global ramifications. The Middle East is also important geo-strategically because of the proximity to Europe, the presence of the Suez Canal and so forth. The region is also important because of the potentially destabilizing consequences of regional conflict. It is a heavily armed part of the world, and there is always a significant risk of war and of war expanding. During the Cold War the concern tended to be that confrontation in the Middle East might spiral out of control and become an East-West confrontation, and that was certainly a risk in 1973, for example, when the Russians began to ship not only military equipment but possibly nuclear materials to Egypt. Since the end of the Cold War, the concern about regional conflict spreading tends to focus more on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this region, as well as the means to deliver them, particularly missiles and aircraft.

After the mid-1970s decision of OPEC to increase oil prices we had a global recession, which affected Canadians in much the same way that it affected everyone else. A large part of Canada's gross national produce comes from trade, and if there is instability in other parts of the world, it affects Canada's trade interests.

Terrorism is another issue that Canadian decision-makers are concerned about, not only because of existing levels of international terrorism, but also because Canada has a large multi-ethnic population, which comes from all around the world and sometimes imports regional conflicts into Canada. One has to take into account the fact that most Canadians originate from somewhere else, and for this reason, amongst others, there is always concern that conflicts in other parts of the world will in some way involve Canada.

In addition to peace and stability, Canada also tends to see respect for International Law as important, because it views International Law and the United Nations as important ways of helping to support international peace and stability. Because of that, the value of a strong UN certainly figures more in Canadian foreign policy than it does in that of the US, Britain or France. Canada is a middle power, and it is therefore stronger in a club than it is by itself, so Canada tends to put more emphasis on International Law and on multilateral institutions than do some other countries.

Because of Canada's interest in peace and stability, it is also keen on promoting sustainable development around the world - although speaking as an academic, I could question whether the two are automatically connected. It is interesting to note that in 1995 or thereabouts, Canada reorganized its foreign ministry in order to establish an entirely new branch called the Global Issues Branch, which looks at things such as development, democratic reform, refugees, global environment issues and so forth. In short, there is a view that support for global development is an important part of our general concern with peace and stability.

Trade

Trade is a second important part of Canadian foreign policy. As I said before, Canada is a country that depends for a very large part of its gross national product on trade, so it is always very concerned with establishing trade relations and opening up investment opportunities and so forth. There is a related trade or economic interest in access to Middle East oil supplies. Canada is not dependent on Middle East oil supplies because we produce a lot of our own energy, whether oil or hydroelectric, and because we buy most of our oil from places like Mexico and Venezuela. Having said that, whenever anything happens in the Middle East and there is less Middle East oil on the market, all oil becomes much more expensive. Of course, if you live in Alberta, which is a large oil-producing province, this may not be a problem; but if you live in Quebec or Ontario, it is. For the federal government, oil is important because it is important to the global and national economy.

Canada's support for sustainable development also factors into Canada's trade interests. In general, there are two basic assumptions: one, that an expanding global economy promotes greater trade, and two, that Canada, like most foreign countries, uses its foreign aid as a way of trying to promote trade links. Some of our aid is tied, which means that the recipient has to spend it back in Canada. This, however, is true of virtually all countries, and if you look at Western countries in general, Canada ties less of its aid on average than most. In the case of aid to the West Bank and Gaza, very little of the aid is tied.

Other interests

With regard to other Canadian interests, one has to do with the attachment of Canadians to the region, in other words domestic political concerns, coming in this case either from the Canadian Jewish community or from the Canadian Arab community. Are these interests or are they not interests? If you are a politician making decisions about foreign policy in this part of the world, you are not just thinking about peace and stability or about trade and economic interests, you are also thinking about domestic constituencies and how things will play out in those domestic constituencies. The fact that Canadian foreign policy has to reflect the particular interests that Canadians have, whether they are Arab Canadians, or Canadians from India, Pakistan, Eastern Europe, etc., is taken for granted and reflects the particular ties that so many Canadians have to other parts of the world. In fact, as the proportion of people coming to Canada from the developing world increases at the same time as the proportion of people coming to Canada from Europe sharply decreases, Canada has far more interest in other parts of the world. Hundreds of Canadian police officers have served in Haiti, for example, not only because this was something constructive that Canada could do in its own hemisphere, but also because there is an increasingly large Haitian community in Canada.

The Role of the US (and Others)

When Canada thinks about its policy in the Middle East or elsewhere, it has to take into consideration how players other than those most immediately involved will react to a given situation. Canada pays a great deal of attention to US views, and it occasionally stands up against US foreign policy, as it did with regard to the embargo against Cuba, for example. We provide development assistance to Cuba, and we are affected by the so-called Helms-Burton Law, according to which people who invest in Cuba are barred from entering the US. Many of the major companies that invest in Cuba are Canadian and we have condemned the law, saying that the American isolation of Cuba is inappropriate and that Cuban democratization is better served by trade and intercultural links and so forth. This has made us somewhat unpopular in certain parts of the US Congress: Senator Jessie Helms, for example, has talked about how Canada is a threat to vital US interests because of its subversion of the embargo and so forth.

With regard to the landmines treaty, our whole foreign policy was essentially built around isolating the US and various other countries, even though the US was very critical of our stand. Ironically, the fact that our bilateral relationship with the US is so good means that Washington is sometimes a little more tolerant of us getting our own way. Of course, there are times when we defer to the US because our interests are not strong while the US has strong preferences and we realize that some issues are simply not worth us risking our good relations with the US Government. On the whole, however, Canadian foreign policy continues to be affected by American views and, to a very limited extent, by the views of the Europeans.

Canadian Values

Finally, there is this whole nebulous idea of Canadian values pertaining to justice, democracy, human rights, gender equity and environmental protection and so forth, and the extent to which these values are reflected in foreign policy. It is sometimes difficult to know if the values are simply self-serving rhetoric that we use when we do what we intended to do anyway, or if they actually drive foreign policy. Canada got involved in the landmines issue because it thought it was the right thing to do, but there are other things we became engaged in where our values probably did not figure too prominently at all.

Our decision to commit forces to the US in the Gulf this year certainly did not seem to reflect our emphasis on reaching a diplomatic settlement. In 1991, Canada pressed the US very hard to obtain an explicit Security Council authorization for the Gulf War, and the UN eventually mandated the use of 'all necessary means' in the conflict. This time around, however, Canada did not press the US to obtain an explicit mandate for enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 687, which would imply that in this particular case, Canada seems to have forgotten its commitment to International Law and has sided with the Americans for various other reasons.

The Role of Decision-Makers

It should be noted that individual prime ministers and foreign ministers can make a difference to foreign policy when it comes to their level of sympathy and activism. The current foreign minister is very activist and fairly sympathetic, and although the Middle East is not high on the list of issues he worries about globally, it may have reached a little higher when he came out to the region in November. The Prime Minister is sometimes active with regard to foreign policy issues but he is inclined to play it very conservatively when it comes to the Middle East.

Moving to the US, the differences between the Bush-Baker administration and the Clinton administration are substantial and have to do with the fact that the Jewish vote in the US disproportionately goes to the Democrats. The various policies of the Bush-Baker era had a lot to do with the pattern of party support, but they also had a lot to do with the fact that the Bush-Baker team was a different team in inclination than is the Clinton team, which is very sympathetic to Israel and reluctant to apply any kind of pressure.

Interests and Policy

In trying to understand Canadian interests, we can look for an example to the Misha'al assassination, which involved the use of Canadian passports. What were the Canadian interests at stake in this particular instance? One interest, which would have suggested that we not make a fuss about the whole affair, was the value of Canadian security cooperation with Israel. Canada cooperates with the Mossad in terms of the supply of information, mainly because it is prohibited by law from spying abroad, although we do have what are called 'security liaison officers'; they do not really spy but they keep their eyes and ears open. Canada has security cooperation agreements with a lot of countries, which include Israel, Jordan and Egypt amongst others, and so you can just imagine the Canadian security intelligence service saying, "Well, let us not make too much of a fuss about the use of our passports as a lot of the information we get on potential terrorist threats comes from Israel and we do not want to upset the Israelis and risk losing our supply of data." The Israelis are very effective at cultivating these sorts of close links to other intelligence and security agencies.

However, in this particular case there were also political factors at work, because domestically the population was furious about the misuse of Canadian passports. There was concern about the security of Canadians abroad and about the fact that if Canada allowed countries to misuse its passports, then Canadians travelling around the world would be suspect. Moreover, this was an infringement on Canadian sovereignty, and I think that these factors turned out to be far more important in the foreign policy decision-making process than our security relations with Israel and were responsible for the fairly firm official reaction to the misuse of Canadian passports.

What about Canadian foreign policy in the Gulf? At the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Canada's calculation of its foreign policy interests was very clear. The Canadian Government felt that this was the violation of another country's sovereignty, which threatened to destabilize the global economy and represented a test case of the UN's ability to provide for collective security. The Iraqis were given more than adequate diplomatic opportunity to back themselves out of Kuwait, which they refused to do, and this according to Canada meant that the UN mandate to use military force to liberate Kuwait was justifiable.

There were debates within the Foreign Ministry at the time as to whether sanctions and diplomacy should be given more time and there were debates over the possible consequences of the use of military force, both regionally and in terms of alienation between the West and the Arab World and over the potential civilian cost, but to be frank, for the most part there were no debates over the justification of the use of military force in terms of protecting Kuwait's sovereignty at the request of the UN and Kuwait - hence the commitment of Canadian forces to the coalition. This time around, in the context of the most recent tensions in the Gulf, I think it is rather different. One does not have the occupation of a sovereign country or the threat to global oil supplies or to other Canadian interests in the region. Today, the interests are twofold: one, the importance of applying the weapons inspection system in full and making sure it does not break down, and two, the weight of the Canadian relationship with the US. I think that most of the Canadian Government is probably convinced that Saddam Hussein will, given half the chance, produce weapons of mass destruction and that being somewhat unpredictable, he might even decide to use them, having already used them in the course of the Iran-Iraq war and against the Kurds. Admittedly Canada does not make a big issue out of the fact that Syria, for example, possesses chemical weapons, but this does not mean that it is not concerned; it is simply far more concerned over past Iraqi behavior and the fact that there is substantial evidence that Iraq has tried to hide part of its weapons programs from UN inspectors.

With regard to the current crisis, I think one can make a good argument that military force would not have solved the weapons inspection problem because it would have led to the withdrawal of UN inspectors from Iraq and the end of inspections. That would lead us to suspect - although it is very hard to dissect the Prime Minister's brain to see what he was thinking at a given time - that it was the relationship with the US and the idea that friends should stand by friends - even if they are not entirely convinced they are right - that was behind the official position of the Canadian Government.

One has to remember that Canada is a middle power that does not have significant military resources other than for peacekeeping and any form of Canadian intervention is largely symbolic. We can undertake peacekeeping activities, which we have performed all over the Middle East and elsewhere in the world since the 1950s. We can also provide economic assistance, and although our aid budget has shrunk it still represents a reasonably good proportion of our gross national product when compared to that of other countries. And, of course, we can provide some diplomatic engagement, although in general there are limits as to what Canada can do. It is able, however, to do somewhat more in association with others, which I think explains why Canada is inclined to try to be part of a broader framework.

Certainly, Canada would prefer a diplomatic solution to the Gulf Crisis. Canada's view is that there is a series of requirements under UN Resolution 687 and that if Iraq were to adhere to these requirements, the embargo should come to an end. The problem is that it is not Saddam who is getting hurt by the embargo but the people of Iraq. Nevertheless, I assume that the Canadian position is that it is Saddam's choice and that he has the option of ending sanctions with full compliance. In this context one has to realize that Security Council resolutions are binding and that once a country joins the UN, technically speaking it gives up part of its sovereignty and accepts the fact that the UN Security Council can formulate binding resolutions on matters of international security.

I admit that there is legitimate concern about the effects of sanctions. On the other hand, if you remove them when the Iraqis are not cooperating, you send a signal that even if you disobey UN instructions, you still get the punishment removed. There is currently some thought going on in the Department of Foreign Affairs on the ineffectiveness of sanctions and their ability to harm the wrong people. In general, Canada is becoming less supportive of the whole idea of sanctions, but then we come to a major problem, namely, how do lift sanctions when the US wants them to remain.

With regard to Canada's position pertaining to the peace process, the Canadians maintain that they will support whatever the Israelis and Palestinians agree to, including an independent state. Canada actually used the magic word self-determination in the late 1980s, and there is a debate going on right now over the establishment of a Canadian representative office in the Palestinian Territories. At the moment, many Palestinians seem to be under the impression that the Canada Fund office in Ramallah is a kind of representative office, but this is not true. [Canada's Representative Office has since opened in Ramallah, ed.]

Canada-US Relations

One thing to remember is that our relationship with the US has not always been friendly. Before we became a country in 1812 we fought a war against the US, during which we burnt down the White House. The reason Canada confederated in 1867 was in part military defense against the possible US threat: at

the end of the Civil War, the US was very heavily armed and there was real concern about expansion northwards. In fact, up until World War II, Canada had active defense plans for dealing with a US invasion.

Our trade relationship with the US would suggest that you could have a big trading relationship without it necessarily being to your disadvantage. In fact, under the North American Free Trade Agreement that we signed with the US and Mexico, which established a single market from Mexico to Canada, we actually came out ahead and the Americans now complain that we are exploiting them. We would prefer, of course, to diversify our trade, but that is not going to happen, and it is not going to happen in Palestine either; Palestine will always be primarily trading with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt and most predominantly with Israel.

Quebec

On the issue of Quebec, there are those who argue that if Quebec gains its independence and Canada is split in half, the country will no longer be viable and will be absorbed by the US. It is very hard to run separated countries, and if Quebec were to leave, it would drastically change the distribution of power within the country. Quebec has become a very important consideration in some aspects of foreign policy. The federalists won the last referendum by less than a percentage point.

The Canadians who are hard-core sovereigntists and want an independent Quebec no matter what probably represent only 20 percent of the population of Quebec. Most of the sovereigntist vote and some of the federalist vote comes from people who speak French, who are unhappy with Quebec's position in Canada and who feel that Quebec should be stronger and have more power and influence, although, at the same time, they would be perfectly willing to live in a united Canada were the status of Quebec to be improved to their full satisfaction. But then there will always be people who ask why the people of Quebec should get things that they as residents of other areas do not, which makes it extremely hard to sell the rest of Canada on the idea of giving Quebec more power. I would argue that the situation in Quebec is different to that elsewhere. The French minority in Quebec has to worry about preserving its national identity, and this is a strong enough argument for giving Quebec disproportionate autonomy, although I understand why people will reject this argument and return to the issue of inequality. It is very difficult to sell people on the idea of an unequal political system.

In actual fact, Quebec already does have quite a few special powers. For instance, it is illegal to have English signs outside: all the signs must be in French, and any English must be half the size of the French. In fact, we have language inspectors who go around giving tickets to people who break this rule. In addition, if you come to Quebec from outside and you speak English, you are prohibited from sending your children to an English school and are obliged to send them to one where the official language is French. I can understand that it is necessary to protect Quebec's Francophone national identity, but it is easy to see why a lot of people say that a lot of what goes on in Quebec is unfair.

I believe it is hard to fit multiple groups in a single state. The American model is a sort of forced assimilation model, where everyone becomes American. I do not like the system, but it appears to work well and the Americans do have a tremendous sense of patriotism as a result. I prefer a model that is a mosaic of different cultural identities in the same state, but it is not at all clear that it works very well.

There are so many problems surrounding Quebec. Had the last referendum gone the other way, it would have meant that in the part of Quebec where I live, where 80 or 90 percent of people continue to say 'no' to an independent Quebec, we would have been left with a huge chunk of Quebec where the majority of residents had voted to stay Canadian. What is supposed to happen to them? Are they forcibly ripped out of Canada and made to become part of an independent Quebec, even if they do not want to be? One also has to consider the native Indians in the north, who do not want to be part of an independent Quebec. The land was originally theirs, and since the treaties they signed were with the British Crown, they say Quebec has no right to take northern Quebec out of Canada without their permission. Even were Quebec to win, the question is confusing, i.e., "Do you give the national assembly the mandate to negotiate an agreement on the basis of the resolution passed on etc.?" It is very confusing language, which means that if Quebec won by one percent, a lot of people would turn around and say that it only won because the question was misleading.

Imagine that Quebec gained its independence: Who would control the border posts? Who would collect taxes? There is certainly the scope for a lot of potential administrative chaos, which could lead to violence, particularly on the part of the native Canadians who may just simply say we do not want Quebec

police here; the federal police will be allowed on our land, but we refuse to go. It could get a lot worse than many people think.

There are of course parallels with the Palestinian situation. Francophone nationalists would argue that I am a settler, while I would probably argue that I am a Palestinian and no one has the right to suddenly put me in a state that I do not want to be a part of. It is a complicated issue. Do you keep the existing borders or do you redraw the borders, and if you redraw borders, how do you redraw them? Even now the Supreme Court is trying to work out how this will all occur, and the federal government is hoping that by showing how messy it is, support for sovereignty will decline.

Information and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

With regard to the transfer of information, pro-Israeli groups in North America have an extremely advanced communications system. I receive on a daily basis in my electronic mail four or five pieces of information from the Israeli Government Press Office, from the Foreign Ministry, and from the Prime Minister's office, not to mention the six or eight items that I receive per day from various right-wing Jewish lobby organizations. Imagine how much I would receive if I were a member of the Canada-Israel Committee! How much do I get from the Palestinian side? Zero, or at least something approaching zero. It is clear, therefore, that the pro-Israeli lobbies are networking with great success. In fact, the Israeli Government, which has an excellent website, pioneered the whole communications revolution by using the Internet to simultaneously communicate to its supporters around the world and it is doing so very effectively. Meanwhile, the Palestinians are trying but they still have a long way to go. The Palestinian Ministry of Information website is absolutely appalling! I actually contacted the ministry when it set up its website and said that I did not think that its method of getting information across would be very effective. The constraint was not time, but understanding how to use information effectively. The Palestinians could learn a great deal by looking at AIPAC (the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee) or the Canadian-Israel Committee to see how they operate.

Does the PLO office in Washington ever provide any reporting? Does anything ever come back to the Ministry of Planning or the Ministry of the Economy on what is being said in Congress? The Lebanese forces have much better representation in Washington than the PLO does in terms of effectiveness even though the leadership is sitting in jail! The level of networking and information exchange is what makes the Jewish lobby so effective and the Palestinians should really make an effort to learn from their example.

Canada and the Multilaterals

Canada has always been an enthusiastic supporter of the multilaterals, but the problem here is that if the Israelis do not like the ways things are progressing or the people involved, they simply refuse to attend. At the second refugees working group meeting in Ottawa, for example, the Israelis were upset because one of the members of the Palestinian delegation was a member of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). This resulted in a ludicrous unofficial cocktail party before the official dinner, during which the Israelis told the head of the Palestinian delegation that they could not sit down at dinner with his colleagues because of the presence of this particular Palestinian. As a result, we snacked on *hors-d'oeuvres* for a whole two hours while the Israelis insisted on negotiating with the Palestinians in the room outside the dining room. This gives some indication of the extent of the problems that sometimes occur.

The trouble is, Canada does not have the capacity to pressure Israel, while America will not even try. All we can do in Canada is to try to do some of the preparatory work to make things easier during the actual negotiations. For example, there has been quite a bit of work carried out with data bases, whereby we have tried to obtain more accurate figures pertaining to the number of refugees and their socio-economic profiles and needs, which should help the Palestinian negotiators later on. Fortunately, the Israelis are unable to prevent us from doing that type of work, which means we have to concentrate on the kind of work that is useful but not provocative.



Canada and the Middle East Peace Process

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The Madrid Peace Process established Jordan-Israel, Syria-Israel, and Lebanon-Israel negotiating tracks and a series of multilateral negotiations that addressed issues of regional concern. The multilaterals, which dealt with issues such as arms control and security, water, the environment, refugees, and regional and economic development, were there for several reasons. One of the reasons was the fact that given the degree of international sympathy the Palestinians enjoyed, particularly that coming from Europe, it was felt that having more countries in the room could only improve their position. The multilaterals also, of course, reflected Israel's desire for normalization.

At the start of the multilateral component of the peace process in Moscow in January 1992, Canada was asked by the co-sponsors of the peace process to assume the role of Gavel Holder of the Refugee Working Group (RWG). One of the reasons why Canada was chosen was because it was seen to be fair-minded, especially by America, which felt that Ottawa had what it took to deal with such a difficult and sensitive portfolio. The RWG was intended to be a kind of incentive for the Palestinians, it being clear that it dealt with an issue, namely refugees, which Israel was not at all keen to talk about. Indeed, the problems began with the initial meeting in Ottawa in May 1992 when the Likud government refused to participate, in part because of its opposition to the participation of Diaspora Palestinians. Nevertheless, the agenda was eventually set in the Israelis' absence but with the Americans doing their best to ensure that it would meet with their approval. The agenda items that were chosen were as follows: public health (Italy), human resources (US), child welfare (Sweden), social and economic infrastructure (EU), databases (Norway), and family reunification (France). Family reunification referred, of course, to the reunification of families within the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis did not like the idea because they were concerned that establishing the humanitarian principle of 'family reunification' would set the groundwork for establishing a broader human right principle of 'right of return', which could then be used to facilitate the return of vast numbers of Palestinians to the homeland. The US, meanwhile, was completely satisfied with the item's inclusion.

Having discovered the cost of not attending, Israel came to Ottawa for the second meeting in November 1992 but then threatened to boycott it due to the participation of Palestinian National Council (PNC) member Mohammed Halaj. The Israelis had been completely willing to ignore his membership as long as no one mentioned it, but when Halaj and his position were mentioned in the press shortly before the meeting, they felt that they had to make a fuss. By way of a compromise, Halaj announced that since the PNC was not in session, he was not technically a PNC member at that moment. The Israelis replied, "That is fine with us," only to turn around the second day of the meeting and walk out of the room.

Although the first two RWG meetings were extremely difficult, changes in the Israeli Government and the Oslo Agreement and so forth meant that problems of this kind more or less came to an end. The RWG held regular meetings through 1993-95, with significant changes occurring after Oslo in September 1993, and whether held in Oslo, Cairo, Turkey, or Switzerland, they continued relatively smoothly. The major problem with the RWG, which operates on a consensual basis, is that the main sessions are unwieldy due to their size; even countries that have nothing to do with the Palestinian refugees want to come, such as South Korea, Romania, and Turkey, not because they have enough money to support the projects, or anything useful to say, or any influence over the parties, but simply because they want to be seen as part of the peace process. The large numbers make achieving a consensus almost impossible, and although there are no formal decisions, if the Palestinians or Israelis do not like the direction in which the RWG is going they can simply use their implicit veto, and things come to a halt.

In addition to the RWG, Canada has also been actively involved in the meetings on water and arms control. With regard to water, Canada supported database and research activities, whilst its involvement in arms control has been mainly related to confidence building.

What, if anything, can Canadian diplomacy do, given the framework of the RWG? It is my view that the most we can do is try and encourage the parties to move in the right direction by doing several things. One is to try and hold the meetings at a smaller level. For example, we have already divided up the agenda items, each of which is shepherded by a particular country. Smaller meetings attended by only a few countries will reduce the distractions that often result from larger meetings and will allow us to deal with issues such as public health and child welfare, etc., in a more efficient manner. We could also encourage the holding of informal non-official meetings, as it is possible that the informality will encourage the participants to be more flexible when it comes to discussing areas of compromise and so forth. There is, however, a dilemma, inasmuch as many people are concerned that focusing on projects to improve the current living conditions of the refugees could be at the expense of dealing with the difficult political issues. Some Palestinians are concerned that normalizing the conditions of the refugees will reduce their number and weaken their political position in the negotiations; others maintain that their political rights and their human rights have nothing to do with their living conditions and should not be put in one basket. Certainly, the debate on the Palestinian side concerning the dangers inherent in focusing on the refugees' immediate humanitarian, economic and social needs and possibly weakening their political position has made that direction rather difficult to move in.

There is certainly a need for a vast amount of information concerning the refugees, not only on their number, living conditions and present needs, but also on their future needs and the socio-economic and other consequences of their possible return to Palestinian territory. The Norwegians have done a very sophisticated living conditions survey in Jordan, and started to do the same in Lebanon.

Another problem is that the Palestinian delegations simply do not have the support mechanisms that are enjoyed by other parties. When the Palestinian academics, such as Salim Tamari and Elia Zureik, were leading the negotiations, they would often only discover a day before a meeting that they were supposed to attend, which meant that they were sometimes obliged to decide upon a position in a hotel coffee shop just minutes before the meeting was due to begin, or discuss it by e-mail, knowing very well that every single word was being read by the Israelis. If the Israelis need information on something, someone from the relevant ministry will supply it, whereas the Palestinian delegation is often left totally in the dark. Now the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs oversees the negotiations, but they are still understaffed and under-equipped.

Unfortunately, the PA is being extremely slow in organizing its refugee policy, having chosen in the past to concentrate on land and security issues, etc. The PLO Department of Refugees has existed for many years, but only last spring did it start moving into its offices and recruiting staff in Palestine. On a more positive note, Arafat established The Higher Council for Refugees in November, a high level inter-ministerial group. Nevertheless, the truth of the matter is that we have been faced with finding a solution to the refugee problem since 1992, and yet only now, in 1998, do we have the beginnings of the infrastructure to think about ways to do this. Another problem is that the Palestinians have been so busy with other matters that they have not been in a position to think about what they can gain from the multilaterals in the way of political points, funding for particular initiatives or increased donor support, etc.

There have been a couple of high-profile so-called 'international missions' to Lebanon involving the 'Gavel' of the RWG and other international actors, during which the delegates talked to the Lebanese Government about the situation of the refugees. Even though the missions did not change anything on the ground, they were able, I am sure, to influence the Lebanese a little. Neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Authority (PA) can do that, because the Lebanese will pay absolutely no attention to them, whereas if the French, the Swiss and the Japanese all show up and say, "We are concerned about the position and treatment of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon," then the Lebanese Government tends to pay a little more attention.

There are those who argue that the RWG has done very little or that it is even worse than hopeless now that the high-level multilateral track has essentially been halted by the decision of the Arab League. Some would say that there is no longer any point in playing the game, others, that certain things can still be achieved, given that almost all the countries that participate in the RWG sympathize with the Palestinian refugees.

As to Canadian involvement in the RWG, which is the single largest component of Canadian political engagement in the peace process, none of us would dispute the fact that it is extremely hard to move ahead on the refugee file under the Likud. Its coalition agreement, for example, prohibits the return of any Palestinians to west of the Jordan River, including the 1967 territories, in spite of the fact that Oslo talks about the return of displaced persons to the area in question.

Canadian Development Assistance

Canada has been providing \$8-10 million per year in development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, much of which has found its way to Rafah, partly because of the Canada Refugee Camp, whose name derives from the fact that the Canadian-UN peacekeeping contingent was originally in that camp. Canada has an agreement in principle concerning the return of those Palestinians trapped on the Egyptian side of the fence to their families on the Gazan side. In practice, it is taking forever to move small numbers of people across the fence, largely because of the Israelis, but also because of the Egyptian bureaucracy. Because of the engagement in Canada Camp, Canada's bilateral aid programs included water and waste projects in Rafah, projects on the environment, and elections support.

In addition, two inflatable boats were provided to the Palestinian Coastal Police. The only trouble was that the boats originally went faster than allowed under the rules, so the Canadian Government had to slow down their engines before sending them over; even then, when the Israelis tried them out in Ashdod, one was found to go two knots too fast, and I am not sure if they have actually been delivered.

With regard to other support, the highest proportion of Canadian funding - about one quarter of all Canadian assistance to the Palestinians - has gone to the Holst Fund. Canada also gives \$9 million per year to UNRWA. The problem with the Holst Fund, which has allowed the PA to continue functioning, is that no one, not even the people in the PA, know who is donating the money; from the point of view of development agencies, this is rather unfortunate as they would all prefer that their contributions be recognized. There are two major reasons for the existence of the fund:

- 1) During closure and other difficult periods, such as when the Israelis cut off the tax money to the PA, it provided a very fast mechanism for transferring money to the PA; all it took was two days to get the money to the bank and another 48 hours for the bank to get the money on the ground. It is the only 'rapid aid' mechanism of its kind.
- 2) The other reason for Holst is that it provides a rapid way to finance income-generating programs under closure.

Holst has been an important part of Canadian assistance and Canada has generally been supportive of the fund, although there are those who have seen it in a less positive light. However, it is unlikely to figure large in future Canadian assistance.

Canada has also been involved in support for NGOs and a considerable number of small projects. The Canada Fund office in Ramallah, which makes very small disbursements with a ceiling of \$50,000 per grant, has been very effective due to the fact that everything is done locally with virtually no reference to headquarters. Most of the other donors do not have an equivalent mechanism for spending their budget - which in the case of the Canada Fund is approximately one million dollars - and the money is usually only available after several months following the exchange of numerous letters, notes and phone calls between the local office and its headquarters.

Other Canadian funding has gone to public health and to Canadian-Palestinian NGO partnerships. A limited amount has also been used for investment cooperation projects, although it is extremely difficult to convince people who are essentially banking officials that Gaza is a great place for investment.

Canadian development assistance in general has not targeted a single area, although the Swiss, for example, tend to concentrate on one particular area in order to establish an opportunity or some kind of presence. Other donors, such as the Swedes, spread their money all over the place based on what they see as good funding opportunities. In other words, there are two models for donors, of whom the majority, including Canada, try to find a balance somewhere between the two.

Canada also serves as a member of the 'steering committee' for international assistance for Palestine. Canada is a member of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) because it is the gavel-holder of the RWG and technically the aid coordination structure flows from the steering group to the multilaterals. Canada is also involved in local aid coordination mechanisms.

When we think about Canadian political and aid policy in the coming couple of years, these are some of the issues that we should consider. What happens after 1998? None of the donors who agreed to provide for Palestine for the period 1994 to 1998 have yet committed to providing further support at the end of the five-year period, although this does not mean that no money will be available, only that until now no one has made any promises about what will happen. Between 1994 and 1998, everyone's aid budget

shrunk by approximately six percent per year, which means that the aid budgets are in real terms 20 or 30 percent smaller than they were at the time of the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993. The CIDA budget has also decreased, the reason being that the governments are trying to reduce their deficits by cutting virtually everything, including aid budgets. Can assistance be maintained at its current level? I would not be surprised if the annual level fell a little and loans or more restrictive types of aid replaced some regular aid. When it comes to making decisions about whether to continue supporting the current levels of West Bank and Gaza assistance at the risk of cutting the aid to countries such as Egypt, Jordan or Lebanon because the CIDA Middle East budget has decreased, one has to be very careful to prepare oneself in advance for a lot of argument. Officials involved in the Egyptian program, for example, will be quick to point out that the Palestinian GNP per capita is 2.5 times higher than the Egyptian GNP per capita, and they will be very upset at any suggestion that the Egyptian program should be cut in order to support the one here. Officials working on aid to Yemen will also be quick to point out that Yemeni GNP per capita is one-third of the Palestinian GNP per capita while life expectancies are ten or 12 years shorter and literacy rates are half those of Palestine, and they will bring all these statistics to bear if anyone argues that Yemen should be cut in order to allow the financing of the West Bank and Gaza to continue. I do not mean to suggest that the West Bank and Gaza will not receive funds at the current levels, only that the Palestinians will have to come up with some very good counter-arguments about why they are more important than the people in other places in which aid agencies operate.

With regard to donor funding for UNRWA, in Canada and many other countries this is considered 'humanitarian assistance' and is a tradeoff against support for the Red Cross and for the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). There is only so much money to go around, and you have to make hard choices about who gets it and who does not. You have to make arguments why UNRWA is so important that ultimately you should give assistance not to the refugees in Rwanda or Burundi or Somalia and various other places, but to UNRWA.

It should be noted that many of the donors do not think that UNRWA is a well-run organization from the management point of view. The question is, do you force it to reform itself at a time when it is going through a crisis? And will UNRWA eventually be obliged to increase charges for its services, or will there be a gradual decline in the services it provides due to the fact that its budget has decreased? These are the types of questions that the donors must consider. One thing is clear: UNRWA will not disappear until there is a permanent settlement. On the other hand, it cannot possibly continue to do the job it is doing without making some drastic changes. Frankly, I do not think that UNRWA is capable of carrying out effective internal planning, simply because within a few hours of its decision-makers making any decision, there is bound to be a leak and half an hour later, people will be out on the streets and the organization will be back at square one, trying to think of other options. UNRWA's current problems are numerous, to say the least. It has some 20,000 Palestinian employees, but due to the fact that its accounts are not very clear the donors often complain that they do not know where the money is going. UNRWA still has its own way of doing things, and every time there is an UNRWA pledging meeting, it comes up with a different figure for its deficit, and the donors turn around and say, "Hang on! You just told us six months ago that this was your figure!"

From the point of view of CIDA, there are several major questions pertaining to UNRWA: What is the appropriate level of funding? How much reform is desirable, and how should that reform be facilitated, i.e., through donor meetings, quiet dialogue with UNRWA, or by paying for a Canadian consultant to help straighten up the organization? The PA, for one, would like donors to pay their full commitment.

UNRWA and a Peace Settlement

It is true that UNRWA was asked to think about how the organization might terminate itself after 1999, i.e. after the final status agreements. In practice, nothing has changed, although there is no doubt that the donors and the PA are probably spending quite a bit of time thinking about what will happen; UNRWA provides a substantial number of services, all of which must be taken over by the PA or else the host governments. Whether or not all this thinking is reflected in the donors' foreign policy, I would not like to say. With regard to UNRWA's 'Peace Implementation Projects', these were an attempt to capture some of the money that was made available as a result of the peace process. The idea was that UNRWA would be able to package up all the things it had wanted to do but not had the funds to do in an attractive parcel and present it to the donors in order to obtain adequate funding. The problem with these projects is that there are substantial operating costs involved; it stands to reason that one cannot simply build a school or youth club and then expect it to run itself, but UNRWA, unfortunately, sometimes failed to include the operating costs in the project amount. In this context, it should be noted that

practically no NGOs receive money for regular operating costs; instead, they include their regular operating costs in their project budgets, and UNRWA could certainly have learned a lesson had it looked at what they were doing. UNRWA in a sense was too honest and said here are the exact costs for building a school and we want that much money; it did not take into account the amount of money that was needed over the next five years to maintain schools, hire qualified teachers, and provide other services.

As to the transfer of the UNRWA headquarters, this was a symbolic decision, made to support the PA. First of all, wages that would have been spent in Austria are now being spent in the West Bank and Gaza, which will most definitely help the current socioeconomic situation. I do not think that the move will make any difference to how the other actors view UNRWA as an international organization; the Lebanese still mistreat the Palestinian refugees in exactly the same way that they mistreated them in the past, the Syrians and the Jordanians still treat them fairly well as they did before, and UNRWA personnel are still UN personnel. But again, it is precisely the kind of issue one must think about when considering the issue of development assistance.



Canada and the Palestinians

HE David Berger, Ambassador of Canada, Tel Aviv

Before I get into the specifics of the Canadian relationship with the Palestinians and the role that Canada is playing in the Middle East Peace Process, I would like to take a moment to review the larger picture of our global foreign policy objectives and explain how our activities here are situated within that broader tableau.

Any country's foreign policy is conditioned by several factors, the most important of which include its relative position in the world as measured by its economic and military strength, geographic location, and so on, and the nature of its society, be it democratic or authoritarian, open or closed, relatively homogeneous or multi-ethnic. In Canada's case, the most important factors that come together to shape our foreign policy priorities include our proximity to the US and the key economic and security relationship that this has brought about, our dependence on a stable and open international trading system, and - related to this - our reliance on a rules-based international system.

But foreign policy is not only about pursuing interests; it is also about values. A country's foreign policy is fundamentally a reflection of who you are and the values that hold your society together. For Canadians these values include tolerance, fairness, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes. These values are of course a product both of our history and our present circumstances. If Canadians value tolerance, it is because from the very outset Canada was built on an accommodation of several founding peoples, one English speaking and predominantly Protestant, another French speaking and overwhelmingly Catholic, and our indigenous peoples. From those communities, Canada has evolved to become one of the most multi-cultural countries in the world. In fact it is estimated that within a decade, fully 56% of Canada's population will be neither of French or British origin. The art of compromise and the acceptance and respect of differences and the need to resolve disputes peacefully have been constant and necessary features of our development as a nation. It is therefore not surprising that these values should infuse our foreign policy.

The pursuit of our interests in a manner consistent with our values is the key to understanding our broad foreign policy goals and our activities here in this region.

In global terms, Canada's three key foreign policy objectives are as follows:

- promotion of prosperity by advancing our trade and commercial interests;
- protecting our security by promoting a stable international environment allows for the peaceful resolution of, and the addressing of issues such as global environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration, international crime and so on;
- projecting Canadian values and culture abroad by promoting respect for human rights, participatory government, the rule of law, and sustainable development.

Returning to the question of Canada's Palestinian policy, I would simply begin by saying that while our direct economic and political interests here are modest, Canada and Canadians remain keenly interested in this region and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several reasons.

The first I linked to our belief in the need to promote international stability through the peaceful resolution of disputes. Regional conflicts that are resolved peacefully discredit the use of violence and help to build respect for International Law. When violent conflict does erupt, Canada has always been in the forefront of those willing to help find a peaceful resolution to the dispute. In this regard our record in the Middle East is particularly telling. Our former Prime Minister Lester Pearson won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in defusing the 1956 Suez Crisis and for inventing the modern-day concept of United

Nations peacekeeping. Since that time Canada has participated in all UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and, in fact, in almost all peacekeeping operations worldwide.

The second reason for our continuing engagement is simply the highly interdependent nature of the global system today. I do not know if the former Canadian academic Marshall McLuhan realized how prophetic he was being when he coined the term 'global village' in the 1960s, but it has surely come to pass in ways McLuhan could not have imagined. Today no one can escape the fallout from major crises no matter where they happen. The recent confrontation with Iraq is just one example of how regional problems can engage the interests of countries around the globe.

Both historically and in modern times, Canada has almost always borne some of the consequences of regional conflict and strife because we are a preferred destination for refugees. Defusing tensions before they boil over into outright conflict helps to stem the problem of uncontrolled migration.

Finally, many domestic constituencies in Canada maintain an active interest in Canada's Middle East policy. These include Canadian Jewish groups, Palestinian Canadian and Arab Canadian associations as well as human rights NGOs. Indeed, there are considerable concentrations of Palestinian Canadians in the Greater Toronto area and in Montreal. Also of note is the fact that in Ottawa, the third most important language after English and French is Arabic.

Now that I have described the fundamentals of our foreign policy and explained some of the reasons why we continue to see a need to be active here, I would like to briefly review Canada's position on key issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Canada recognizes that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be realized, including the right to self-determination, and that these rights can only be realized by the peace negotiations. Canada also supports the security, wellbeing and rights of Israel as a legitimate, independent state. This is consistent with, and indeed rests upon, our belief in the values of fairness, respect for human dignity and the right of all societies to freely decide their own future.

Canada does not recognize permanent Israeli control over the territories occupied in 1967 and opposes all unilateral actions intended to predetermine the outcome of negotiations, including the establishment of settlements in the territories and unilateral moves to annex East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Canada considers such actions to be contrary to International Law and unproductive to the peace process.

Canada believes that the status of Jerusalem can be resolved only as part of a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and we oppose, as I mentioned, Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem.

We believe that Palestinians should enjoy the rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a political system that is open, democratic, and accountable. Demonstrating our support for this principle, in 1996 Canada provided financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) to help carry out the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and President. In April, we will be sponsoring the visit to Canada of a delegation from the PLC, and the program will focus on the institutions of our democracy, how they work and their relevance to the situation here. Finally, we continue to take an active interest in the evolving human rights situation for Palestinians under both the PA and Israel. We regularly make representations to both sides to express our concerns when we see violations of internationally accepted human rights standards. We also provide financial support to a number of Palestinian human rights NGOs to enable them to carry out the important work of human rights monitoring.

Canada fully supports the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles signed in September 1993 and the subsequent Interim Agreement. The agreement should become a comprehensive agreement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which emphasize the right of all countries in the region to live within secure and recognized boundaries and the requirement that Israel withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967.

Canada does not recognize the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as announced in Algiers in November 1998. Canada's position, however, does not exclude the creation of a Palestinian state if the parties through negotiations decided upon that.

To say that the peace process is going through a difficult period would be to state the obvious. But we should not lose sight of what Palestinians have gained since the process began. Today a clear majority of Palestinians are governed by leaders whom they have democratically elected. All major urban centers in the West Bank and Gaza are under Palestinian control, except of course Hebron where jurisdiction is shared. And the right of Palestinians to decide their own political future with a land base in the West Bank and Gaza is almost universally recognized. Given the history of the Palestinian people since 1948, these are not insignificant accomplishments.

On the economic front however, we know that Palestinians have not realized the peace dividends that had been expected. Indeed, far from improving, all indicators suggest that the economic plight of ordinary Palestinians has substantially worsened in the last three years. This is extremely distressing to us both from a humanitarian perspective and because widespread support for the peace process cannot be sustained unless Palestinians believe that the Oslo Accords will lead to a better and more prosperous future for themselves and their children.

While our ability to help ameliorate this situation is limited, Canada has a substantial, multi-dimensional development assistance program in the West Bank and Gaza. Over a five-year period, Canada is spending more than \$80 million to improve the living conditions of Palestinians. For example, we are helping to rebuild the municipal infrastructure such as water and sewerage networks and roads that were neglected during occupation, and we are funding projects to improve the conditions in refugee camps. Through the Canada Fund we support a wide range of projects, such as camps for children, health clinics, arts and recreation programs and environmental clean-ups. Through our Dialogue Fund we support people to people contact between Palestinians and Israelis. Since 1992 we have funded 66 such projects for 1.4 million Canadian Dollars. Last year we funded a summer camp called 'Nature Has No Boundaries' for Palestinian and Israeli young people interested in environmental issues.

Last November, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. During the course of his visit, he met with Chairman Arafat and Faisal Husseini, toured a refugee camp in Rafah and opened our Canada Fund office in Ramallah. It is fair to say that Mr. Axworthy was disturbed by what he found both in terms of the state of the peace process and the plight of the Palestinians, particularly the refugees. He ordered a review of our programs and services to Palestinians with a view to making them more effective, more visible and of greater support to the peace process. Earlier this month a task force from Ottawa led by Mr. Andrew Robinson, the Gavel Holder or Chair of the Refugee Working Group of the Multilateral Track of the peace process, spent two weeks here meeting with Palestinians and developing proposals to implement our minister's instructions.

Central to our efforts and Axworthy's concerns, is the question of Palestinian refugees. As Gavel Holder of the Refugee Working Group, Canada has a special responsibility to ensure that this issue remains a focus of attention for all parties. The question of refugees is, of course, one of the most difficult components of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It has been described as highly complex, emotional, and even explosive. And yet it must be tackled since any realistic and durable solution to this conflict requires it.

Under the DoP, the matter of refugees from 1948 has been reserved for the Final Status Negotiations. While the refugee issue itself must ultimately be resolved by the parties themselves, the Refugee Working Group has tried to complement the bilateral negotiations by defining the scope of the problem, by promoting dialogue between the parties and by mobilizing resources to improve current living conditions.

One project that Canadians are particularly proud of is in Tel As-Sultan in Gaza. Canada has taken up one of the provisions of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty and provided funding to permit the return to Gaza from Egypt of Palestinian refugees who had been living in the former Canadian peacekeeper barracks known as Canada Camp. This project has also received important financial support from the Government of Kuwait. To date, we have helped 107 extended families, involving about 1,500 people, return to their communities in Gaza.

We have a variety of other proposals in the fields of medical research, information technology, industrial innovation and university cooperation that are being developed and evaluated. On the trade front, we have committed ourselves to negotiating a memorandum of understanding between Canada and the PA that would lead to greater cooperation in the development of our bilateral commercial relations. In the coming months, I hope that most if not all of these projects will be realized.

On a broader level, I think Canada can offer some useful lessons for Palestinians and Israelis on institutional mechanisms for cooperation. As a very decentralized federal state composed of ten provinces, Canada has a wealth of experience in dealing with issues that cross both geographic and jurisdictional boundaries. And, like the Palestinians, we have a large, powerful neighbor to contend with. Former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau once said that living next door to the US was like a mouse sleeping with an elephant. If the elephant rolled over, the mouse was in trouble. Yet, despite our sometimes-precarious position, we have found ways to level the playing field in many areas, particularly in the all-important economic and trade field. For example, within the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement that includes our southern partner Mexico, we negotiated built-in dispute resolution mechanisms that arbitrate disagreements in a manner that is relatively fair and objective. On another front, we also have several Canada-US commissions that deal with a wide variety of transboundary issues such as water and environmental questions. The point is that there are ways in which weaker partners can negotiate arrangements with stronger neighbors that determined the imbalance of power. There is also the case of the European Union where many of these same problems have been dealt with, albeit in different ways. I think it would be useful for Palestinians and Israelis to look at the experience of countries like Canada in this regard to see what lessons can be drawn and applied here.

Finally, I just want to say once again that despite its ups and downs, despite the difficulties and setbacks, there is no real alternative to negotiation and dialogue as a means to settle this conflict. In this process both sides must understand and respect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the other or the entire process will collapse and with it the hopes for a just and lasting peace. But I am convinced that those who say that the process is doomed are wrong. I am convinced that ordinary people on both sides want the peace process to go forward and do not want their leaders to allow the historic opportunity that exists to build a peaceful future slip from their grasp. As Lloyd Axworthy said after his visit here, "We must keep alive the search for common ground." In this regard Canada, in its own modest way, is doing its part.



MEDIA DISCUSSION

With Joel Greenberg, The New York Times, and Paul Adams, BBC

Dr. Rosemary Hollis:

This session is intended to give participants the opportunity to talk to international correspondents who cover this part of the world in order to provide news to their respective publics. These publics include people who do not know and/or not care very much, and who have specific agendas. This serves to complicate the life of a correspondent, which is already affected by various constraints and restrictions.

Paul Adams:

As most people know, the BBC is a very large and multifaceted organization. We do not have what I perceive to be the luxury of working for a single media. We are radio and television, and we are not just one radio and one television; we are world service radio and domestic radio, which has about three or four networks, world service television, and domestic television. In addition, we have recently started a new domestic 24-hour cable channel, which we have to provide material for.

I think it fair to say that the BBC has become an increasingly demanding organization in terms of quantity. I am pretty sure that my bosses in London are very aware of the fact that the more programs we have to work for and the more times we have to go live, the less we are able to think about what we are doing and talk to people.

Due to the fact that there are only three BBC correspondents here in Jerusalem, it is often extremely difficult to talk to people in order to learn more about the reactions, etc., and we are sometimes forced to rely on what London provides us with, which is usually obtained from Reuters or AFP or one of the other big news agencies. Relying on others, obviously, has its dangers. We often find ourselves having to rely on three or four international news picture agencies for material, which can be a real problem as they often make mistakes; they say that somebody is talking when it is actually somebody else and they say this is a picture of one place when it is actually a picture of somewhere else. They once, for example, mistakenly showed a shot of downtown Ramallah in the middle of a story on Tel Aviv! This is the kind of thing that happens, and it happens more and more.

Joel Greenberg:

I want to talk a little bit about the dilemmas that we face here in the Middle East by giving you a recent example. Two days ago I did a story on the meeting in Ramallah to commemorate the passing of 50 years since the *Naqba*, which coincidentally came just one day after Israel inaugurated its 50 years of independence celebrations. When I proposed the story and sent it to New York, one of the questions I was asked was, "Why are we writing about this when we did not write nearly enough about Israel's 50th anniversary?" The complaints centered around the fact that the anniversary of the *Naqba* had to do with history, while coverage of the Israeli celebration focused exclusively on the controversies involving the planning committee, which had been forced to deal with one crisis after another. Of course, maybe the people making the complaints were not aware that *The New York Times*, like any other news organization, is planning a big special edition on Israeli Independence Day, but it just goes to show the kind of sensitivity that exists. Here was a chance to look at what Israel's 50th anniversary means for the Palestinians, and that is why it was so interesting and why I wrote the article. It was not - at least as far as I was concerned - a matter of scorekeeping. For me, the idea is really not so much to balance for one side or for the other, but to present an interesting story that tells us something about the society, politics and origins of the people involved.

The problem is that we are talking about a country where there is a major conflict, which is why the parties to the conflict each try to pull you to their side and ask questions such as: "Why did you write about this, and why did you write about that, and how come you did not mention this or that, etc.?" I think that one must always ask oneself the question, "Does the story tell us something new about the politics and the social reality of this society or country?"

There are two very good examples of stories that I felt were very interesting, both of which are connected with time. One concerns the Palestinians, the other the Israelis. The first story was about the

'premature' end of summertime in Israel. It was decided in Israel well before the summer ended to go back from summertime to wintertime. This decision angered many circles in Israel: it was all to do with religious considerations and the fact that the Minister of Interior in Israel is from the Ultra-Orthodox Shas Party. So, this was a story that told us a lot about the cultural clash in Israel between religious and non-religious Jews, between the secular culture and the religious culture, and that was very interesting.

The other story involves the Ramadan canon in East Jerusalem, which goes off during Ramadan to mark the end of the fast. Here the issue was security constraints, because the man responsible for the canon has problems with the police because of security considerations regarding the explosive charges. The police, apparently, are constantly watching him to make sure that he uses all the explosives for the canon and does not use them for anything else, which means that the story tells us quite a bit about Palestinian society, its customs, and religion under occupation, as well as the existing political situation. In this case, the criteria are does the story tell us something new and interesting about the society and about the people and does it do it in a fair and honest manner? This, I believe, should be the guideline when one reads the foreign press.

Participant:

What sort of problems do you have with the Israeli censor?

Joel Greenberg:

As a rule, we usually do not submit our material to the censor, although we are always careful to display tact and common sense when dealing with an issue that might be problematic from the censorship point of view. Let me give you an example. When Katyusha rockets were fired at a certain Israeli kibbutz in Northern Israel, I went to the kibbutz and interviewed several people. The Israeli military told me to submit the finished article to the censor to make sure that it could not be used by Hizbollah to determine the actual location of the spot where the rockets fell. I did not, however, submit the article, the reason being that I did not specify the name of the kibbutz, partly because it was not necessary to do so. The article was about what people in the North are going through and their anxiety, not about specific locations. This means that we always keep in mind potential problems and are careful to constantly check ourselves.

Now, what happens if there is a really important story about a Palestinian who has been tortured to death and it is clear that the Israeli censor will not release any information. This is where the issue of journalistic integrity becomes very important. We would probably bend the rules a little in order to get the story out, which is more or less common practice amongst foreign correspondents, although I personally have never really come up against that kind of problem. I can say, that as a rule, we do not submit to censorship.

Paul Adams:

I think people have exaggerated how vigilant the censors actually are and how often we are obliged to deal with them. For example, when the Israeli soldiers were killed in Southern Lebanon, there were reports coming out from Beirut quoting Lebanese security sources, but in the majority of instances, it was London that gathered the information and took responsibility for broadcasting the reports.

There are times when the censor is very busy indeed. During the Gulf War in 1991, it reached the point where censors were in hotels in Tel Aviv and we really were under some pressure to play by the rules. I remember talking to my editors in London on the phone in my home in Abu Dis; I was not broadcasting, but simply confirming that another Scud missile had landed in Ramat Gan. Suddenly, the censor came on the line and told me that the conversation had gone far enough and had to come to an end. I explained to him that I was not broadcasting but simply discussing the situation and he said to me, "Okay. I just want to remind you that these are the rules."

Joel Greenberg:

The reality is, that censorship exists, but it only applies to immediate and extreme security circumstances. I once discovered there were Syrian Jews in Israel whilst walking down the street and hearing some people talking Arabic in West Jerusalem. Upon asking them some questions, I discovered that they were Jews who had come from Syria secretly after Syria had agreed to let Jews out through a third country such as America. Public understanding was that the Syrian Government was allowing them to leave and giving them visas on the condition that their final destination should not be discovered, published or discussed. I felt I had an interesting story, but I called the censor about it because it was clear that there were human lives involved. I was concerned that if it was published that 'X' from Damascus is in Israel, it could have very bad implications for his family inasmuch as it could harm their wellbeing and hamper their chances of leaving. Indeed, the Israelis said that I could not publish the story. It was a very worrying sense of responsibility, and to be honest, I did not have much of a problem with the censor's decision, in spite of the fact that the story was so interesting.

The real problem arises when censorship is misused. One good example concerns the training accident that occurred two or three years ago. At the time, Ehud Barak was heading the army command, but the fact that he was there was censored. Why should it not be known that he was there at the exercise? Censorship is understandable to some degree, but there are certainly times when it is misused.

Paul Adams:

There are actually times when foreign journalists can help Israeli journalists by breaking censorship rules for them; for example, by naming a member of the Mossad who is currently under investigation. The man was first named abroad, and that put pressure on the authorities here. There is also another kind of pressure, but this time it is put on the journalists; it is not really censorship as such, but it is still a problem. It happens when you interview, for example, a government official, and then he reminds you of something you said yesterday or last week, something the official clearly disagrees with. Some journalists might feel intimidated by that, particularly if they are keen to have a good relationship with the interviewee. Unfortunately, it is something we all have to go along with.

Participant:

Why has so little been done to reflect the reality of Palestinian daily life in other countries?

Paul Adams:

You have raised a very good point. As journalists, we tend to tell the big political stories. Sometimes these stories concern only the politicians, but we often want to describe to our readers the human consequences of policies. A good example is the closure. 'Closure' is a very dry sounding term that does not really mean anything to people abroad. It sounds administrative, but it has enormous human personal consequences, so as journalists we try to illustrate those. Palestinian propaganda is used very badly, and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from the Israelis, who provide enormous quantities of information, great access to officials, including home telephone numbers, documents, invitations to film female army units training, and press conferences with military officials, etc., all of which is pure propaganda. This is where the Palestinians have several disadvantages in terms of organizing such things, but they would do well to try a bit harder.

Joel Greenberg:

The problem, I believe, is the nature of the explosive political situation and the military and security situation on which we naturally focus. No, we do not do enough about ordinary life, whether in relation to the economic difficulties of Israelis in a development town in Southern Israel or the life of a Palestinian student at Birzeit University. Look at life in Ramallah, for example, and how that has changed: the nightlife, the shows, the music, the bars. Under occupation there was nothing, but today, Ramallah is becoming an alternative Palestinian capital due to the fact that people are unable to reach Jerusalem. That is an interesting story, but as it is not political, we tend not to do enough about it.

Participant:

Do you not agree that journalists sometimes provide incorrect or inadequate information? The Israeli news, for example, covered a story about how Palestinians steal cars. The story concentrated on the fact that it was Palestinian thieves who were stealing the cars and failed to mention certain important details, such as the way in which the cars arrived in the Palestinian territories. What about the checkpoints? How did the cars get through those? And what about the cooperation between the 'mafias' on both sides?

Paul Adams:

Not every story is going to be accurate or told the way you want it to be told. Now, if you are suggesting that the cars story is not a story then you are wrong, because the statistics alone tell you that it is a story, that huge numbers of cars - for whatever reasons - are stolen, and that the 'skeletons' of the cars are frequently discovered in the *wadis* of the West Bank. Now, there are reasons why this happens: there are political reasons and there are reasons to do with the prevailing socioeconomic situation. If I had done that story, I would have found it important to state that there are several reasons why this is happening. It would, after all, be very idiotic to suggest that you had a nation of thieves, and I do not think that London would allow me to do that; those in charge would say that this is nothing but crude and racist nonsense.

There is something that you did not mention, which is the question of pressure. Palestinian journalists are now under two kinds of pressure: pressure from Israel and pressure from their own authority. Just yesterday or the day before, Ghazi Al-Jabali, who has no legal authority in terms of the media, announced that all 30 or so Palestinian independent TV and radio stations had to apply to the Interior Ministry for a permit within 48 hours. Neither the man nor the ministry has the right to do that, which led to a great deal of confusion. I was at a Palestinian TV station in Bethlehem while the employees were discussing the order and they were genuinely surprised, asking questions such as: Why is Ghazi Al-Jabali coming up

with an order like this? What is the motive? Is it because of the Gulf crisis? Is it because they want to prevent us from broadcasting demonstrations in the street? This is a new kind of pressure that is coming from your own leadership.

Participant:

Of course, this is one case, but do not forget that the Israelis have arrested a huge number of journalists and closed media offices. With regard to the Authority, we need more training, and more truth, etc.

Participant:

But no one can deny that journalists are over-highlighting the mistakes being made by the Palestinian Authority whilst ignoring those being made by the Israeli Government. For example, if the PA arrests a journalist, practically every single journalist will cover the story, but hundreds of Palestinian journalists are in Israeli jails and nobody cares about them.

Joel Greenberg:

I have to disagree with you. Prior to Oslo, we covered many steps taken by the Israelis against the press. In fact, we still do, but what is different today is that there is now a Palestinian government and for the first time Palestinians are in charge of their own press. This is something that is interesting to the readers because it tells us something about the society and about the politics of the society. Our readers and we ourselves are interested in the new situation whereby there is a Palestinian government for the first time and for the first time Palestinian newspapers have to answer to a Palestinian authority. Again, you are getting back into the scorekeeping and the game of ten points here, ten points there.

Participant:

But you often exaggerate.

Paul Adams:

Are you saying that we should somehow be more generous to the PA? Look, there is a difficult moral dilemma here. I mean you have a new Palestinian government operating under extreme difficulties. Does that mean that I should somehow say, "Oh, well, if that journalist disappears or that guy is tortured to death in a Palestinian jail, it is because Arafat is having difficulties with the Israelis and therefore, it means he has good reason to be tough"? We have to apply the same standards, and I do not think that you are right. Take the question of torture. Torture is now being conducted in Palestinian and Israeli jails; yet, there is much more debate about torture in Israeli jails because there are legal cases in the Israeli courts involving Israeli lawyers and Palestinian human rights lawyers, whereas no such debate exists concerning what is going on in Palestinian jails. Whether you like it or not this kind of debate can go on in Israel because there is a relatively free press and a relatively lively judicial system as well.

Participant:

Suppose for example that there is a bomb in West Jerusalem and another one in East Jerusalem at the same time. Which one will you cover? What are the considerations: the preference of the organization you work for, your personal preference or the audience that you cater for?

Paul Adams:

I hate to admit it, but it would be the number of people killed that would determine which bombing we covered. I'm sorry, but it is rather a pointless question because you want me to say that we will go to one or the other, which is not the case: there is no political reason, there is no journalistic reason, and there is no editorial reason why we would choose one over the other. We are going to get the pictures anyway. If we do not take them ourselves, we get them from Reuters, or from the Associated Press, or from elsewhere. Our decision to go to one scene and not the other does not mean that we have taken a kind of decision to be more sympathetic to a particular side. It means that one site was closer than the other was, or that for other reasons it was more practical to go there.

It is true that whenever there is a tragedy involving Israeli civilians, we see more of the aftermath, the funerals, etc., and this is something I often wonder about. If five people are killed on one side and five people are killed on the other side, you are going to see more of the Israeli side. I do not think that there is a deliberate attempt to sympathize with one side more than the other; it is just that we have more material around. Nevertheless, this is something that troubles me from time to time.

Joel Greenberg:

I remember one particular funeral in Bethlehem. We had a picture of the mother of the boy in the paper, but because of the current situation, the funeral became - as Palestinian funerals often become - a political demonstration with flags and slogans, and this is what we ended up seeing on TV. The Israelis

are much quieter, and all we usually see is a string of shots of women and men crying, which is something that Western audiences can relate to. The Palestinian men, on the other hand, are not crying, but shouting, "*Bilroh, bildam, nafdik ya shahid*" (with our soul and our blood, we sacrifice ourselves for you the martyr). So you see, we have two totally different images.

We also have a problem with access. Following the Hebron massacre, for example, the Israeli army shut the area, whereas following the bombings in *Ben Yehuda* street, anybody could walk in there and take as many pictures as they wanted. Hebron was under occupation at the time of the massacre and I remember that when I went there, it was very quiet and nobody had any pictures. It all happened very early in the morning, at around 5.30, and because the wounded were taken away so quickly, there were only a few pictures of the wounded on stretchers, which some locals managed to get from the roofs. The problem was that the Israeli military made it impossible to get any decent pictures by closing the area.

Another good example concerns the events at Al-Aqsa the day after the tunnel was opened. Three people were killed, and I managed to get into the mosque area - I am not a Moslem, and I should not have been there, but I managed - and I wrote about everything I had seen, but again, it was extremely hard to get pictures because both the Israelis and the *Waqf* do not allow non-Moslems to enter the area. On the other hand, anybody can go to the market in West Jerusalem.

Participant:

Many Palestinian women cry and we do not see this on the Israeli TV, whereas we often see Israelis crying over the 'slaughter' of their people.

Joel Greenberg:

When the boy Ali Al-Jawarish from Bethlehem was killed, they showed his mother in the hospital crying. During the *Intifada*, the Israelis never got to see the grief of Palestinians, but this changed to a considerable extent with the Oslo Accords. I am not saying that Israeli television is perfect, but it is certainly improving. Today, we see interviews with mothers and fathers who have lost children, which is something that we never saw during the *Intifada* because at that time, the Israelis thought they were in a war, and during a war, you do not show the other side.

Paul Adams:

It is a cultural thing too. The Israeli funeral is much closer to what Westerners know, what they recognize as a funeral. When you get right down to the core of it, people in the West have an easier time identifying with Israelis because they feel they are more or less the same kind of people. Many Israelis are from Britain and America, which makes it easier for Westerners to identify with them. When Westerners see a funeral where the overwhelming flavor is loud and nationalistic, they tend to pull away and to think, this is not for me, I do not understand this, I want to keep it at a distance. It is a very deep-seated cultural reaction that is actually to your disadvantage.

Participant:

Do you agree with me that for a long time, say from 1967 until the *Intifada*, the Western media was more sympathetic to the Israeli line, especially in the US, and that this sympathy continues to influence media practices and organizations in the West?

Joel Greenberg:

I would like you to come to a synagogue in New York or to any Jewish gathering in New York and listen to the questions we get. People will say that we write much more sympathetically about the Palestinians. All sorts of camps think that we favor the other side, but the reality is that the mechanisms of reaction are more organized in a Jewish community; in other words, you will get more letters, you will get more telephone calls, you will get more of a response from the Israeli Consulate, from Jewish organizations, and from pro-Israel advocacy groups that are well-organized to defend Israel's interests. I once received a letter from the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee when I quoted a Palestinian who said that the Palestinians had 'fled' in 1948; the letter said, we did not flee in 1948, we were expelled by the Israelis. What I mean is that these pressures are coming from different directions and the reality is that the pressure is coming more - I would say - from the Israeli-Jewish side, and as a reporter you have to resist this; you have to believe in what you write. I am not saying that we are perfect, but we try to be fair. A good reporter should be able to resist pressure and to think of himself not as serving any one side, but as representing what is fair and honest.

Paul Adams:

I will just echo that. I mean the Israelis are convinced that the BBC is and always has been anti-Israeli; they are convinced. Just as you assume the opposite, they assume that that is the truth.

Dr. Rosemary Hollis:

There are a lot of stories in Britain about journalists being quietly eased out of posts in Jerusalem because of Israeli pressure.

Joel Greenberg:

Unfortunately, the Palestinian media is chaperoned by President Arafat. There are newspapers in Israel, on the other hand, which you could say are heavily influenced by the military establishment and the defense establishment. As to the international journalism, such as the Herald Tribune and the BBC, it strives to be independent of interest and pressure groups and governments. I think good media serves no master.

Paul Adams:

Sometimes, the media becomes a pressure group for a particular issue. Bosnia is a very good example. The Western media in its reporting of what was happening convinced the general public that there should be Western intervention in Bosnia. Again, independent newspapers started a campaign, calling for our involvement in Bosnia. Is that what newspapers should be doing? I am not sure, but I am sure that it is different from representing the interests of governments or other groups.

Participant:

I do not think that the world understands the Palestinians. Take the settlements: Netanyahu talks about them using terms such as 'the natural growth' of Israel, which can often mislead Western audiences.

Paul Adams:

You know, that is a phrase that has been used, but it is a term that is used mostly by the Israeli Government and whenever one quotes someone using that term, one must be careful to say, "what the Israeli Government describes as national growth" and to remind people that as far as International Law is concerned settlements are illegal. You might choose to repeat the British Government's view, which is that they are illegal and are not good for peace, or you might choose to use the American formula, which is that they are an obstacle in the way of achieving peace, or you might choose to recall UN resolutions on the subject or to quote the Palestinians who say that they have torpedoed the peace process; there are many ways in which you can balance the phrase 'natural growth'.

Joel Greenberg:

I was at Bet El a month or two ago when they dedicated a new neighborhood and Mordechai said that the neighborhood was necessary because of the needs of the people in that area and the fact that the next generation has to get married and find homes, etc. At the same gathering, they handed out flyers, advertising new houses in the neighborhood. Why are they advertising if it is natural growth? If it is only the children of Bet El who need houses, why is there a need to advertise? Obviously, that advertisement should be mentioned in any story and there should be a real effort on the part of the reporter to take the myth and see if it bears any relation to the reality. Today, for example, the Americans said we have to attack Iraq because there are weapons of mass destruction, there are biological weapons, and so forth; you have to check this as a journalist and to consider the evidence. A good journalist always checks the statement.

Paul Adams:

One thing that this conversation has demonstrated is that you are all under the impression that the pressures on us from Israel, from our own editors, and from our own governments are enormous. That is just not the case. I agree that there was a time when it was not fashionable to criticize Israel, but the 1980s really changed that; the press relationship with Israel changed dramatically and besides, today's journalists usually have an instinctive sympathy for the underdog, the person who the journalist thinks is the one in the most difficult situation. It is a natural sympathy and it sometimes leads you down the wrong path, but most journalists probably share it. The result of the *Intifada* was that amongst journalists and in the West in general, Palestinians were regarded for the first time more as victims than persecutors, and we should not underestimate the effects of this.

Concerning Iraq, we think that it is actually quite important to explain to foreigners what is happening here, but because there are so many correspondents in the Gulf producing all this material on planes landing and so on, it is difficult for us to get our material to the audience. I admit freely without reservation that that is a weakness. I personally am constantly telling my people in London if you do not have a piece from us here in Jerusalem explaining the whole issue of why the Palestinians react the way they do, then we have failed to do our job.



SIMULATION EXERCISES

1. Crisis in Iraq

Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

The simulation was divided into four parts or rounds, each lasting 40 minutes, with ten-minute breaks in between for 'press briefings' and a concluding final meeting for all participants. In accordance with the role assignments they received, the participants had to gather in different groups. The **background situation** for all participants at the outset of the simulation was as follows:

It is May 1998. A military strike on Iraq by US and British forces was averted in February 1998 by the mediation of UN Secretary General Kofi Anan. Under his auspices an agreement was worked out whereby UNSCOM inspection teams would continue their work unimpeded, but on the understanding that a team of diplomats would accompany them on their inspections and that every effort would be made to reach a speedy conclusion to this phase of the UN operation. Once finished, the sanctions could be lifted and the UN would switch from inspections to routine monitoring.

Now, three months on, the UNSCOM inspectors are making some progress, but at a slower rate than expected. There have been difficulties arranging for an increase in the amount of oil Iraq can sell to buy food and medicine, because the Iraqis are reluctant to implement a measure that could imply the extended duration of the sanctions regime. There are fears that the Iraqi Government will again lose patience with the whole sanctions and inspections regime.

After the first round, each participant received a **communiqué** about the latest developments on the ground, which had to be taken into consideration and which read as follows:

COMMUNIQUÉ No. 1

The Iraqi Government announces it has lost faith in the agreement reached with the UN last February. It announces that the UNSCOM inspectors must leave unless the UN agrees to a four-week deadline for completing the inspections and then to lift sanctions.

Before the third round, a **second communiqué** was circulated, which read as follows:

COMMUNIQUÉ No. 2

A dissident group of 'Afghan' returnees and others, calling itself the Brotherhood for the Protection of Moslems Against Western Imperialism, fires a rocket grenade at a car in Dahrán carrying the Commander of the US Central Command in the Gulf (General Zinny) and the Chief of the Saudi Air Force. Both are killed and so are the assailants in the ensuing gun battle.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi Government rounds up the US and British members of the UNSCOM team in Iraq and holds them hostage. Iraq says they will only be released if the UN agrees to its terms for bringing a speedy conclusion to the inspections and a lifting of sanctions. Iraq also says that it cannot guarantee the safety of the hostages should the US resort to military force.

Each of the participants had to represent one of the following **personalities** and was given specific instructions regarding the positions of their respective countries, which were also reflected in 'press briefings' that were held after each round. The different **roles** and **tasks** were as follows:

1. US SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT

Formulate and implement US foreign policy, bearing in mind how you can best serve the US national interest.

Task: Work out a way to persuade the Iraqi regime to allow UNSCOM work to continue at the same time as finding a way to ease the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people without enabling the regime to benefit at their expense. Prepare an action plan.

2. US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen

Formulate and implement US national defense policy, bearing in mind how you can best serve the US national interest.

Task: Work out a plan for how to defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states from any potential threats from Iraq and Iran, both before and after the removal of the sanctions regime on Iraq. You need alternative plans for how to contain Iraq with the current regime in place and when, potentially, there is a successor regime. Your priorities are to protect US interests and to take into account the sensibilities of US allies in the region, which should be reflected in your strategy.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the US Military

Implement US national defense policy, in accordance with the policy formulated by the US Cabinet, and advise the US Secretary of Defense on capabilities and options.

Task: Work out a plan for how to defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states from any potential threats from Iraq and Iran, both before and after the removal of the sanctions regime on Iraq. You need alternative plans for how to contain Iraq with the current regime in place and when, potentially, there is a successor regime. Your priorities are to protect US interests and to take into account the sensibilities of US allies in the region.

4. US National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger

Advise the US President on security issues and how he can best serve the US national interest at the same time as protecting his political standing in the US.

Task: Work out a plan for conducting a *coup d'état* in Iraq to overthrow the current regime. Decide what is the most effective way to do this and what kind of government will result. Once you have formulated the plan, devise a press statement that publicizes whatever aspect of your plan you wish to reveal. You can deliberately mislead if you wish, or you can engage in a propaganda exercise. Choose a spokesperson to read the press statement in the press briefing to come.

5. Saudi Minister of Oil

Maximize the Saudi oil market share and maximize the returns on Saudi oil sales. You know that the Saudi Government as a whole is worried about Arab public opinion regarding the suffering of the Iraqi people. However, you do not think a rapid return of Iraqi oil to the market would be good for prices. You therefore have to find a way to best protect the Saudi national interest.

Task: Together with other players in the energy market, you are to work out the implications of increased Iraqi oil sales under sanctions and once sanctions are lifted. Discuss options with the others and decide what course you will recommend to King Fahd, Crown Prince Abdallah and the rest of the Cabinet. Also decide on a strategy to influence US policy in the direction you want.

6. Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeni Primakov

Formulate and implement Russian foreign policy, bearing in mind how you can best serve the Russian national interest.

Task: Work out a way to persuade the Iraqi regime to allow UNSCOM to finish its work at the same time as finding a way to ease the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people. You personally want to see an end to sanctions as soon as possible, but you want the US to accept this strategy. Together with the French work out a strategy to try to dissuade the US from resorting to force. Draft a plan of action. This may conceal some of your plans if you wish.

7. French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine

Formulate and implement French foreign policy, bearing in mind how you can best serve the French national interest.

Task: Work out a way to persuade the Iraqi regime to allow UNSCOM to finish its work at the same time as finding a way to ease the humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people. You personally want to see an end to sanctions as soon as possible, but you want the US to accept this strategy. Together with the Russians formulate a strategy to try to dissuade the US from resorting to force. Help draft a plan of action. This may conceal some of your plans if you wish.

8. A defector from Iraq and former senior officer in the Iraqi army who is a personal acquaintance of President Saddam Hussein

Formulate and implement a *coup d'état* to overthrow and replace the Government of Iraq.

Task: Work out a plan for conducting a *coup d'état* in Iraq to overthrow the current regime. Decide what is the most effective way to do this and what kind of government will result. Once you have formulated the plan, devise a press statement that publicizes whatever aspect of your plan you wish to reveal. You can deliberately mislead if you wish or you can engage in a propaganda exercise. Decide on a strategy to influence US policy in the direction you want. Try to persuade the French and Russian nationals of your case.

9. Chief Executive of US oil company Mobil

Maximize the profits of your company, which is engaged in oil explorations and production as well as buying and selling oil produced by others, such as Saudi Arabia. Your company is part of a consortium developing oil in the Caspian Sea region. You want to end US sanctions on Iran so that you can bring out Caspian Sea oil via Iran. Meanwhile, you do not want the French and Russian companies that have draft contracts with Iraq to be able to go ahead with these until your company has a chance to negotiate rival contracts with the Iraqis. You do not expect to be able to do this until there has been a change of regime in Iraq, given US hostility to Saddam Hussein.

Task: Together with other players in the energy market, you are to work out the implications of increased Iraqi oil sales under sanctions and once sanctions are lifted. Your personal goal is to try to keep Iraq off the market as far as possible, so long as the current Iraqi regime and sanctions are in place. However, you do not want to jeopardize your chances of one day operating in Iraq. Work out who else in your meeting has compatible interests. Also, decide what policy you wish to urge on the US Government in light of what you discover in the meeting.

10. Chief Executive of the Russian oil company Lukoil

Maximize the profits of your company, which is engaged in oil explorations and production as well as buying and selling oil. You have draft contracts with the Iraqi Government to develop its oil sector as soon as the lifting of sanctions permits. You want to go ahead as soon as possible. In the meantime, you are prepared to buy Iraqi oil under the oil-for-food arrangements.

Task: Together with other players in the energy market, you are to work out the implications of increased Iraqi oil sales under sanctions and once sanctions are lifted. Your personal goal is to try to get Iraq back into full production as soon as possible. Also, decide what policy you wish to urge on the Russian Government in light of what you discover in the meeting. Together with the Russians and French work out a strategy to try to dissuade the US from resorting to force.

11. French Minister of Finance

Formulate and implement French economic policy. You know that Iraq owes France a lot of money and you hope to arrange for this to be repaid once sanctions are lifted. You also know that the French oil company Elf has draft contracts in place with the Iraqis to develop its energy sector once sanctions are lifted. You want French interests to be served.

Task: Together with other players in the energy market, you are to work out the implications of increased Iraqi oil sales under sanctions and once sanctions are lifted. Your personal goal is to try to get Iraq back into full production as soon as possible. Work out who else in your meeting has compatible interests. Also, decide what policy you wish the French Government to follow in light of what you discover in the meeting. Try to develop a plan with the Russians to respond to events and to dissuade the US from resorting to force.

12. Secretary General of the Iraqi National Congress opposition group in exile, Ahmed Challabi

Formulate and implement a *coup d'état* to overthrow and replace the Government of Iraq.

Task: Work out a plan for conducting a *coup d'état* in Iraq to overthrow the current regime. Decide what is the most effective way to do this and what kind of government will result. Once you have formulated the plan, devise a press statement that publicizes whatever aspect of your plan you wish to reveal. You can deliberately mislead if you wish or you can engage in a propaganda exercise. Help decide on a strategy to influence US policy in the direction you want. Try to persuade the French and Russians of your case.

13. Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan

Formulate and implement Saudi national defense policy, bearing in mind how you can best serve the Saudi national interest, in keeping with the interests of the As-Saud family.

Task: Work out a plan for how to defend Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states from any potential threats from Iraq and Iran, both before and after the removal of the sanctions regime on Iraq. You need alternative plans for how to contain Iraq with the current regime in place and when, potentially, there is a successor regime. Your priorities are to protect Saudi interests and to take into account public opinion in the region. Once you have formulated a strategy, help the US devise a press statement that publicizes whatever aspect of your strategy you wish to reveal. Decide on a strategy to influence US policy in the direction you want.

2. Canadian Foreign Policy Simulation

*Dr. Rex Brynen, Professor of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada,
and Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies (ICAS) at McGill University*

Each of the participants had to represent one of the following personalities and was given specific instructions regarding the positions of their countries or organizations:

DFAIT/GXD	Middle East Peace Process Coordination, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade - Taskforce Co-Chair
DFAIT/GMR	Middle East Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DEFIT/MINA	Minister's Office, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
TAVIV	Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv
WSHDC	Canadian Embassy, Washington DC
AMMAN	Canadian Embassy, Amman
BEIRUT	Canadian Embassy, Beirut
CIDA/BFM	Middle East and North Africa, Canadian International Development Agency - Taskforce Co-Chair
CIDA/IHA	International Humanitarian Assistance, Canadian International Development Agency
CIDA/NGO	NGO Division, Canadian International Development Agency
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PCO	Privy Council Office

Canada-Israel Committee

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

The CIC has grown increasingly concerned that Canada is failing to address legitimate Israeli concerns. In particular, the Palestinian Authority has not taken effective security measures against extremist terrorism, and continues to violate signed agreements. There is broad support in the Canadian Jewish community for pressing the PA to live up to its commitments. Also, Canada's involvement in the Refugee Working Group should be based on a clear understanding that it will not accept either Palestinian statehood, nor the return of refugees to any areas west of the Jordan River.

The CIC has taken these concerns to both the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA/DFAIT). It is important that these concerns be actively followed up, to guarantee that the taskforce report reflects Israel's legitimate security concerns, as well as the positive nature of Canadian-Israeli relations.

Briefing Paper: DFAIT/GXD

You are the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (GX) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for coordinating Canadian involvement in the multilateral working groups of the Middle East Peace Process, as well as overseeing and advising on other aspects of Canadian policy that touch upon the Arab-Israeli conflict. The largest component of your position involves your role as Gavel-Holder of the Refugee Working Group (RWG), which represents the most visible aspect of Canadian involvement in the peace process.

You have been asked to co-chair a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, in cooperation with the Director General for the Middle East and North Africa (BFM) at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Your report should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- RWG Gavel's Speech to UNRWA Donor's Meeting
- Middle East Peace Process: Refugee Working Group
- The Refugee Working Group and the Refugee Question
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations
- Much Ado About Nothing? The RWG and the Perils of Multilateral Quasi- Negotiations

Briefing Paper: DFAIT/GMR

You are the Director of the Middle East Bureau (GMR) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for overseeing Canadian political and trade relations with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinians. You are also responsible for promoting Canadian trade and investment opportunities in the Middle East.

You have been asked to participate in a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, co-chaired by DFAIT and CIDA. In doing so, you will want to assure that any recommendations produced by the taskforce are consistent with Canada's broader Interests in the region and do not undermine Canada's existing friendly relations with these countries. You will also provide support to the DFAIT /GXD co-chair of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Middle East Peace Process: Refugee Working Group
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations
- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

Briefing Paper: DFAIT/MINA

You are a political advisor in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MINA) at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). As such, you are responsible for advising the Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on the broader international and domestic ramifications of policy decisions.

The minister recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In thinking about any new Canadian policy it is important to consider the consequences for Canada's relations with its Western allies, as well as with states in the region. Moreover, there are domestic political factors to be considered: the minister has recently been criticized by some members of the Canada-Israel Committee for what they perceive as a 'pro-Palestinian tilt'. The CIC is particularly concerned about what it sees as the failure of the PA to deal with terrorism and live up to its commitments under the Oslo Agreement. Your private academic advisors suggest that a more energetic Canadian approach is needed, that Canada should focus on the refugee issue, and that Canadian aid programs should play a stronger role in the area. (It should be noted, however, that CIDA is not under DFAIT control.) While the minister often prefers bold and innovative policies, it is essential that these enjoy broad support within Canada and from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is known to favor a more cautious approach.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

Briefing Paper: Canadian Embassy/TAVIV

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Israel and the Canadian Representative to the Palestinian Authority. The embassy is based in Tel Aviv and is responsible for the implementation of both diplomatic and aid policy. The CIDA officer for the West Bank and Gaza is based at the embassy; in addition, a local office of the 'Canada Fund' (which supports small projects) is based in Ramallah.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect Canada's relationship with both Israel and the Palestinians. The embassy is likely to be the focal point of any new policy, so it is important that you are closely engaged with the work of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process
- CIDA Consultant's Report

Briefing Paper: Canadian Embassy/AMMAN

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Jordan.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect Canada's relationship with Jordan. Of particular importance is the large Palestinian refugee population in Jordan and possible initiatives undertaken by Canada in the context of the Refugee Working Group. Jordan is an active member of the RWG.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

Canadian Embassy/BEIRUT

You are the Canadian Ambassador to Lebanon.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of local conditions and assessing how changes in policy might affect our relationship with Lebanon. Of particular importance is the large Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon and possible initiatives undertaken by Canada in the context of the Refugee Working Group. Lebanon and Syria have refused to participate in the RWG or other multilateral working groups that include Israel. Moreover, there is strong suspicion in Lebanon that Canada supports the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. While untrue, this suspicion has had negative effects on Canadian-Lebanese relations.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process

Canadian Embassy/WSHDC

You are a political officer at the Canadian Embassy to the United States. You are responsible for monitoring American policy in the Middle East.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to offer input to the taskforce, informing them of how the US is likely to regard Canadian initiatives, and what potential areas of US-Canadian cooperation there might be assuming that the US initiatives do not antagonize the regional parties or further polarize the delicate political situation.

Of course, the Middle East is only a small part of Canada's broader relations with the US. Canada is perhaps the closest ally of the US; the two economies are closely linked under the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the US accounts for fully 85 percent of Canadian trade. This aspect too should be brought to the attention of the taskforce.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

PCO

You are a staff member of the Privy Council Office. The PCO supports Cabinet decision-making. It also undertakes medium and long-term political intelligence assessments of international politics. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to monitor the taskforce discussions to assure that any policy recommendations are consistent with broader Canadian foreign and domestic interests.

The current PCO assessment is that the Middle East Peace Process is in a period of extended stalemate. No substantial changes are expected under the current Israeli Government. Canada has been actively involved in the Refugee Working Group, but there have been no major achievements. The Middle East is not an important region to Canada in economic terms, although it is of some strategic importance. Canadian policy in the region has been closely coordinated with that of the US.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

PMO

You are a staff member of the Prime Minister's Office. The PMO provides policy and political advice to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

You will want to monitor the taskforce discussions to assure that any policy recommendations are consistent with the political interests of the government.

It should be noted that some officials in the Canada-Israel Committee have recently complained to the Prime Minister about Canada's perceived 'pro-Palestinian' tilt, as well as the PA's failure to crack down on terrorist groups. The Canadian Jewish community is very well organized, is very effective at political mobilization, and closely monitors Canadian support for Israel. Arab Canadian groups are much less well organized and have much less political influence. The Canadian press is generally even-handed in its treatment of the issue and has devoted little attention to Canadian policy. Press editorials have generally been critical of the Netanyahu government.

In a recent meeting, President Clinton thanked Canada for its continued support of the Middle East Peace Process. He also thanked Canada for its position on the current crisis with Iraq.

The Middle East is not an area of critical economic interest to Canada. While the Prime Minister supports the peace process, he sees little reason to dramatically change Canadian policy.

You will find the following reading material of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy

CIDA/BFM

You are the Director General for the Middle East and North Africa (BFM) in the Bilateral (Africa/Middle East) Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you are responsible for coordinating Canadian development assistance to the Palestinians, as well as to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and other countries in the region. CIDA has its own minister and is not part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

You have been asked to co-chair a taskforce that is currently examining Canadian policy towards the Palestinians, in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The report should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, the CIDA budget has faced serious cuts. Consequently, it is unlikely that funding for the West Bank and Gaza can be expanded above its current level of \$8-10 million per year, although it may be possible to find an additional \$1 million for next year. Additional CIDA funds flow to non-governmental organizations and to the UNRWA from CIDA's Partnership and Multilateral Branches. In designing an aid program, CIDA attempts to maximize the role of the private sector as an engine of economic growth and also attempts to promote the involvement of Canadian companies and technical aid. Other priorities include good governance, women, the environment, and poverty alleviation/ basic needs.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- CIDA Consultant's Report
- Other CIDA materials

CIDA/IHA

You are the Director General for International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) in the Multilateral Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you provide support for the UNRWA, as well as other refugee and relief agencies around the world.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy, and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, the CIDA aid budget has faced serious reductions. As a consequence, CIDA/IHA has had to cut \$1 million from its \$9 million annual contribution to UNRWA. The alternative would have been to cut support to the UNHCR or the Red Cross, both of which serve much poorer and more vulnerable refugee populations in Africa and elsewhere. In addition, CIDA has concerns regarding UNRWA's long-term donors' willingness to add to its limited resources, and the Palestinian refugee population continues to grow at four percent per year.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process
- CIDA materials.

CIDA/NGO

You are responsible for Middle East NGOs in the Partnership Branch at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). As such, you provide funds to support partnerships between Canadian and Palestinian NGOs.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently established a taskforce to examine Canadian policy towards the Palestinians. This taskforce should identify options and make specific recommendations regarding Canadian diplomatic, aid and trade policy and suggest how Canada could make a stronger contribution to the search for Middle East peace.

In recent years, you have grown concerned about the human rights abuses by the PA. It is important that Canada support Palestinian NGO activities so as to promote democracy and civil society.

You will find the following reading materials of particular use in preparing for your role:

- Visit to the Middle East by FM Lloyd Axworthy
- The RWG of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Process
- CIDA materials

PASSIA Seminar 1998

**THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POLICY-MAKING
AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

APPENDICES

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|--------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Appendix A: | Lecture Program |
| Appendix B: | Lecturers |
| Appendix C: | Palestinian Participants |
| Appendix D: | Reading Material |
| Appendix E: | The US and Canada at a Glance |
| Appendix F: | Maps |

APPENDIX A:
LECTURE PROGRAM
16-27 FEBRUARY 1998

DAY ONE: Monday, 16 February

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| 8.30-9.15 | Registration and Group Photographs |
| 9.15-10.15 | Welcoming Address
<i>Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi</i> |
| 10.30-11.30 | The State in the International System - Alternative Theoretical Frameworks
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 11.30-12.45 | The State in the International System, contd.
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 14.00-15.30 | The Phenomenon of Globalization
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 16.00-17.00 | <i>Participants</i> : Paper presentations |

DAY TWO: Tuesday, 17 February

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|-------------|---|
| 9.00-10.30 | The US and Canada in the International System
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 10.45-12.15 | Defining the National Interest
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 13.30-15.00 | Decision-Making Theory
<i>Dr. Rosemary Hollis</i> |
| 15.15-16.45 | <i>Participants (II)</i> : Paper presentations |

DAY THREE: Wednesday, 18 February

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|-------------|---|
| 9.00-10.30 | The US Political System (I): Separation of Powers
<i>Prof. Shibley Telhami</i> |
| 10.45-12.15 | The US Political System (II): Interest Groups, Lobbies and Public Opinion
<i>Prof. Shibley Telhami</i> |
| 13.00-14.30 | The US Political System (III): Foreign Policy-Making
<i>Prof. Shibley Telhami</i> |
| 15.00-17.00 | Film on the Gulf War |

DAY FOUR: Thursday, 19 February

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 9.00-10.30 | The Canadian Political System (I): Separation of Powers, Interest Groups, Lobbies, and Public Opinion
<i>Dominique Jacquin-Berdal</i> |
| 10.45-12.15 | The Canadian Political System (II): Foreign Policy-Making
<i>Dominique Jacquin-Berdal</i> |
| 13.30-15.00 | The Political System in the US and Canada: Comparisons and Contrasts
<i>Dominique Jacquin-Berdal</i> |

APPENDIX A:
LECTURE PROGRAM
16-27 FEBRUARY 1998

DAY ONE: Monday, 16 February

- 8.30-9.15 Registration and Group Photographs
- 9.15-10.15 Welcoming Address
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi
- 10.30-11.30 The State in the International System - Alternative Theoretical Frameworks
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 11.30-12.45 The State in the International System, contd.
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 14.00-15.30 The Phenomenon of Globalization
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 16.00-17.00 *Participants: Paper presentations*

DAY TWO: Tuesday, 17 February

- 9.00-10.30 The US and Canada in the International System
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 10.45-12.15 Defining the National Interest
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 13.30-15.00 Decision-Making Theory
Dr. Rosemary Hollis
- 15.15-16.45 *Participants (II): Paper presentations*

DAY THREE: Wednesday, 18 February

- 9.00-10.30 The US Political System (I): Separation of Powers
Prof. Shibley Telhami
- 10.45-12.15 The US Political System (II): Interest Groups, Lobbies and Public Opinion
Prof. Shibley Telhami
- 13.00-14.30 The US Political System (III): Foreign Policy-Making
Prof. Shibley Telhami
- 15.00-17.00 Film on the Gulf War

DAY FOUR: Thursday, 19 February

- 9.00-10.30 The Canadian Political System (I): Separation of Powers, Interest Groups, Lobbies,
and Public Opinion
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal
- 10.45-12.15 The Canadian Political System (II): Foreign Policy-Making
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal
- 13.30-15.00 The Political System in the US and Canada: Comparisons and Contrasts
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal

15.15-16.45 Media Discussion: The US and Canada and the Middle East
Paul Adams and Joel Greenberg

DAY FIVE: Friday, 20 February

9.00-10.30 US (and Canadian) Relations/Roles in the Contemporary Middle East (I): Weapons Proliferation, "Terrorism", and the "Rogue State" Phenomenon
Prof. Shibley Telhami

10.45-12.15 Canadian Involvement in the Peacekeeping
Dominique Jacquin-Berdal

13.00-17.00 Simulation: Iraqi Crisis
Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY SIX /SEVEN: Saturday/Sunday, 21-22 February - WEEKEND

DAY EIGHT: Monday, 23 February

9.00-10.30 The Historical Evolution of the US Involvement in the Middle East
Dr. Michael Hudson

10.45-12.15 The US and the Middle East - The Policy-Making Process
Dr. Michael Hudson

13.30-15.00 National (Security) Concerns for the US in the Middle East and The US: Origins and Implications of the Special Relationship with Israel
Dr. Joseph Alpher

15.15-16.45 *Participants (III): Paper presentations*

DAY NINE: Tuesday, 24 February

9.00-10.30 Instruments of American Policy in the Middle East: From Diplomacy to Intervention
Dr. Michael Hudson

10.45-12.15 The Historical Evolution of Canada's Involvement in the Middle East
Dr. Rex Brynen

13.15-14.45 National (Security) Concerns for Canada in the Middle East
Dr. Rex Brynen

15.00-17.00 Videos of the Gulf War Footage – Comparing and Contrasting Perspectives
With Dr. Rosemary Hollis - Followed by a Discussion

DAY TEN: Wednesday, 25 February

9.00-10.30 Canada and the Middle East Peace Process
Dr. Rex Brynen

10.45-12.15 Canadian Foreign Policy Simulation
Dr. Rex Brynen

13.30-15.00 Mediation: Camp David and Madrid
Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Mr. Mamdouh Nofal

15.15-16.45 Mediation Simulation
Dr. Rosemary Hollis

DAY ELEVEN: Thursday, 26 February

- 9.00-10.30 US (and Canadian) Relations/Roles in the Contemporary Middle East (II): The Economic Dimension and the Vision for a New Middle East
John Desrocher
- 10.45-12.15 US Decision-Making in the Middle East: Case Studies
Dr. Cheryl Rubenberg
- 13.30-15.00 US (and Canadian) Relations/Roles in the Contemporary Middle East (III): Fundamentalism - The Islamic 'Threat' and its Repercussions
Duncan MacInnes
- 15.15-16.45 US Foreign Policy in the Middle East
HE John Herbst

DAY TWELVE: Friday, 27 February

- 9.0-10.30 The Palestinians and the US
Dr. Ziad Abu Amr
Conny Mayer
- 10.45-12.15 Canada and The Palestinians
HE David Berger
- 15.15-16.45 Writing Assignments and Wrap-up of the Seminar

NB: At the request of the US Consulate in Jerusalem, the presentations of the American diplomats who participated in the seminar have not been included in this publication.

APPENDIX B: LECTURERS

Dr. MAHDI ABDUL HADI

Head of PASSIA, Jerusalem

Dr. ZIAD ABU AMR

PLC Member, Chair of the Political Committee

Dr. PAUL ADAMS

BBC Correspondent, Jerusalem

Dr. JOSEPH ALPHER

American-Jewish Committee, Jerusalem

HE DAVID BERGER

Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv

Dr. REX BRYNEN

ICAS and McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Mr. JOHN DESROCHER

Economic Officer, US Consulate General, Jerusalem

Mr. JOEL GREENBERG

Correspondent, The New York Times, Jerusalem

HE JOHN HERBST

US Counsel General, Jerusalem

Dr. ROSEMARY HOLLIS

Head, Middle East Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London

Dr. MICHAEL HUDSON

Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

Ms. DOMINIQUE JACQUIN-BERDAL

Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, London

Mr. DUNCAN MACINNES

Public Affairs Officer, USIS, US Consulate General, Jerusalem

Mrs. CONNY MAYER

Political Officer, US Consulate General, Jerusalem

Mr. MAMDOUH NOFAL

Member of the Palestinian Central Council and PLC Member

Dr. CHERYL RUBENBERG

Fullbright Fellow, Birzeit University

HE AFIF SAFIEH

Head of the PLO Delegation to the UK and to the Holy See

Prof. SHIBLEY TELHAMI

Anwar Sadat Chair for Population, Development and Peace at the University of Maryland; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute

APPENDIX C: PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS

(by name, year/place of birth, place of residency, degree, occupation,
first writing assignments)

ABU HIJLEH, SAED

- Born 1966, Nablus; living and working in Nablus
- BSc Geography, University of Iowa; MA Geography, University of Northern Iowa
- Independent Consultant; previously, Legal Translator, USAID
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Interests of Canada

ABU KHADIJEH, JAMAL

- Born 1956, Jerusalem; living in Jerusalem and working in Ramallah
- BA English, University of Jordan
- Translator, ARD; previously, Translator, Spimaco, Saudi Arabia
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Decision-making in Canada

ABU YOUSEF, RAWAN

- Born 1970, Jerusalem; living and working in Ramallah
- BA English language and Literature, Ain-Shams University
- Director, NGOs Department, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation; previously, Personnel Clerk, Health Services, Ramallah
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Interests of Canada

ASH-SHEHABI, MUZNA

- Born 1973, Tripoli; living and working in Ramallah
- BA English Literature, Mohammed V University, Morocco
- Assistant Manager, Masrouji Company and Teacher at the French Cultural Center; previously, Registration Officer, American University, Morocco
- Assignment: Basic Characteristics of the US

AWAD, OLA

- Born 1975, Jerusalem; living in Jerusalem and working in Ramallah
- BA Economics, Birzeit University
- Administrative and Logistics Officer, Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
- Assignment: The Political System of Canada

DABUS, HAYAT

- Born 1967, Amman; living and working in Gaza
- BA English, University of Mississippi
- Assistant Director of the General Activities Department, Governorate of Gaza; previously, Tutor/part-time teacher, University of Mississippi
- Assignment: The Political System of Canada

HALLAK, MOHAMMED

- Born 1964, Ar-Rehieh; living and working in Hebron
- BA English Language, Hebron University
- Chairman of the Books Department, Southern Hebron Education Office; previously, Teacher, Ministry of Education
- Assignment: The Political System of the US

KHOURY, HIND

- Born 1953, Bethlehem; living in Bethlehem and working in Jerusalem
- BA Economics, American University, Beirut; MSc Management, Ben Gurion Boston Universities Joint Program
- National Program Officer, UN Population Fund, UNDP; previously, Freelance Development Consultant, Bethlehem
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Decision-making in the US

MANNA', JAWDAT

- Born 1952, Bethlehem; living and working in Bethlehem
- Diplomas in Bimedia Journalism, TV Journalism
- Manager, Bethlehem TV and Freelance Correspondent, *Ad-Dustour* Jordanian Daily; previously, Freelance Correspondent, *Okaz* Saudi Daily
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Decision-making in the US

NAJIB, MOHAMMED

- Born 1969, Arourah; living in Ramallah and working in Jerusalem
- Diploma in Professional Journalism, Birzeit University
- Reporter on Palestinian Affairs, *The Jerusalem Post* and Radio 2000; previously, Researcher on Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Committee to Protect Journalists, New York
- Assignment: Foreign Policy Interests of the US

NASSAR, MOHAMMED

- Born 1962, Dura; living and working in Hebron
- BA English
- Teacher, Kerma Basic School, Hebron; previously, Teacher, Al-Burj Preparatory School
- Assignment: The Political System of the USA

SAMANDAR, ISSA

- Born 1955, Birzeit; living in Ar-Ram and working in Ramallah
- BA Economics
- Manager, General Agency for International Trade Services; previously, Secretariat of Workers' General Union, Ramallah
- Assignment: Basic Characteristics of Canada

YASSIN, MAY

- Born 1977, Jerusalem; living in Jerusalem and working in Ramallah
- BA Mathematics, Al-Quds University
- Teacher, Al-Urdunieh Secondary School, Al-Bireh
- Assignment: Basic Characteristics of Canada

APPENDIX D: READING MATERIAL

A. General Background Reading

Ambrose, S. "America in the Middle East and Africa", in *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. Ed. by Ambrose S., Penguin Books, 7th rev. ed., 1993.

Bowles, Nigel. "Foreign and Defense Policy", in *The Government and Politics of The United States*. Series Ed. by Vincent Wright, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1993.

Canada and the Middle East. Canadian Foreign Ministry, Official Internet Home Page (see <http://canada.gc.ca> or <http://www.gc.ca>).

Facts on Canada. Canadian Foreign Ministry, Official Internet Home Page (see <http://www.dfait-macci.gc.ca> or <http://www.infocan.gc.ca/facts>).

Fisher, Louis. *The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the Executive*. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1993.

Legg, Keith R. and Morrison, James F., *Politics and the International System: An Introduction*. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Macan, Robert L. *The Basis of the American Economy*. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs - United States Information Agency, 1981.

Nossal, Kim R. "Analyzing Canadian Foreign Policy", in *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*.

A Summary of American History, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs - United States Information Agency (USIA). (Arabic)

B. Reading Material for Individual Research Assignments

Ambrose, S. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. Penguin Books, 7th rev. ed., 1993.

The American Political System, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs - USIA, 1981.

Report on Canada's Relations with the Countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1985.

Stevenson, Douglas K. *American Life and Institutions*. Jordan Book Center, 1987.

Strange Susan. "The Future of the American Empire", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1988.

Tschirgi, Dan. *The American Search for Mideast Peace*. Egypt: Dar Ash-Shorouk, 1993. (Arabic)

C. Recommended Reading Material

Aksyonov, Vassily. *In Search of Melancholy Baby*. New York: Random House, 1987.

Allen, Robert V. *Russia Looks At America: The View to 1917*. Library of Congress, 1988.

Arakie, Margaret. *The Broken Sword of Justice: America, Israel and The Palestinian Tragedy*. London: Quartet Books, 1973.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990.

Bode, Carl. *American Perspectives: The United States in the Modern Age*. Forum Reader Series, 1990.

- Brynen, Rex and Tansley Jill. "The Refugee Working Group and the Perils of Multilateral Quasi-Negotiations", in *International Negotiation*, 2, 1997, p. 279-302.
- Brynen, Rex. "Much Ado About Nothing? The Refugee Working Group of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations", in *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol. II, No. 4.
- Chomsky, Noam. *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and The Palestinians*. Boston MA: South End Press, 1983.
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- Denny, Brewster C. *Seeing American Foreign Policy Whole*. Cairo-Kuwait-London: International Pub. and Dist. House, 1985.
- Elazar, Daniel J. *American Federalism: A View From The States*. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1984.
- Findley, Paul. *Basic Deliberate Deception: Facing The Facts About The US-Israeli Relationship*. Lawrence Hill Books, 1993.
- Horwitz, Robert H. et al. *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*. University Press of Virginia, 1986.
- Kammen, Michael. *A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986.
- Lesch, David W. *The Middle East and The United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*. Westview Press, 1996.
- Levy, Leonard W. *Essays on The Making Of the Constitution*. Oxford University Press, Inc., 1969.
- Madrid, Robin. *Statements and Position Papers of Major American Organizations on Middle East Peace*. Washington Middle East Associates, 1985.
- Nevins, Allan. *A Short History of The United States*. Cairo-Kuwait-London: International Pub. and Dist. House, 1981.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, 1990.
- Palmer, Michael A. *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992*, Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publication, 1992.
- Peck, Juliana S. *The Reagan Administration and The Palestinian Question: The First Thousand Days*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984.
- Polsby, Nelson W. and Wildavsky, Aaron. *Presidential Elections: Contemporary Strategies of American Electoral Politics*. The Free Press, 1988.
- Quandt, William B. *The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David*. Alam Al-Koutob Press, 1988.
- Spanier, John. *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. TATA McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, 1988.
- Storing, Herbert J. *The Anti-Federalist: Writings By The Opponents of the Constitution*. The University of Chicago Press, 1985.
- Tonelson Alan. "Globalization: The Great American Non-Debate." *Current History*, November 1997.
- Urofsky, Melvin. *Basic Readings in The United States Democracy*. USIA, 1994.
- Wilson, Evan M. *Decisions on Palestine: How The US Came To Recognize Israel*. Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

APPENDIX E: The US and Canada at a Glance

(from the World Fact Book 1997, published March 1998)

United States

GEOGRAPHY (note: world's third-largest country after Russia and Canada)

- *Location:* North America, bordering both the North Atlantic Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean, between Canada and Mexico
- *Geographic coordinates:* 38 00 N, 97 00 W
- *Area:* - total: 9,629,091 sq km (note: includes only the 50 states and District of Columbia)
 - land: 9,158,960 sq km
 - water : 470,131 sq km
- *Area - comparative:* about one-half the size of Russia; about three-tenths the size of Africa; about one-half the size of South America; slightly larger than China; about two and one-half times the size of Western Europe
- *Land boundaries:* - total: 12,248 km
 - border countries: Canada 8,893 km (incl. 2,477 km with Alaska), Cuba 29 km (US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay leased by the US), Mexico 3,326 km
- *Coastline:* 19,924 km
- *Maritime claims:* - contiguous zone : 12 nm
 - continental shelf: not specified
 - exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
 - territorial sea: 12 nm
- *Climate:* mostly temperate, but tropical in Hawaii and Florida and arctic in Alaska, semiarid in the great plains west of the Mississippi River and arid in the Great Basin of the southwest; low winter temperatures in the northwest are ameliorated occasionally in January and February by warm chinook winds from the eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains
- *Terrain:* vast central plain, mountains in west, hills and low mountains in east; rugged mountains and broad river valleys in Alaska; rugged, volcanic topography in Hawaii
- *Elevation extremes:* lowest point: Death Valley -86 m; highest point: Mount McKinley 6,194 m
- *Natural resources:* coal, copper, lead, molybdenum, phosphates, uranium, bauxite, gold, iron, mercury, nickel, silver, potash, tungsten, zinc, petroleum, natural gas, timber
- *Land use:* - arable land: 19%
 - permanent pastures: 25%
 - forests and woodland: 30%
 - other: 26% (1993 est.)
- *Irrigated land:* 207,000 sq km (1993 est.)
- *Natural hazards:* tsunamis, volcanoes, earthquake activity around Pacific Basin; hurricanes along the Atlantic coast; tornadoes in the midwest; mud slides in California; forest fires in the west; flooding; permafrost in northern Alaska is a major impediment to development
- *Environment - current issues:* air pollution resulting in acid rain in both the US and Canada; the US is the largest single emitter of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels; water pollution from runoff of pesticides and fertilizers; very limited natural fresh water resources in much of the western part of the country require careful management; desertification

PEOPLE

- *Population:* 267,954,764 (July 1997 est.)
- *Age structure:* - 0-14 years: 22% (male 29,837,393; female 28,450,028)
 - 15-64 years: 65% (male 87,170,245; female 88,400,551)
 - 65 years and over : 13% (male 13,975,746; female 20,120,801) (July 1997 est.)
- *Population growth rate:* 0.89% (1997 est.)
- *Birth rate:* 14.6 births/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Death rate:* 8.8 deaths/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Net migration rate:* 3.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Sex ratio:* - at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
 - under 15 years : 1.05 male(s)/female
 - 15-64 years: 0.99 male(s)/female
 - 65 years and over: 0.7 male(s)/female
 - total population: 0.96 male(s)/female (1997 est.)
- *Infant mortality rate:* 6.55 deaths/1,000 live births (1997 est.)
- *Life expectancy at birth:* total population: 76.04 years (male: 72.75 years; female : 79.49 years - 1997 est.)
- *Total fertility rate:* 2.06 children born/woman (1997 est.)
- *Nationality:* noun: American(s) - adjective: American

- *Ethnic groups*: white 83.4%, black 12.4%, Asian 3.3%, Amerindian 0.8% - 1992)
- *Religions*: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2%, other 4%, none 10% (1989)
- *Languages*: English, Spanish (spoken by a sizable minority)
- *Literacy* (age 15 and over can read and write): 97%

GOVERNMENT

- *Country name*: - conventional long form : United States of America
- conventional short form: United States (abbreviation: US or USA)
- *Government type*: federal republic; strong democratic tradition
- *National capital*: Washington, DC
- *Administrative divisions*: 50 states, and 1 district*; Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia*, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
- *Dependent areas*: American Samoa, Baker Island, Guam, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Islands, Navassa Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Palmyra Atoll, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Wake Island (note: from 18 July 1947 until 1 October 1994, the US administered the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, but recently entered into a new political relationship with all four political units: the Northern Mariana Islands is a Commonwealth in political union with the US (effective 3 November 1986); Palau concluded a Compact of Free Association with the US (effective 1 October 1994); the Federated States of Micronesia signed a Compact of Free Association with the US (effective 3 November 1986); the Republic of the Marshall Islands signed a Compact of Free Association with the US (effective 21 October 1986)
- *Independence*: 4 July 1776 (from England) = national holiday
- *Constitution*: 17 September 1787, effective 4 March 1789
- *Legal system*: based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
- *Suffrage*: 18 years of age; universal
- *Executive branch*: - chief of state/head of government: President William Jefferson CLINTON; and Vice President Al Albert GORE, (since 20 Jan. 1993); (note – the president is both the chief of state and head of government)
- cabinet: appointed by the president with Senate approval elections: president and vice president elected on the same ticket by representatives who are elected directly from each state; president and vice pres. serve four-year terms; election last held 5 Nov. 1996 (next: 7 Nov. 2000)
- *Legislative branch*: bicameral Congress consists of Senate (100 seats, one-third are renewed every two years; two members are elected from each state by popular vote to serve six-year terms) and House of Representatives (435 seats; members are directly elected by popular vote to serve two-year terms)
- *Judicial branch*: Supreme Court, justices are appointed for life by the president with confirmation by the Senate
- *Political parties and leaders*: Republican Party, Jim NICHOLSON, national committee chairman; Democratic Party, Steve GROSSMAN, national committee chairman; several other groups or parties of minor political significance.
- *International organization participation*: AfDB, AG (observer), ANZUS, APEC, AsDB, Australia Group, BIS, CCC, CE (observer), CP, EBRD, ECE, ECLAC, ESCAP, FAO, G- 2, G- 5, G- 7, G- 8, G-10, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICTU, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRC, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, MINURSO, MTCR, NACC, NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS, OECD, OSCE, PCA, SPC, UN, UN Security Council, UNCTAD, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNMIH, UNOMIG, UNPREDEP, UNRWA, UNTAES, UNTSO, UNU, UPU, WCL, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, WTrO, ZC
- *Flag description*: 13 equal horizontal stripes of red (top and bottom) alternating with white; there is a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing 50 small white five-pointed stars arranged in nine offset horizontal rows of six stars (top and bottom) alternating with rows of five stars; the 50 stars represent the 50 states, the 13 stripes represent the 13 original colonies; known as Old Glory; the design and colors have been the basis for a number of other flags including Chile, Liberia, Malaysia, and Puerto Rico

ECONOMY

- *Overview*: The US has the most powerful, diverse, and technologically advanced economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of \$28,600, the largest among major industrial nations. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the decisions, and government buys needed goods and services predominantly in the private marketplace. US business firms enjoy considerably greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, lay off surplus workers, and develop new products. At the same time, they face higher barriers to entry in their rivals' home markets than the barriers to entry of foreign firms in US markets. In all economic sectors, US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers, and medical, aerospace, and military equipment, although their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II. The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a "two-tier labor market" in which those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and more, fail to get pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. The years 1994-96 witnessed moderate gains in real output, low inflation rates, and a drop in unemployment below 6%. Long-term problems include inadequate investment in economic infrastructure, rapidly rising medical costs of an aging population, sizable budget and trade deficits, and stagnation of family income in the lower economic groups. The outlook for 1997 is for continued moderate growth, low inflation, and about the same level of unemployment.
- *GDP*: purchasing power parity - \$7.61 trillion (1996 est.)
- *GDP - real growth rate*: 2.4% (1996 est.)
- *GDP - per capita*: purchasing power parity - \$28,600 (1996 est.)
- *GDP - by sector*: - agriculture: 2%
- industry: 23%
- services: 75% (1996 est.)

- *Inflation rate - consumer price index*: 3% (1996 est.)
- *Labor force*: - total: 133.943 million (includes unemployed) (1996)
- by occupation: managerial/professional 28.8%, technical/sales/administrative support 29.7%, services 13.6%, manufacturing/mining/transportation/crafts 25.1%, farming/forestry/fishing 2.8%
- *Unemployment rate*: 5.4% (1996)
- *Budget*: revenues: \$1.351 trillion; expenditures: \$1.514 trillion, including capital expenditures of \$NA (1995)
- *Industries*: world's leading industrial power, highly diversified/technologically advanced; petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, electronics, food processing, consumer goods, lumber, mining
- *Industrial production growth rate*: 3.1% (1996)
- *Electricity - capacity*: 702.7 million kW (1995)
- *Electricity - production*: 3.5357 trillion kWh (1995)
- *Electricity - consumption per capita*: 11,636 kWh (1994 est.)
- *Agriculture*: wheat, grains, corn, fruits, vegetables, cotton; beef, pork, poultry, dairy products; forest products; fish
- *Exports*: - total value: \$584.7 billion (f.o.b., 1995)
- commodities: capital goods, automobiles, industrial supplies/raw materials, consumer and agricultural goods
- partners: Canada 22%, Western Europe 21%, Japan 11%, Mexico 8% (1995)
- *Imports*: - total value: \$771 billion (c.i.f., 1995)
- commodities: crude oil/refined petroleum products, machinery, automobiles, consumer goods, industrial raw materials, food and beverages
- partners: Canada, 20%, Western Europe 18%, Japan 16.5%, Mexico 8% (1995)
- *Debt - external*: \$862 billion (1995 est.)
- *Economic aid*: donor: ODA, \$9.721 billion (1993)
- *Currency*: 1 United States dollar (US\$) = 100 cents
- *Fiscal year*: 1 October - 30 September
- *Military expenditures - percent of GDP*: 3.4% (1997 est.)

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

- *Disputes - international*: maritime boundary disputes with Canada (Dixon Entrance, Beaufort Sea, Strait of Juan de Fuca, Machias Seal Island); US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay is leased from Cuba and only mutual agreement or US abandonment of the area can terminate the lease; Haiti claims Navassa Island; US has made no territorial claim in Antarctica (but has reserved the right to do so) and does not recognize the claims of any other nation; Republic of Marshall Islands claims Wake Island
- *Illicit drugs*: consumer of cocaine shipped from Colombia through Mexico and the Caribbean, of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines from Mexico and of Southeast Asian heroin; illicit producer of cannabis, marijuana, depressants, stimulants, hallucinogens, and methamphetamines; drug money-laundering center

Canada

GEOGRAPHY (note: second-largest country in world after Russia; strategic location between Russia and US via north polar route; nearly 90% of the population is concentrated within 161 km of the US/Canada border)

- *Location*: Northern North America, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and North Pacific Ocean, north of the conterminous US
- *Geographic coordinates*: 60 00 N, 95 00 W
- *Area*: - total: 9,976,140 sq km
- land: 9,220,970 sq km
- water: 755,170 sq km
- *Area - comparative*: slightly larger than US
- *Land boundaries*: - total: 8,893 km
- border countries: US 8,893 km (includes 2,477 km with Alaska)
- *Coastline*: 243,791 km
- *Maritime claims*: - continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin
- exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm
- territorial sea: 12 nm
- *Climate*: varies from temperate in south to subarctic and arctic in north
- *Terrain*: mostly plains with mountains in west and lowlands in southeast
- *Elevation extremes*: lowest point: Atlantic Ocean 0 m; highest point: Mount Logan 5,950 m
- *Natural resources*: nickel, zinc, copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, potash, silver, fish, timber, wildlife, petroleum, natural gas, coal
- *Land use*: - arable land: 5%
- permanent pastures: 3%
- forests and woodland: 54%
- other: 38% (1993 est.)
- *Irrigated land*: 7,100 sq km (1993 est.)
- *Natural hazards*: continuous permafrost in north is a serious obstacle to development; cyclonic storms form east of the Rocky Mountains, a result of the mixing of air masses from the Arctic, Pacific, and North American interior, and produce most of the country's rain and snow
- *Environment - current issues*: air pollution and resulting acid rain severely affecting lakes and damaging forests; metal smelting, coal-burning utilities, and vehicle emissions impacting on agricultural and forest productivity; ocean waters becoming contaminated due to agricultural, industrial, mining, and forestry activities

PEOPLE

- *Population*: 30,337,334 (July 1997 est.)
- *Age structure*:
 - 0-14 years: 20% (male 3,101,968; female 2,957,927)
 - 15-64 years: 68% (male 10,333,085; female 10,201,996)
 - 65 years and over: 12% (male 1,583,643; female 2,158,715) (July 1997 est.)
- *Population growth rate*: 1.13% (1997 est.)
- *Birth rate*: 12.4 births/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Death rate*: 7.23 deaths/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Net migration rate*: 6.1 migrant(s)/1,000 population (1997 est.)
- *Sex ratio*:
 - at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
 - under 15 years: 1.05 male(s)/female
 - 15-64 years: 1.01 male(s)/female
 - 65 years and over: 0.73 male(s)/female
 - total population : 0.98 male(s)/female (1997 est.)
- *Infant mortality rate*: 5.7 deaths/1,000 live births (1997 est.)
- *Life expectancy at birth*: total population: 78.96 years (male: 75.61 years; female: 82.48 years - 1997 est.)
- *Total fertility rate*: 1.66 children born/woman (1997 est.)
- *Nationality*: noun: Canadian(s) - adjective: Canadian
- *Ethnic groups*: British Isles origin 40%, French origin 27%, other European 20%, Amerindian 1.5%, other, mostly Asian 11.5%
- *Religions*: Roman Catholic 45%, United Church 12%, Anglican 8%, other 35% (1991)
- *Languages*: English (official), French (official)
- *Literacy* (age 15 and over can read and write): 97% (1986 est.)

GOVERNMENT

- *Country name*:
 - conventional long form : none
 - conventional short form: Canada
- *Government type*: confederation with parliamentary democracy
- *National capital*: Ottawa
- *Administrative divisions*: 10 provinces and 2 territories*; Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Northwest Territories*, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan, Yukon Territory* (note: the Northwest Territories will be split in two as of April 1999; the eastern section will be renamed Nunavut, the west is as yet unnamed)
- *Independence*: 1 July 1867 (from UK) = national holiday
- *Constitution*: 17 April 1982 (Constitution Act); originally, the machinery of the government was set up in the British North America Act of 1867; charter of rights and unwritten customs
- *Legal system*: based on English common law, except in Quebec, where civil law system based on French law prevails; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
- *Suffrage*: 18 years of age; universal
- *Executive branch*:
 - chief of state: Queen ELIZABETH II of the UK (since 6 Feb. 1952), represented by Governor General Romeo LeBLANC (since 8 Feb. 1995)
 - head of government: Prime Minister Jean CHRETIEN (since 4 Nov. 1993)
 - cabinet : Federal Ministry chosen by the prime minister from among the members of his own party; the queen is a hereditary monarch; governor general appointed by the queen on the advice of the prime minister; following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party in the House of Commons is automatically designated by the governor general to become prime minister
- *Legislative branch*: bicameral Parliament or Parlement consists of the Senate or Senat (members are appointed to serve until reaching 75 years by the governor general and selected on the advice of the prime minister; normal limit: 104 senators) and the House of Commons or Chambre des Communes (295 seats; will rise to 301 after next election; members elected by direct popular vote to serve five-year terms)
- *Judicial branch*: Supreme Court, judges are appointed by the prime minister through the governor general
- *Political parties and leaders*: Liberal Party [Jean CHRETIEN]; Bloc Quebecois [Michel GAUTHIER (until March 1997)]; Reform Party [Preston MANNING]; New Democratic Party [Alexa MCDONOUGH]; Progressive Conservative Party [Jean CHAREST]
- *International organization participation*: ACCT, AfDB, AG (observer), APEC, AsDB, Australia Group, BIS, C, CCC, CDB (non-regional), CE (observer), EBRD, ECE, ECLAC, ESA (cooperating state), FAO, G- 7, G- 8, G-10, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IEA, IFAD, IFC, IFRC, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, MTCR, NACC, NAM (guest), NATO, NEA, NSG, OAS, OECD, OSCE, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNDOF, UNESCO, UNFICYP, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNMOP, UNPREDEP, UNTSO, UNU, UPU, WCL, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTrO, ZC
- *Flag description*: three vertical bands of red (hoist side), white (double width, square), and red with a red maple leaf centered in the white band

ECONOMY

- *Overview*: As an affluent, high-tech industrial society, Canada today closely resembles the US in per capita output, market-oriented economic system, and pattern of production. Since World War II, the growth of the mining, manufacturing, and service sectors has transformed the nation from a rural economy into one industrial and urban. Canada started the 1990s in recession, and real growth rates averaged only 1.1% so far. Because of slower growth, Canada still faces high unemployment - especially in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces - and a large public sector debt. But with its great natural resources, skilled labor force, and modern capital plant, Canada will

has good economic future prospects. The continuing constitutional impasse between English- and French-speaking areas is raising the possibility of a split in the confederation, making foreign investors somewhat edgy.

- *GDP*: purchasing power parity - \$721 billion (1996 est.)
- *GDP - real growth rate*: 1.4% (1996 est.)
- *GDP - per capita*: purchasing power parity - \$25,000 (1996 est.)
- *GDP - by sector*: - agriculture: 3%
- industry: 31%
- services : 66% (1996)
- *Inflation rate - consumer price index*: 1.4% (1996)
- *Labor force*: - total: 15.1 million (1996)
- by occupation : services 74%, manufacturing 15%, agriculture 3%, construction 5%, other 3% (1994)
- *Unemployment rate*: 9.7% (December 1996)
- *Budget*: revenues: \$94.3 billion; expenditures: \$115.2 billion, incl. capital expenditures of \$1.7 billion (1995/96 est.)
- *Industries*: processed/unprocessed minerals, food products, wood/paper products, transportation equipment, fish products, chemicals, petroleum and natural gas
- *Industrial production growth rate*: 1.3% (1996)
- *Electricity - capacity*: 113.65 million kW (1994)
- *Electricity - production*: 547.9 billion kWh (1995)
- *Electricity - consumption per capita*: 16,137 kWh (1995 est.)
- *Agriculture - products*: wheat, barley, oilseed, tobacco, fruits, vegetables; dairy products; forest products; commercial fisheries provide annual catch of 1.5 million metric tons, of which 75% is exported
- *Exports*: - total value: \$195.4 billion (f.o.b., 1996 est.)
- commodities : newsprint, wood pulp, timber, crude petroleum, machinery, natural gas, aluminum, motor vehicles and parts; telecommunications equipment
- partners: US, Japan, UK, Germany, South Korea, Netherlands, China
- *Imports*: - total value: \$169.5 billion (c.i.f., 1996 est.)
- commodities: crude oil, chemicals, motor vehicles and parts, durable consumer goods, electronic computers; telecommunications equipment and parts
- partners: US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, Mexico, Taiwan, South Korea
- *Debt - external*: \$253 billion (1996)
- *Economic aid*: donor: ODA, \$1.6 billion (1995) (note : ODA and OOF commitments, \$10.1 billion, 1986-91)
- *Currency*: 1 Canadian dollar (Can\$) = 100 cents
- *Fiscal year*: 1 April - 31 March
- *Military expenditures - percent of GDP*: 1.6% (1995/96)

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

- *Disputes - international*: maritime boundary disputes with the US (Dixon Entrance, Beaufort Sea, Strait of Juan de Fuca, Machias Seal Island); Saint Pierre and Miquelon is focus of maritime boundary dispute between Canada and France; in 1992 an arbitration panel awarded the islands an exclusive economic zone area of 12,348 sq km to settle the dispute
- *Illicit drugs*: illicit producer of cannabis for the domestic drug market; use of hydroponics technology permits growers to plant large quantities of high-quality marijuana indoors; growing role as a transit point for heroin and cocaine entering the US market

APPENDIX F:
MAPS

